Social Identity and the European Community
An Iberian Example

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ABSTRACT This article analyzes the interrelationship between the rationalization of the Galician fishing sector—animated and implemented by the European Community (EC)—and construction of social identities within a fishing community. Specifically, the construction of occupational and national identity informed the trajectory of Spain’s negotiations for admission to the EC. The account illustrates that processes of identity formation in these fishing communities have been redefined by Spain’s participation in the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy. Inclusion within the EC, by recontextualizing the concepts and practices of local fishermen, has redefined the conditions for the construction of subjects and subjectivity. The argument is absorption into the EC reconfigures the basic set of relations shaping collective self-definition and thus what it is to be a fishermen.

When I am fishing, I complain incessantly and cannot wait to go home; when I am home for no more than a week I cannot wait for the next voyage. (A crewman.)

The objective of this article is to describe and explore the interrelationship between the rationalization of the Galician fishing sector—animated and implemented by the European Community (EC)—and construction of social identities within a fishing community. The critical focus is on how the construction of occupational and national identity informed the trajectory of Spain’s negotiations for admission to the EC. The account documents how the processes of identity formation in the fishing communities along the ria de Vigo both fundamentally influenced, and have been transformed by, Spain’s participation in the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy. Inclusion within the EC, by recontextualizing the concepts and practices of local fishermen, has redefined the conditions for the construction of subjects and subjectivity. The argument is absorption into the EC reconfigures the basic set of relations shaping collective self-definition and thus what it is to be a fishermen.

To live facing the sea is equally a description of community. It means that whatever occurs, without question, is shaped by the presence of the sea and of fishermen. The shopkeepers open their bars and stores at 6am because that is when the sardineros return from their early morning venture. Situated on an inlet along the ria de Vigo, the dock and adjoining park with its paseo (i.e., the promenade where local people present themselves publicly) are the central features around which the town of Aldan is geographically organized. Whether a person is a fishermen or waiter, a builder or a baker, it is the sea which defines time and space and labor. The presentation of food at important occasions, such as weddings and baptisms, features heaping plates of shellfish (e.g., scallops, oysters, shrimp) followed by valued varieties of fish (e.g., hake). On the liturgical calendar, the major fiestas celebrate fishermen and specifically beseech the powers of the Lord to safeguard them.

And, it is on these terms that the people of Aldan, Cangas, Moana and other fishing communities contrast themselves with ‘those who live with their backs to the sea.’ For the fishing villages, being integrated into the European Community involves more than a change in the objective structure of the fisheries, it involves a transformation in subjectivity. It transforms the way people see themselves as part of a ‘community,’ both immediate and imagined. In 1986, the captain of a medium-sized trawler, a man in his late 50’s, put it this way: ‘when we enter the Community, this will no longer be Aldan [as I have known it], it will be one of a thousand fishing towns along the coast of Europe.’

Since we are dealing with the relationship between structures of different design and magnitude, the analysis must of necessity move back and forth between, and attempt to connect, these levels. The account begins by describing the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and the ‘nationalist’ issues inherent in its actualization. The account then shifts gears and delineates the structure of the Galician fishing fleet in and around the main port city of Vigo, Spain’s largest and most productive fisheries port located on its rocky northwest Atlantic coast (Map 1). The ethnography sets out the processes of the making of occupational and regional identity in these fishing communities, particularly the community of Aldan where I conducted fieldwork for some two years. The account then returns to the field of inter-nation affairs and describes Spain’s prolonged negotiations for admission into the EC. My focus is on how the character of collective identity inflected the trajectory and outcome of the negotiations. Central to an understanding is the turbulent and contradictory relationship between that form of international capitalism intrinsic to the charter of the European Community and the construction of specific collective identities. This contradiction, though general, is most palpable and powerful in the field of primary industries, such as fisheries, and in the symbolic embodiments of nationhood, such as national language and currency. It is the first of these that constitutes the subject of this analysis.

The Common Fishery Policy

On 25 January 1983, the European Community, then composed of ten member states, ratified a common fisheries policy. The main and official purpose was to establish community wide rules, plus an enforcement mechanism, in order to manage fishery
stocks that observe no national boundaries. A parallel reason was to create an instrument for exercising control over community waters given the spread of 200 mile exclusive fishery zones (Farnell and Ellis 1984:1-16). The Community’s common policy has five dimensions:

1. the ‘rational’ management of resources;
2. fair distribution of catches, paying special attention to the needs of traditional regions highly dependent on fishing;
3. effective controls on the conditions applying (e.g. state subsidies) to fisheries;
4. adoption of measures to oversee the capacity, design, and operations of the fishing fleet;
5. fisheries agreements with third countries such as the US.

Beneath the technical and legal reasons for such common cause was a more fundamental set of ambitions that would bring national culture, international capitalism, and the concept of a European Community into conflict. The terms of conflict and the nature of the contradiction were inscribed in the original plan. Consider, for instance, that ‘rational’ management is precisely what is not needed if the Community aim is to support those regions that have historically depended on fishing. What is rational and fair from a formal economic or biological perspective may be irrational and unfair from the standpoint of local fishing communities. They do not accept the fact that excess capacity in relation to available resources (as determined by some bio-economic model) automatically requires that some owners and crewmen be denied the right to make a living. Indeed, while the CFP assumes that ‘rational’ does not entail special clarification (because it is the unmediated result of the bioeconomic assessment), just what is ‘rational,’ and what constitutes rational fisheries management, would become a bone of contention throughout the negotiations and into the future.

The industrialization of some sectors of the fishery coupled with the small scale, producer-owner attributes of other sectors created a twofold problem. First, starting in 1968, the catches of EC members began to stagnate or even decline ‘largely because investments during the boom [1956-65] pushed productivity to such a point that stocks had insufficient time to regenerate and some of the most common species became seriously depleted’ (European Documentation 1985:12). The industrialized sectors soon reached the point of overcapacity. In addition, worldwide acceptance of the Law of the Sea often led to the exclusion of this industrial fleet from third nation waters (esp. Canada). Second, the small scale middle-distance and inshore producers had a difficult time competing with the industrial sector for capital, labor, markets, etc. The effect was indirect but exceptionally powerful and the result was an evisceration of the small fishing and agricultural towns – towns that were understood by the French, Italians, Scots, Greeks and others, including the Spanish and Portuguese who were standing in the wings, to be inseparable from the embodiment and reproduction of the regional and national cultures. This is not to say that small capital always perished (See, for example, the work of Durrenberger and Pâsson 1987, Apostle and Barrett 1992, Hoefnagel 1991, and Gonzalez Laxe 1983), only that in many cases it was progressively marginalized and subject to economic forces that it could neither understand nor control.

The two convergent sets of problems led to the invitation for the Community’s administration to formulate common policy. From the standpoint of the Eurocrats, who envision a united states of Europe in which all of the countries and cultures pull together, the common policy was an awaited opportunity to institutionalize and extend their authority and influence. To implement a common policy entails substantial coordination between the fisheries of each nation, and between those of different nations. To do this, the EC administration has attempted to formalize and rationalize, and sometimes standardize, local institutions and practices. So the implementation document for the CFP explicitly calls for the establishment of institutions (e.g. producer’s organization, PO), procedures (e.g. pricing guidelines), and policies (e.g. quotas) that are uniform throughout the member nations (with the partial exception of Greece).

