**Contested coastal commercialisation:**
Marine Fishing Tourism in Norway

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– if the world is shrinking in terms of resources, it is expanding in terms of new candidates of ownership (Strathern 1999:23)

**Abstract** Coasts have been throughout history popular areas for nature-based recreational tourism and with an overall increase in global travel many coastal communities are now experiencing a fast growth in tourism activities. The development of coastal tourism represents a new challenge for the management of coastal areas and marine resources. It also adds to the level of stakeholder conflicts in the coastal zone. This is currently the situation in Norway, a coastal nation experiencing a steady increase in marine fishing tourism activities. This article presents an analysis of the discourse on sustainability on marine fishing tourism following this increase and it presents the regulatory framework which has been suggested as a result of this discourse. From this analysis it is concluded that present attempts at regulating marine fishing tourism in Norway are more a result of political pressure to regulate the activity than a thorough process of evaluating what would be the best regulatory framework.

**Introduction**

Throughout history, coasts have been preferred areas for nature-based recreational tourism (Fabri 1990; Corbin 1994; Inglish 2000; Urbain 2003) as they have provided possibilities for recreational activities such as swimming, surfing, sailing, boating, fishing, diving, and sunbathing. With the increase in global travel, the popularity of the coasts as an area for tourist activities is increasing (Johnston 1991; Agardy 1993; Stewart 1993; Hall 2001; Carter 2003). As a result many coastal nations are presently experiencing an increase in coastal and marine tourism development (Baum 1999; Cheong 2003).

Coastal tourism development implies increased pressure on coastal areas (Agardy 1993; Stewart 1993; Wong 1993; Hall 2001) and marine resources like sea mammals, sea birds and fish stocks (Garrod and Wilson 2004). From this follows a need for new policy regimes to secure an environmentally sound coastal development and a sustainable utilisation of marine resources (Miller and Ditton 1986; Miller and Auyong 1991; Miller 1993; Wong 1993; Orams 1997; Orams 1999; Noronha 2003; Bramwell 2004) as well as systems to deal with the stakeholder conflicts that often follow coastal tourism development (Baum 1999; Boissevain...
This article focuses on the differences in institutional power which can often be observed in political decision making related to management of new nature-based commercial activities.

When a new type of nature-based tourism develops in any one geographical setting, it will necessarily take some time and resources to follow up with a sound knowledge base and systems or institutions to deal with the policy issues following from such development. In this phase, decision-making related to tourism developments will be a process of uncertainty for politicians, natural-resource managers and tourism operators. In addition, as the process of organising the interests of businesses in new tourism developments also takes some time and resources, the tourism industry will often be lacking in institutional strength to voice its interests and participate in management. This fragile state of policy systems, the knowledge base and the weak organisation often characterising new stakeholders can often be observed in settings where new stakeholders compete with other interest groups over access to natural resources. Groups with longer traditions for utilising the natural resources in question will have a stronger definitional influence in management. The result from this often is that management decisions are taken as a result of pressure from strong stakeholders and not on the basis of a thorough evaluation of what would be the best management tools.

In this article the rapidly developing marine fishing tourism industry in Norway is applied as a case to illustrate this point. On the demand side the marine fishing tourism industry in Norway is made up by tourists wanting to take part in coastal fishing. On the supply side we find tourism companies providing accommodation, boats for rent and fishing facilities to cater to this demand from tourists. The main explanations for the increase which can be observed in marine fishing tourism in Norway are: 1) a growing demand for nature-based activities in tourism markets and strong angling traditions in many European countries; 2) a specialised marketing campaign to promote Norway as an angling destination run by Innovation Norway since the mid-1990s; 3) the establishment of professional marine fishing companies along the Norwegian coast; 4) improvements in the coastal infrastructure of Norway, including roads, ferries, and bridges making it easy to access fishing destinations; 5) the peripheral settlement pattern along the coast (which tourists find attractive) and last but not least; 6) the free of charge access to salt-water recreational fishing in Norway (Borch 2004; Borch, Aas and Policansky 2008).

As the marine fishing tourism industry is a fairly new stakeholder in a Norwegian coastal zone already experiencing many user-conflicts, the development of the activity has been met with substantial critique. The main critique has come from commercial fisheries interests who have urged increased regulation of the activity. Both Norwegian fisheries authorities and the tourism industry itself agree that there is a need for a management regime to secure the sustainable development of fishing tourism. There is, however, disagreement on what would be the most appropriate regulatory tools to reach this goal of sustainability.