Institutionally, the EC segments fishing into three formally distinct divisions: Structures, Treaties and Quotas, and Markets. Structures organizes the construction and retirement of vessels; Treaties and Quotas defines fishing operations and makes accords with third countries; and Markets regulates the sale of products. The Fishery Directorate has a powerful set of tools to formalize and rationalize the fisheries. These range from the setting of fish quotas to financial incentives that encourage building certain types of vessels and scrapping others. Nonetheless, making and implementing a Common Fishery Plan (CFP) has been a non-stop and yearly confrontation, pitting the EC bureaucracy against the member states. This conflict between the EC bureaucracy and the member states is characterized (e.g. in various newsletters that report on the EC) as a clash between ambitious, overweening, but also inept and insensitive, Eurocrats versus self-interested and self-serving member states. This is only the surface form of a deeper contradiction that the inclusion of Spain, with its large and diversified fleet, is exacerbating.

In Galicia and Euzkadi (Basque), as in many other regions of Europe (e.g. Britain), national and ethnic identity have become attached to primary industries, such as fishing but also farming and winemaking. The reason is that labor in its full capitalist form has not totally replaced kinship and community as the means of organizing production. There, the cultural and institutional homogeneity fostered by capitalism is still held at arms length. Ethnic and regional identities which are founded on the logic of differentiation can be articulated precisely because the sectors have not been rationalized and formalized. For example, Euzkadi forms of work organizations, recruitment, patterns of ownership, notions of fishing, participation in industry organizations, and so forth, are rather different from those that exist in Galicia, Pais Vasco, or other areas of Iberia (e.g. Portugal, Cole 1991). This recognized differentiation, possible because the indigenous community still shapes the relations of production, is the basis of specific collective identities. Politically, strong forms of social identity run against the model of civil society – based on individual competition, rights, and freedoms – that underlies the Community’s view of political economy. What this means is that the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy has the effect of replacing the manifold forms of collective identity, such as regional nationalism, with capitalism, where the formalizing and rationalizing of industry generates social homogeneity, hence to forge a unified Europe. What may be rational for the industrial fisheries will effectively subvert the regional and occupational identities that define – and Davis (1991:11) would argue help to humanizing – its nonindustrial counterpart.

The critical point is that this view of political economy and civil society – inscribed as presuppositions in the EC ‘model’ of the rational fisheries – has little room for a notion of community or for collective, as against individual, identities. This will be most
problematic in those fields, such as fishing and farming, where occupational, ethnic, and regional identities are connected, powerful and enduring. For the EC, this has meant slow progress and conflict in creating common policy because the policy itself has two contradictory purposes: first, to create a united Europe through a unified policy; and second, to reproduce the community and familial based primary sectors which underwrite occupational, regional and national identities. It is not possible for the EC to rationalize and formalize the fishing sector and also conform to the interests of the member states in maintaining the ethnic, regional, and occupational identities inscribed in their primary sectors. Fishing, because it involves Galician boats manned by kin and community members, is an objectification and inculcation of these social identities. Hence, during Spain's negotiations for admission into the European Community, fisheries was a forum for evaluating and redefining political relations between Madrid and the provinces, specially Galicia and the Euzkadi area. They assumed that the extent to which Madrid was willing to negotiate hard to defend their coastal fleet was an index of the degree to which it supported Galician and Euzkadi regional identities. It is no accident then that the agreement on fisheries was the last and combative chapter of the negotiations. A Spanish negotiator and Galician cogently put it this way:

It is easier to negotiate petrochemicals where billions of pesetas are at stake than it is to reach an agreement on a few million pesetas worth of megrim or hake. When we deal with the petrochemicals, it is business and people will be rational; when we deal with the fish, the business part is drowned by everything else. When a man owns one boat, and works with his lifelong friends and relatives, when he has fished every day of his life and it is how he supports his family, he cannot understand that it is not 'rational' for him to fish. He will always find a way; he will continue to fish until he can no longer pay for the gasoil.

The diplomat is saying that given the structure of ownership and labor within the small and medium capital fisheries, being a fisherman is not a job (i.e. labor is not fungible) but an occupation and mode of labor which is inseparably tied to a person's identity. A fisherman's self-image, his presentation of self in the public arena, the resources that he uses to define his place in the community, his kin relations and village friends, and the trajectory of his family are intrinsically bound to fishing. It is this network of relations and meanings, determined by life in the fisheries, which defines the ground in terms of which people construct their subjectivity. The diplomat is calling attention also to the fact that because of the structure of the fisheries, and people's inculcated personal commitment to their fellow crew members, boatowners have a significant capacity to cut operating expenses. To understand why this is the case it is necessary to examine the structure of the Vigo-area fleet.

The Structure of the Vigo-area Fleet

The fishing industry of the Vigo region is neither a unified endeavor nor a single fishery. It can best be conceptualized as the organization of marine and socio-economic space. Within the Vigo fishery, there are three recognized fleets which correspond to forms of technology, means of commercialization, and concepts of labor. There is, for of all, a gran altura or distant water fleet comprised almost entirely of large freezer trawlers (built at nearby shipyards). The freezer-trawlers are broken down into fisheries, two of the most notable being the hake and cephalopod producers. The gran altura fleet is capital intensive, increasingly unionized, and technologically driven - the vessels ranging in size from 300 to 1000 tons. Around six thousand crewmen work on the long distance trawlers, spending from one to three months at a time at sea. While most boatowners are from the indigenous community, and have previously owned and worked on smaller boats, 'outside' socios or financial partners are increasingly accepted.

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A seiner in the Aldan harbor

The village of Bueu

A seiner in the Aldan harbor

The lighthouse at the end of the ria de Vigo (Donon)
The second fleet is the altura or high water fleet. This is exclusively a ‘fresh fish’ fleet that sells its product to local merchants and to the Madrid market via a network of fish vendors. The altura fleet employs a variety of technologies—ranging from side and stern trawlers to longliners and seiners. The fleet is organized into three fisheries: the vessels that fish the narrow continental shelf off of Portugal, those that ply the waters off the Western Sahara, southern Morocco, and also ‘Gran Sol’ boats that work the rich seas near Ireland and England. These vessels aim for species such as hake and monkfish that are highly prized and lucrative in Spain (the most robust fish market in Europe by absolute and per capita consumption). Many of these boatowners, in contrast to those of the gran altura, practice ‘minimal input management’—meaning that most monitor their operation by simply seeking to spend as little as possible (on repairs, gear, etc.). However, the organizational, administrative, and capital demands of this fleet have been increasing markedly in recent years, and boatowners now generally acknowledge that owners who are willing to moderate their strategies will be truly successful. The impetus for this transformation comes from two sources. First, some of those boatowners who graduated to freezer trawlers have retained their altura boats. Second, EC fishing regulations place more emphasis on productive efficiency by forcing owners to share licenses and thus shortening the time any one owner is permitted in EC waters. Still, an overwhelming majority of boats have a single owner and most owners have only one boat. No matter who owns the boat the crew is related and recruited on the basis of kin or community ties. There are approximately sixty boatowners and a thousand crewmen, almost all of whom are lifetime participants and know each other personally.

Finally, there is the bajura or littoral fleet, mostly made up of hundreds of near shore, small-scale, fishing ventures that resemble those in other parts of Iberia (e.g. Barandiaran Irizar 1981 (Pais Vasco), Alegret 1987 (Catalonia), Melzoff and LiPuma 1986 (Andalucia)). These vessels work the waters off of Galicia and northern Portugal, using a wide and changing variety of gear types and fishing for whatever species are available. The boats are invariably skippered by their owner; the crewmen are composed of kinsmen and friends; and, part of the day’s catch is marketed by local women. Though their products have for a long time been sold as commodities in Vigo, the organization of work, the means of production, and the control over production have historically rested in community hands. Rather than earning a standard wage, crewmen receive fish, a share of the net value of the catch, and a variety of additional payments that depend on their individual circumstances (e.g. their wife had a baby). There is no precise tabulation of earnings, crewmen relying on their ‘sense’ of what is fair and right given the results of a particular fishing trip or marea. The auction and marketing of fresh fish has been done ‘traditionally’ by the local cofradia, the fishing fraternity or brotherhood of boatowners, crewmen, and fresh fish sellers. The extension of maritime jurisdictions and the advent of the EC have had an especially dramatic imprint on the bajura fleet, not least because several of its traditional fishing grounds now lie within Portuguese territorial waters, and because the internal structure of the cofradia has no place in the EC concept of what a fishery is and how it should operate.

The most telling change in the Galician fisheries has been the formation of boatowner associations, beginning in 1977 following restoration of Spanish democracy (See LiPuma in press for a more complete account). Since that time, all of the fisheries, right down to the small-scale, kinship-based sardine fleet have formed boatowner associations. There are now eight associations in the Vigo-area, all under the auspices and umbrella of the Vigo-based institute, Cooperativa de Armadores de Pesca del Puerto de Vigo (ARVI). The purpose of this structure in which associations are embedded within a cooperative is to produce the advantages of an organization in which the members cooperate and the interests of the various associations can be coordinated (by ARVI management) with the familiar and community structure that defines fishermen and the fishing sector. In other words, these associations have two tiers: one that preserves and encourages individual/familial ownership and operation, and another that promotes the interests of fishermen in national and international arenas, such as those involving the European Community.

**Fisheries and Forms of Identity**

To be a fisherman is, for Galicians, a specific and powerful form of identity. On the local account, the identity is specific because fishing is thought to instill a distinctive, recognizable type of personality; it is powerful because this form of identity is thought to have salience across a wide range of contexts, from the way fishermen treat their children to the type of houses that they construct. The distinctiveness of fishing and its separation from other forms of work arise from cultural concepts that define the fishing trip, or marea, as the simultaneous production of mutually sustaining social and material relations.

For a Spanish crew, family members and friends fish together, while fishing together imbues these structural relationships with practical force. The unity and solidarity of the crew exists by virtue of transcending and masking differences among factions and between individuals. The fishing practices define the sharing of space, tasks, food, and danger, as the terms for the construction of the group. The inevitable tensions that arise from working in the confined quarters of the boat under stressful conditions produce not only verbal and sometimes physical fights but the social bonds that unify a crew. Fishermen underline the point when they explain how sharing food or working side by side in rough weather engenders a mutual indebtedness and camaraderie that can never be acquired on land. Less obvious to fishermen and analysts alike is that crewmen share a common set of dispositions, including social agreement not to publicly acknowledge certain dispositions. For example, that fishermen know and experience common dangers at sea, yet assent within the silent complicity of practice not to openly acknowledge fear, elevates that physical reality of danger into a principle of identity formation. True fishermen do not show fear of the sea and not showing fear is an index of being a true fisherman. There is, in different words, a dialogue between public and private images of the self. These images are mediated by, and defined in terms of, the concepts and practice of fishing. In this way the labor of fishing is simultaneously and powerfully the construction of a specific kind of self.

The senses of the fishermen—his ability to grasp clues given by the seascape—is a cultural product reproduced only by working at sea. Fishermen can identify the important features from among the innumerable sea signs by referring unconsciously to the universe of possible clues. They can evaluate the familiar faces of the sea—the colors of the water, the orientation of the currents and wind, the presence of various
kinds of seabirds — without ever being able to state explicitly the criteria for their evaluation. Such practical interpretation is linked to the autonomy of fishing because it requires, indeed is inseparable from, special cultural competence earned only through experience at sea.

A key element of the fishermen's identity is the competition between boats working out of the same port, especially those that chase the same species. Fishermen state emphatically that every fishery possesses fish and that they will inevitably be found and caught by a skilful patron de pesca (fishing captain). The only thing that prevents this is if the fish have already been captured and locked in the holds of competing boats. The social result is a game of recognition and status whose yardstick is the quantity, quality, and species of fish brought to dock. Fishermen are thus partly defined by this sense of mutual and measurable competition.

But perhaps nothing characterizes the Spanish fisherman more than his movements. There is perpetual rotation between the all-male, physically trying, emotionally intense, and often dangerous sealife and the family and community routines onshore (e.g. going to a neighborhood bar). This is nothing less than an oscillation between two distinctive forms of familial life, each with its own characteristics, rewards, and opportunities. The young wife of a crewman explains: 'fishermen farm, they make wine, but what sets fishermen apart is that once fishing is in their blood, they must always return to the sea' (Juanita 1983). Underlying these forms of familial life is the notion that each is enriched by absence — a man can better appreciate his wife and family after a period of separation and longing. Almost all crewmen carry a photograph of their wife flanked by their children; it is not a family portrait (the crewman himself is never included) but an objectification of family life, a reason and reward for enduring the hard conditions at sea, and an icon of their desire to return home (Zulaika 1981: 35-41). Such enrichment by absence flows in the other direction as well, and thus after several weeks of familial life, fishermen long to return to sea again. Thus it is that each voyage outward to sea engenders an overpowering longing to return home, and each homcoming and return to familial lifeways energizes the upcoming marea. The oscillation is embodied as a permanent predisposition in the fishing community and an index of identity that is reproduced with each trip. It is also inscribed at another level in fishermen's speaking and maintaining silence, in an inclination to concentrate in a waterfront barrio, in the way that they treat their family and define their male relationships (e.g. they often avoid their shipmates while ashore), and in their relatively high rate of endogamy (ranging from nearly 70 percent for the littoral fishermen to 25 percent for the gran altura).

As these rates of marriage endogamy suggest, having a fishing identity is graduated. The identity is understood to be stronger and more deeply ingrained for littoral fishermen who still mostly define themselves and the organization of their boats in terms of kinship and community relations. This identity is thought to be slightly less salient for those who operate in the altura fishery and to move down still another notch for the unionized, formally-contracted, wage labor, job specific, government regulated, fixed hours, gran altura fishery. Observe that in the local conception the salience of the identity is inversely linked to the degree of capitalist and state penetration. It is difficult as one crewman commented, 'for fishermen to be fishermen when we are being taken over by capitalism' (Jorge 1986).

Fisheries and the Development Cycle

The Family of Ramon Pesquera

In 1955, Ramon Pesquera (a pseudonym), the owner of a small sardine boat (20 tons) that fishes the waters off northern Portugal and Galicia, married Elena Vendador, the daughter of a patron de pesca, or fishing boat captain. Soon after the marriage, and with the assistance of his inlaws, Ramon bought a second-hand Gran Sol boat. His younger brother, Martin, took command of the sardine vessel while he worked with his father-in-law fishing the Irish coast. Elena did two types of work (in addition, of course, to managing the house); she farmed a small plot of land (approximately one half hectare which is the characteristic size of farmlands in Aldan) and sold fish both at the local market in Cangas and at the main market in Vigo. She marketed the sardines caught by Martin in conjunction with his wife, and part of the Gran Sol catch (the greater part being sold to middlemen who shipped it mostly to Madrid). In the harsh months when bad weather made it difficult to fish the Irish coast, Ramon would plant grapes that would be used for production of vino verde, the local wine. In the first five years of marriage, they had three children, two sons and a daughter. In 1970, Ramon began the construction of a new house, made of traditional stone on the outside but with a more modern design inside. In that same year, Ramon sold his old Gran Sol boat, and using family capital, had a new vessel built to his own specifications at a boatyard, owned by an Aldan family. The house took about eight years to build; partly because Ramon and his relatives did the greater portion of the work themselves, and in part because he did not need a third story until his daughter married, and moved into the upstairs apartment with her husband, a man who worked with his own
father who owned the nautical supplies store where Ramon had, for a quarter of a century, bought his nets and other equipment. In 1973, Elena's father retired, and her son Juan, who had worked first as a crewman on the sardine boat and then on Ramon's Gran Sol vessel, assumed the role of fishing captain. In 1980, Ramon acquired another small tract of farm land, and in that same year he stopped going to sea, managing his boat from ashore. In 1988, Ramon and Elena retired from fishing and fish marketing to full time farming and winemaking.

Notice that the Ramon Pesquera family is involved in fishing, fish selling, farming, and winemaking. Unlike other communities (e.g. Ireland, Peace 1991), there is no real distinction between farmers and farm families and those who create their living from the sea. The majority of families (72%) involved in fishing are also engaged in either farming, commerce (e.g. working in a dockside tavern), or both. The evidence from Galicia indicates that three forms of occupational composition/alternation characterize small capital. Due to the existence of minifundia—the division of land into progressively smaller plots—and recruitment to the fishery based on kinship, almost everyone has the opportunity to fish and/or farm. This characteristically takes the form of the division of familial labor: women engage in part-time agriculture and marketing; men fish as their primary occupation. The family is a complex productive unit where the occupational identity of men, as fishermen, is intrinsically tied to, and defined against, the women's partial farming identity. The second is a seasonal alternation as when fishermen labor at farming during the winter months. This is specially true of Gran Sol fishermen, the North Atlantic seas so often stormy and turbulent from October through March. Finally, there is the alternation based on the lifecycle of the family, specifically the fact that fishermen retire to be farmers. As a fisherman becomes older and nearer to retirement, most retiring between forty-five and sixty years of age—he goes to sea progressively less frequently and becomes more interested in farming, his grandchildren, and the lifeways of the shoreside. While everyone lives facing the sea fishing is the core identity for such men; their participation in farming in part and product of the oscillation between sea and land, the boat and the house. They are alternately separated and then rejoined in a continuous cycle of production and reproduction over time. These relations of opposition and complementarity between land and sea, fishing and farming, is represented in Chart 1.

As stated earlier, these special and distinctive features of the cycles of fishing production place their stamp on the entire community. But even more than that, people's sense of community, being Galician, and personal identity is intrinsically linked to the fishery. As mediated by the fishing associations and by the government negotiators, these forms of identity were influential in refecting the course of negotiations for accession to the EC.

Spain and the EC Negotiations

For more than a decade, Spain's attempts to enter the EC were turned aside on the grounds that it would be inexcusable to join hands with a totalitarian regime. So just more than a year after the resurrection of democracy (1977), Spain tendered a new, and in its eyes, now unproachable bid for community membership. For its part, the EC had motives for including Spain. Inclusion would secure a Spanish democracy that, particularly in its early moments, was fragile, as the aborted coup in February 1981 amply underlined. Some members of the EC bureaucracy argued that this was the Community's chance to prevent a 'Latin American' pattern: meaning, a political pendulum that swings between limited reform and savage repression. Advocates of a strong European Community also envisioned Spain's accession as the opportunity to solidify and extend the EC's political and geographical authority. There was also a powerful economic incentive. From 1965 to the negotiations, Spain had the fastest growing economy in Europe (Tamames 1985) with particularly vibrant growth in industrial and capital intensive sectors. Numerous business and government interests in member states (especially Germany) argued that Spanish accession would open-up a promising new arena for their capital investment and expansion—a prophecy that has come to pass.

Although there were sound political and economic reasons for admitting Spain, this view was not shared by the primary sectors in the relevant member states. Indeed, the more influential the primary sectors, the more that nation opposed Spanish admission. As a result progress on Spain's petition to join the EC was best measured in angstroms. France foremost, then Italy and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Britain, tried to delay admission. A key reason for this was their fear that Spain's fishing fleet—which was larger than the rest of the Community combined—coupled with Spanish farming, silviculture (i.e., olive oil), and wine-making would endanger their own primary sectors. What was not said was that member nations understood these sectors as the repositories of national and ethnic cultures, imbuing them with a social thus political value far beyond their economic contribution.

In 1977, the EC formally extended its marine jurisdiction to 200 miles and exercised the right to exclude all foreign vessels from what would come to be named the Community Pond. Though the Law of the Sea (LOS) had made provision for the continuance of historical fishing rights, what constituted a traditional presence was abandoned to the discretion of the home nation, rendering such rights useless. The French decided, for example, that the Basque presence in the Bay of Biscay, having only begun during the reign of Charlemagne (800-814), failed to qualify on grounds of historical longevity. Of equal significance, the Irish decreed that the Galician (Gran Sol) fleet was excluded from all fishing grounds within 50 miles of the Irish coast, no matter what history lesson might be cited. To add to the irony, the Spanish were interested in megrim, hake, and monkfish (Port of Vigo records show that these accounted for 67.1% of catches), species that are unmarketable on either Irish or English markets. So it was that starting in 1978 the Spanish were compelled to negotiate with the Community to maintain fishing rights in waters that were, and had historically been, vital to the existence and survival of the fishing communities such as Aldan.

Unlike other nations that were simply expelled from EC waters, the Community agreed to extend 240 licenses to the Spanish fleet, partly out of respect for Spain's petition for membership. From the start, the EC aimed to decrease the Spanish fleet so that it would be entitled to a lower allocation after accession, but not so drastically that the fisheries would sustain permanent damage. As it turned out, licensing agreements would go on for more than a decade. And, real negotiation for Spain's admission to the EC could not begin in earnest until the Community ratified a Common Fisheries Policy—that is, a policy that the large Spanish fleet would have to accept as a condition of accession. From the last quarter of 1978 through 1984, the number of EC licenses
have noted that biologically-based management schemes are inclined to underestimate, ngland. Approximately ten Vigo-area vessels, all in serious financial

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Aldan

gave

were conceded to Spain would decline at approximately 16% per annum, ending up at 106 licenses. In the Vigo area, there were seventy Gran Sol vessels (sixty three of which were in the association), but only twenty-seven licenses. In the town of Aldan, there were sixteen boats and eight licenses.

Apart from their own internal troubles, the chances that the EC and Spain could quickly reach an agreement were slim. For as far as foreign water fishing was concerned, the EC and Spain had responded very differently to the Law of the Sea. Early on, the Community decided that foreign water fishing was doomed and that it would be more profitable to consolidate resources in its home waters. The decision was enshrined in professional forecasts as well as official pronouncements. By contrast, the Spanish fleet had decided to make the best of the extension of maritime jurisdictions by forging treaties, joint ventures, and by discovering new fishing grounds outside the 200 mile limit. Namibia became, for example, a source of hake and a flounder fishery was founded outside of the Canadian 200 mile zone.11 Such treaties and joint ventures were created through the initiative of the associations rather than Madrid. The Spanish pressed on with fishing because their fleet was made up of family owned boats from villages like Aldan where fishing was a way of life and a social economy, less an economic investment. For example, in the Gran Sol fleet, 85% of the companies in ARPOSOl, its association, have only one boat (ARPOSOl 1985), and more than 90% of the crew on any vessel were born within walking distance of one another. Community position and individual identity, senses of well-being, duty, life-cycle, and personal reward were all bound up with fishing. The peoples of the ria de Vigo had no alternative; either they gave up their social identity and also suffered economically or they found new ways to continue fishing. In the words of boatowners, captains, and crewmen, they had no choice because fishing was their way of life (as opposed to simply an occupation/business). So contrary to all but their own predictions, Galician boatowners have fared well since the 200 mile limit was declared. Fish catches, after falling by approximately 15% the first two years, have rebounded so that they now exceed pre-Law of the Sea levels.

Because of the original decision to consolidate resources in its own territorial waters, the essential basis of the CFP would have to be conservation through the rational, meaning biological, management of marine resources and the restructuring (mainly the reduction) of the Community fleet. The EC Commission focused on how to achieve these objectives rather than on why they might be necessary or what alternatives might exist (e.g. quotas were the only conservation measure considered).32 From the start, the EC Commission acquired the practice of jumping immediately from the biological assessment of total allowable catch (TAC) for a given species to a method of implementation, without taking account of the social, economic, and cultural impact of a decision to limit fishing. McGuire (1991), McGoodwin (1990), Pásson (1991) among others have noted that biologically-based management schemes are inclined to underestimate, misrecognize, and overlook the social and cultural. Sinclair (1990) points out that when a management strategy is imposed on a fishery-dependent community, fisheries policy necessarily turns into a social policy that is unintended and often misguided. Although the CFP assumes that it can treat even the smallest fishery like any other expression or sector of capitalist production, this viewpoint was (is) barely acceptable to member states, and was rejected outright by Spanish fishermen and their associations. These associations, the regional media, provincial politicians, and indirectly secessionist

movements such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (more commonly known as ETA (See, Clark 1984)), in turn, placed considerable, continuing pressure on the Spanish government to defend and maintain the regional fisheries.

In a city-wide labor strike aimed at protesting the ‘failure’ of the government to support ailing shipyards in Vigo, the pamphlet (1982) written by strike leaders accuses the Socialist regime of discriminating against Galicia by turning its back on the plight of the boatbuilders and regional fisheries.

From the perspective of Gran Sol boatowners and crewmen, the EC demand for a drastic reduction in licenses was irrational and incomprehensible. From association meetings to conversations at the local bars, people asked why the EC would reduce licenses at a time when the fish were plentiful and people still struggling to deal with the effects of the LOS. The Community’s answer was that no biological assessment had been done for hake and other species of interest to Spain, the reduction in licenses and thus catch was simply a wise precautionary measure against depleting these stocks (Lopez Veiga et al. 1988:110). At a village level, people were bewildered that, in their words, the Community would show more interest in safeguarding the fish then it did in helping fishermen and their families. Their practical categories of thought and action did not allow for any situation in which fish were more important than community. In fact, given the logic of community, only two explanations were conceivable: those who ran the EC were irrational and out of touch with the reality of fishing (not fishermen knew, from their own experience, that catches had not decreased) or that the Community was an enemy interested in dismantling the Galician fleet for its own advantage.13

Not surprisingly, the response of the Gran Sol fishermen was to continue fishing in EC waters, with licenses but mainly without. Given the nature of the Spanish fleet, plus boatowners and crew for whom fishing is a mode of life and community, there was no way that the Galician or Basque vessels were going to respect the licenses and quotas instituted by the Community. One result was that the EC negotiations would be conducted in a politically charged atmosphere. The Galician vessels were regularly pursued, boarded and searched by the Irish authorities; their owners were fined, their captains jailed, but the illegal fishing continued. The boatowners association, ARPOSOl, retained Irish council, and were perpetually busy with their members’ trials. The fisheries newspapers and trade sheets (e.g. Eurofish report) demanded that stiff sanctions be levied against what the papers would call the ‘Spanish Armada.’ From 1979 to 1986, 106 vessels from the Vigo cooperative alone would be arrested in Irish seas not to mention scores of Basque boats in French territorial waters.14 At least forty other Galician and Basque vessels were arrested in English waters during this same period. More legal strategies were also used, the most common being the ‘flag of convenience.’ Galician boatowners who wanted access to Irish fishing grounds registered their boat in England. Approximately ten Vigo-area vessels, all in serious financial trouble (often because they had been caught and heavily fined for illegal fishing), employed this strategy.15 All of this underlined to the Spanish government and the EC that, given the position of fishing in the Galician social economy and politics of identity, steps would have to be taken to accommodate such regions highly dependent on fishing.

When negotiations began in 1978, many Spanish felt that they were in a poor position to field a negotiating team. Between the variegated local institutions of Spain’s fishing communities and the EC there were no substantial mediating institutions or links. Until
the 1970's, the government fisheries department was a slim administration, buried in the Ministry of Commerce and under the command of the Merchant Marine. From time to time, it was moved from one ministry to another (such as Transportation), but never elevated to even a sub-ministerial level. Its main offices were doled out to ex-navy men to help cushion their last years before they retired to their pension. Indeed, the 1978 accord with the EC was negotiated by the first civilian director of fisheries.

In response to the changing political climate, the fisheries administration was professionalized and restructured in 1979-1980. Three subdirectors were drafted from the professional diplomatic corps; one to oversee the bajura or inshore fleet that worked in Spanish waters; and two others to negotiate treaties in northern and southern hemispheres respectively. The renovation in Madrid now brought the administration into what would be an underground but continuing conflict with the fishing associations, specially those in Galicia. The associations and the administration would henceforth be competing for power and control over the fisheries even as they had to join hands to be successful in international negotiations, not least those for accession to the Community.

In 1980, the Community and Spain ratified a ‘frame agreement’ that was supposed to set out the grounds for the negotiations so that talks might advance smoothly and to a successful conclusion.

But from 1980 to 1983 accession talks went nowhere; an inspection of the negotiating documents shows that they were directed mostly at collecting information. Though the Spanish did not know it at the time, little progress could be made in the negotiations until the EC had traveled its own difficult road and finalized a common fisheries policy.

Social Identity and the Outcome of the Negotiations

Given the political economy of Spanish fisheries and the fact that Spain had to accept the structure of the Community’s CFP as is (non-negotiable), Spanish negotiators were at a disadvantage, at least from a technical standpoint. But several factors worked in Spain’s favor to produce better results than the fishing sector had dared anticipate. One of its main advantages throughout the negotiations was an absence of information on the activities, catch rates, and organization of its fleet. On the Spanish side, this stemmed from a combination of related factors, not least of which is continuing familial organization of production. It has been able to reproduce itself in a changed political environment through the creation of associations. A result is a lingering — though diminishing — heterogeneity, closure, and fragmentation at the level of immediate production. This structure combines with historical memory to produce a deeply-seated distrust of central government and its intentions. Even the industry’s associations have a difficult time obtaining the basic information from their membership. In good measure, this occurs because information is personal rather than corporate; particularly in the littoral and Gran Sol fisheries, people do not distinguish between public and private information. Further, this concept of privacy is linked to autonomy and independence. Said another way, the statistical gathering procedures that the Community relied upon presuppose a species of managerial capitalism in which firms define their own behavior and set their course of action through the accumulation and recording of information about themselves.

The factors are inseparable from each other and from ethnicity and community identity; positively, because culture and forms of local organization are inseparable from relations of production; and oppositively, because ethnic identity is defined against a ‘Castilian’ central government identity, typically summarized in the notion of Madrid. Certainly in the discourse of the fishing community Madrid is not simply a place. It is the key symbol of the opposition between land and sea, the local community against the central government, and finally, being Galician versus being Spanish. The Basque fishermen, as usual, expressed these values most vocally noting at one point that they refused to accept any treaties negotiated between foreign, inland cities — meaning here Paris and Madrid. Given such political values, data is withheld irrespective of its economic import, though as things turned out the dearth of information was a negotiating advantage.

For example, the EC argued that Spain should reduce that part of its fleet operating in Community waters (i.e. Gran Sol fleet of Vigo and La Coruña and the Basque fleet in the Bay of Biscay). The EC position was that a reduction was necessary because stock assessments for hake and megrim were vague and uncertain, and it was safer to assume scarcity. Though the associations knew that these assessments were extremely conservative, they pressed that no assessment program be undertaken by the Spanish Oceanographic Institute. The only instance in which, against the instincts of many of their members, the associations had provided data to the EC had proven disastrous. After telling a French representative to the Euro-Parliament that ARVI had found a black bream fishery in EC waters — a species valued only by the Spanish market — the EC immediately set a black bream quota and then divided it up among existing EC members. The EC was, from a Spanish view, trying to appropriate the species of interest to the Spanish in advance of accession so that they could export to the Spanish market. Thus the Spanish negotiators, using data furnished by the Vigo cooperative, let the EC set relatively low quotas (called TAC or total allowable catch) for species valuable to Spain.

For example, in negotiation, Spain received 30% of the TAC of 11,000 metric tons of megrim. In the future, as it becomes evident that the figure is too low, Spain will receive 30% of an increasing total amount. The cooperative knows that this TAC is extremely low because its private statistics show that this tonnage of megrim is offloaded yearly at a port of Vigo alone.

Another advantage for Spanish negotiators was that, given the significance of its fisheries, Spaniards would, after accession, come to occupy high posts in the EC Fisheries hierarchy. The EC negotiators thus had to adopt a firm but conciliatory bargaining stance, pinned as they were between their responsibility to forward the interests of current members and their future interests and status following accession. One of the reasons fisheries is significant is that its political importance transcends its economic value. Throughout the negotiations, the associations were able to link what it means to be Basque or Galician to the fate of fisheries, and particularly those fisheries in EC water which had long histories. The tacit argument was that ethnic identity is most linked to those sectors that provide food, directly deal with nature, and whose evolution is inseparable from the history of a people. This argument was given immediacy and force by the separatist movement in Galicia and especially, of course, by ETA in El Pais Vasco. The associations and local media were able to turn Madrid’s performance in the EC fisheries negotiations into a referendum on its concern for, and willingness to support,
local regional culture and autonomy. Further, the negotiations became, especially for small and medium-scale fishermen, a referendum on whether the Community was willing to support local community and regional identity – both of which they viewed as inseparable from the maintenance of the fisheries. In petitions, demonstrations, and through their associations, the fishing communities from the ria de Vigo and elsewhere made it politically clear that if they could not retain access to traditional fishing grounds they were opposed to accession. Interviews with Spanish and Community negotiators reveal that this stance had a double effect: first, it meant that Spanish negotiators had no options (i.e., they did not even devise a fall back position on this issue) but to press for its traditional fisheries; second, it played upon that dimension of the CFP devoted to supporting those regions very dependent on fishing. In effect, the weight and interests of the diverse and dispersed fishing communities were powerfully motivated and silently coordinated by the logic of identity, and partly orchestrated by their newly-created associations, produced an agreement that the Spanish fisheries view as “just.” That is, they obtained better and increasing access to Irish seas for the Galicians and French seas for the Basque.

But this is more the beginning than the end of the story: for the fishing communities along the ria de Vigo, membership in the European Community has set in train forces that are transforming the terms of identity construction. In the past five years, the small capital fishing sector has increasingly adopted industrial practices, world views, and organizational forms. Not least has been the advent of Producer Organizations as mandated by the EC. These organizations presuppose a division and opposition between boatowners and crewmen, this in sharp contrast to the indigenous fishery which understands boatowners and crewmen as bound by the same social relations of production and community. Intrinsic to these Producer Organizations (PO) is a “utilitarian” rationality which grasps boat owners and crewmen as the owners of capital and the sellers of labor respectively. In addition, there exists no EC structure which corresponds to the structure of the relations of community-based production insofar as these relations combine fishing, farming, and marketing – as exemplified by the family of Ramon Pesquera. The questions of the future are whether and how the contradiction inscribed in the CFP will be played out in the fishing communities on the ria de Vigo; whether local conformity and compliance with EC institutional objectives will preempt and subvert the social identities and intimacies of family, kinship, and community; whether the ethos of community-based reliance and self-help will give way to dependence on the European Community; and whether the regional nationalisms will continue as critical forms of collective identity.

Conclusion: The Dialectic of Change

The absorption of Spain into the European Community and the ensuing imposition of EC policies and programs on Spain’s local communities has set in motion changes in both the objective and subjective aspects of social life. Set in train is a dialectic between the forms of rationalization intrinsic to EC capitalism and the forms of resistance put up by local communities. These two dimensions of the dialectic differ fundamentally: the forms of rationalization are consciously-structured, bureaucratically-implemented, based on and legitimated by science and scientific-like analyses, and, in general, part and product of the systems world; the forms of resistance are mostly non-conscious, highly pragmatic, based on and legitimated by tradition and experience, and grounded almost totally in the life-world.13 In Bourdieu’s terms (e.g. 1985), this is a distinction between the structures of the state and technologies of power on one hand and those of the ‘habitus’ on the other.

In the Galician fisheries, the contrasts between the systems and life world, the operation of the European Community and the contours of local practices, are critical along two dimensions. First, the ownership of vessels, the recruitment and payment of the crewmen, the marketing of the catch, and other relations of production have historically been organized in terms of kinship and community. Within this orbit, the forms of domination were overt and interpersonal – as when the captain or patron de pescador would exercise almost absolute control over crewmen when at sea. But relations of production based on kinship and community have gradually and partially been eroded and preempted by capitalist relations of production. Nonetheless, in the littoral and Gran Sol fisheries it is still mostly one-boat/one owner with a crew made-up of kin and community members, although all the elements of transformation (starting with industrialization in the 1960s) are now very much in place. Certainly the encompassment of the Galician fisheries by the EC sets in motion their formalization and rationalization with a greater immediacy and power than had existed before. The institution of the EC and its policies are defined in terms of, and presuppose, fully capitalist relations of production. The partial unwillingness of Galician fishermen to go along with the rationalization of their fisheries because it erodes the institutions (specially family) and traditions of the fishing life constitutes an implicit form of resistance.

Second, the European Community subscribes to and presupposes a form of civil society based on individual rights, identities, ownership of property, and maximization. Within this framework, the EC defines its mission as exercising a regulatory role over the operation of society (e.g. production of fish) by compelling classes of individuals (e.g. fishers) to behavior in a certain, prescribed way (e.g. harvest only a stipulated tonnage of fish). But as Chatterjee (1989) has argued, this view of civil society has not space for a concept of community or for the existence of collective identities. This view of civil society runs counter to the view indigenous to the community-based fisheries; there, occupation, ethnicity, and regional/nationalism are crucial and enduring forms of identity. To the extent that fishing communities such as Aldan sustain these forms of identity, they offer resistance to the underlying premises and logic of EC fisheries policy. Within this framework, there is a continuing evolution of institutions and practice, each step of which brings Spanish fishermen closer to a rationalized fishery, though one in which these rationalized institutions and practices bear a distinctly Spanish stamp. In effect, the forms of resistance intrinsic to the Galician fishery influence the form and trajectory of their rationalization.

In Spain’s negotiations for admission to the Community, the forms of identity present in the fishing communities determined the way fishermen responded to EC policy, put pressure on local and national politicians, defined their associations, and ultimately inflected the orientation and outcome of the negotiations.

Such forms of resistance were possible and partially successful in part because of the contradiction that lies at the center of the Community’s Common Fisheries (and also
Common Agricultural) Policy. Indeed, if the Community applied its political economy in an unrestricted way, its form of capitalism would soon overwhelm, preempt, subordinate any relations of production founded on kin and community; its view of civil society would erode and sublimate (as a kind of cultural defense mechanism) local forms of identity. But the EC cannot enact a fully capitalist regime because nationness is the ‘most universally legitimate value in political life of our times’ (Anderson 1983:12). And, as I and others have argued, the very concept of the nation, imagined as distinctive and particular, is tied to primary industries, such as fishing. The consequence is the animation of countervailing forces, some of which encourage the dissolution and disbanding of ‘traditional’ fishing communities, and others that encourage their reconstitution (because the market has no overall direction). The EC fosters organizations which oppose boat owners to crewmen, thus dividing kin and community loyalties. It requires associations, especially Producers’ Organizations, that are instrumental (e.g. based on economic objectives) and voluntary, thereby undermining identities and associations based on kinship and community (i.e. essentialist). The CFP assumes and encourages individual maximization. Quotas, for example, are set for fisheries rather than for vessels. On the other side of the equation, the EC provides monetary aid to areas historically dependent on fishing, thereby allowing kin and community based producers to survive. Also, by bypassing the national fisheries administration (e.g. that based in Madrid), it promotes regional fisheries administrations, such as that of the Galician autonomous government. Not surprisingly, a major change since Spain’s accession has been the emergence of a Galician provincial fisheries administration led by none other than the former head of the Vigo cooperative who, ironically, is on leave from the EC’s fisheries directorate. Community support for local fishers and regional governments bolsters regional and occupational identities. These social changes are both systemic and contradictory because the EC serves as a source of rationalization and as a resource for strengthening local communities and regional nationalisms.

The ethnography of Galician communities indicates that their encompassment within the EC reconfigures the very conditions for the construction of subjects in at least the following ways. It encourages, presupposes, codifies and legitimates stronger forms of individualism. People are self-consciously aware of this and view increasing egalism as one consequence of the general changes that define modern life. EC policy also motivates people to see their relation to other workers as mediated by labor rather than by kinship and community. Subjects are increasingly defined and subjectivity constructed in terms of individuals’ ability to own capital and sell their labor, rather than in terms of their network of and community relations. Similarly, people increasingly understand being a fishermen as a work type – interchangeable and commensurable with other types of work – rather than as a special particularistic occupation. The rise of the EC is also part of, and shapes, a form of domination which is sensed as abstract and distant. Spain’s accession to the European Community, following upon the industrialization of the 1970s, has placed in motion a new set of sometimes contradictory relations and conditions that not only reshape the character of collective self-definition but give it an unpredictable future.

The small fishing communities along the ria de Vigo, elsewhere in Spain from Catalonia to Andalucia and the Basque area, and throughout much of coastal Europe are not of great economic importance. I would, however, submit that they are nonethe-

less important, for they are an index and a metaphor, a social stage on which some of the most crucial conundrums and contradictions inherent in the construction of collective identities are being played out.

Notes

1. My ethnography is founded on two years of field research in Aldán and the central port city of Vigo (in northwest Galicia) where the fishing associations are located and where most boat-owners sell their fish and bring their vessels for maintenance. The account is amplified with three months of investigation in Brussels, at the headquarters of the European Community Fishery Division. Here, I examined (among other things) those documents and records pertaining to Spain, and interviewed (over three year period) most of the participants in the fishery negotiations. As most of the Aldanese vessels operate in Irish waters, information (e.g. court records, fishing newspapers) was amassed on the Irish perspective and reactions to the Spanish presence. Finally, the analysis was supplemented by four months of field study in Madrid, focusing on the Spanish bureaucracy and the interrelation between the government and the local communities.

2. The organization of the market places illustrates the centrality of fishing in production and consumption. Markets in Vigo, Cangas, and even smaller villages are two story buildings, with the meats, vegetables, and fruits lumped together on the second floor while the first is reserved entirely for fish and shellfish.

3. The relationship between Vigo and the satellite villages in an entire study in itself. Over the past twenty years, Vigo has come to provide all of those technical and banking services, docking and maintenance facilities, and marketing channels that the local ports are too small and under-capitalized to offer. What is more is that each fishing community exists not only in relationship to Vigo, but in relationship to each other. It is thus impossible to study one village or community without reference to the others. Accordingly, though my focus is on Aldán, it is necessary to refer to both Vigo and to the other villages within its orbit.

4. Levine (1989) observes that fishing rights have emerged as a key issue in New Zealand ethnic politics, the Maori measuring the extent to which they are politically accepted by mainstream white New Zealand by their success in preserving ‘traditional’ fishing rights.

5. The action by the European Community in July 1977 to extend its maritime zone to 200 miles and produce a CFP was a mostly defensive reaction to external events – particularly the extension of maritime jurisdictions by the United States, Canada, and Norway – rather than a well-planned and articulated policy. EC contemplation of a Common Fisheries Policy really begins in 1976 with a set of working papers that assessed the impact of the Law of the Sea (LOS) on Community fishing. These papers noted that if EC vessels were limited to the Community Pond and foreign vessels were excluded then: (1) 60% of the Community’s resources would be located within the British zone, (2) the amount of fish caught would remain nearly constant, but its overall value would decline moderately, and (3) the open EC market would generate serious price competition. Given the circumstances, the Community concluded that a CFP was essential.

6. Vestergaard (1990), writing on the changing character of fishermen’s identity in Denmark, approaches this same problem eloquently and from a slightly different angle. He argues that: the Danish fisheries is a social segment whose identity is not exhausted by its place in the modern interpretation of civil society, particularly as this interpretation sees them only as uncoordinated competitors who need regulation. Yet it would be untenable to do away with the distinction between fact and value that underlies
our notion of individual rights (p. 29-30). Davis (1991) notes that as small capital fisheries come under the sway of "capitalist-industrial formal institutions and their rationalities" they become "dehumanised" precisely because community and familial identities are submerged and preempted by the imperative and logic of capitalism (p. 13).

7. In sum, the EC has two contradictory objectives. The first is to neutralize forms of occupational and regional identity through its policies and programs. The neutralization of identities will allow to emerge agreement on a notion of "rational." This notion has an evaluative and motivational component; the first says that the accuracy and truth of information is a function of scientific analyses, and that such analyses should constitute the main basis of fishery policy; the second asserts that a fishery is made-up of individuals whose sole objective is to economically maximize (i.e. extract the most fish as the lowest cost) against the competitors. The second EC objective is to support traditional fisheries which implies forms of community and collective identity. And, these communities use a notion of rationality (and maximization) that overlaps but is surely not the same as that presupposed by rational management.

8. The associations in the ARVI cooperative are the following:
ANAMOR - Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Congeladores de Pesca de Merluch
ANAVAR - Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Congeladores de Pescas Verdes
ARAGBA - Asociacion Gallega de Armadores de Buques de Pesca de Buleaño
ARPOSUR - Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Pesca del Litoral Español Y Sur Portugal de Pontevedra
ARPOSAL - Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques Artisanales de Pesca de Pontevedra
ARPOAN - Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Pesca de Angulo y Polangre de Pontevedra
ARTERMAR - Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques Artisanales de Pesca de Pontevedra
CERCOR - Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Cercor de Pon

9. Zalata presents a harsher picture befitting life aboard the now defunct pair trawler. He defines life aboard these boats in terms of deprivation — no family, no sex, no community, no power over one's life, etc. The figure for EC licenses are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Spain and Canada have had a difficult and combative relationship for the past decade. The difficulties of Spanish fishing in North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) waters originate in the deadlock reached during the Spanish-Canadian negotiation. Trouble began early on when Spain refused to sign the NAFO convention because of the special status awarded coastal states. By 1981, relations between Spain and Canada had dissolved, as the associations rejected the final Canadian offer because they felt that Canada wanted great access to the Spanish market in exchange for minuscule quotas. In principle, this forced Spanish boats to fish beyond the 200 mile zone of Canada, though given the Canadian arrests records for the period there was also much illicit fishing by Spanish boats. By the end of 1983, the Galician gran altura fleet had discovered two fisheries outside of Canada's 200 mile zone. The first was a mixed fishery whose most important species was hake. By 1984, eighteen trawlers depended on this fishery. The second was a redfish fishery.

11. In a capitalist model of a capture fishery, its distinctive economic features are that (1) fish are hunted, (2) the resource is self-renewing, and most critical, (3) it is a common property resource. Because of these features, the fishery is believed to violate the basis of capitalist production, i.e., private ownership and control of the factors of production. A result is that all the mechanisms that normally enhance productivity (and which have empowered the global expansion of capitalism) serve here to undermine the fishery. They lead to overcapitalization and thus overproduction of the lowest cost input — the fish (see McCay and Anderson 1987 for a review). Within the orbit of this economic, and also economicist model, there are two basic solutions to the problem: redefine access to the fishery in terms of individual property rights and/or limit the quantity captured. The EC has employed the second solution by placing quotas on the amount of fish that can be caught. Unfortunately, both these solutions are an objectification of capitalist ideology, as that ideology has become embodied in bioeconomic analyses. They presume that the social and political economy of a fishery is reducible to, and a product of, individual maximizing interests. And, having purged the cultural and institutional dimensions of the fishery, the modelers cannot help but aggrandize the social interests of local communities as barriers to economic progress.

12. The view that they have been marginalized runs rather deep in the Galician collective memory, Galicians generally and fishermen in particular hold that they are marginal and marginalized by the central Madrid-based power structures.

13. A good illustration is the June 1985 issue of Fishing News International — the primary trade publication. The headline was: "Spanish fishermen frighten Euro-MPs," noting that at that May's session of the European Parliament concern was expressed over the EC ability to control such "unruly fishermen."

14. A case in point is the vessel, Cachamuina, which in the space of four years, and operating under various names, was heavily fined three times, its catch was twice confiscated, and once its fishing gear was confiscated for violating net size limits. Its owner, no longer able to withstand the financial pain, registered the vessel in England in 1985.

15. For its part, the EC knew little about the economy of Spanish fisheries. In part, this is because its analysts, even those who specialize in fishing, have viewed Spain as on the border of European society, economically, socially and politically. Its peninsular geography was an index of its marginal status. Spain was both socially traditional and economically retarded, making it a fascinating, affordable place for vacation, but not to analyze as part and product of European society.

16. I am, of course, taking the distinction between the systems world and life world from Jürgen Habermas.

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