As marine fishing tourism is by now a well established part of the Norwegian tourism industry, implying increased pressure on fish stocks, it is vital that the activity be included in Norwegian fisheries management systems. The shap-
The Marine Fishing Tourism Discourse in Norway

Foreign Anglers

Foreign anglers have a long history of visiting Norway for freshwater fishing, the first fishing tourists being British lords fishing for salmon in Norwegian rivers (Berntsen and Nyquist 1990; Sillanpää 2002; Kostiainen 2005). Over the last two decades there has been, however, an increase in foreigners visiting Norway to take part in salt-water recreational fishing. From this tourist demand, a marine fishing tourism industry has developed in the country. The companies in this industry provide accommodation, boat rental and other fishing facilities for tourists. There are no reliable statistics on the number of tourists visiting Norway to take part in coastal fishing. However the main markets for marine fishing tourism are Germany and Sweden, with an increase in visits of fishing tourists from the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Russia.

Until recently, the only limitation on salt-water fishing for foreigners visiting Norway has been that they may only use a hand-held line or fishing rod, that they do not sell their catch, and that they keep a 100-meter distance away from aquaculture installations and commercial fishing gear (Fiskeridirektoratet 1983; Fiskeridirektoratet 2006b). With the increase in marine fishing tourism there is an ongoing debate on the need for increased regulation of the activity. Even though salt water recreational fishing by Norwegians seems quite substantial (Hallenstvedt and Wulff, 2004), it is interesting to note that the focus in this debate is on foreign anglers only. Maybe this is part of what Cheong and Miller point to when they argue that international tourists are in a more ‘vulnerable position to be managed by agent of power’ than is the case for domestic tourists (2000:383).

15,000 Tons

The marine fishing tourism industry in Norway first developed in the southern parts of the country, mainly because this region is closest to European tourism markets (Norstrand 2000). Gradually, the industry moved north to mid-Norway, and it was from this region that protest about the activity started in the mid-1990s. Some of this protest was channelled through the largest interest organisation for commercial fishermen in Norway, the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (NFA) (www.fiskarlaget.no). In 1999, as a result of these complaints, the NFA contacted the Ministry of Fisheries, urging the government to start acting upon marine
fishing tourism. The response from the Ministry was to provide the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association with a mandate and the financial resources to set up a working committee on fishing tourism. After a period of work, this Fishing Tourism Committee initiated a study of fish catches by foreign tourists.13 In this Catch Study the annual tourism catch was estimated to be in the range 12,000–15,000 tons (Hallenstvedt and Wulff 2001).

Before the Catch Study, marine fishing tourism had been only sporadically on the agenda in Norway.14 With the Catch Study however, the attention of both the general public, the media, government institutions, and coastal stakeholders, was drawn to the activity.15 The overall focus in the debates running in wake of the Catch Study was on fish catches and foreign fishing tourists. The estimated catch by foreign fishing tourists was spoken of as considerable16 by both representatives from the commercial fisheries sector, government representatives,17 and the tourism industry.18 The media contributed to dramatisation of the results of the study by presenting the study under headlines such as: ‘Fishing tourists are emptying our fjords’, ‘Tourists fish for the freezer’ and by presenting, almost without exception, the highest catch estimate from the study: 15,000 tons.

287 Million Euro
One of the responses from the tourist industry to the focus on fish catches in marine fishing tourism was to commission a study of the economic value of the activity.19 The result from the first study of economic value was presented in a report in 2002. In this study it was estimated that foreign fishing tourists spent 287 million Euro annually when visiting Norway20 (Hallenstvedt and Wulff 2002). In 2003, the tourism industry also initiated a review of both the 2001 Catch Study and the 2002 Economic Value Study (Cap Gemini 2003). The consulting company responsible for the Review Study argued that the estimates in the Catch Study were too high and proposed that catches in the range of 6,000–9,000 tons were more accurate.21 The consulting company also compared the export value from fishing tourism with the export value from commercial fisheries, concluding that the export value per kilogram of fish from tourist fishing is several times the value generated by commercial fisheries. However, in the report it was argued that there is a need for more dependable data on both fish catches and economic spending by tourists to be able to produce more reliable knowledge on these issues.

Fifteen kilograms
In the minutes from a 2001 meeting with representatives from the Fishing Tourism Committee, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Norwegian Hospitality Association, it is stated that it important to decide on measures to ensure that ‘tourist fishing is performed in more acceptable ways’. From reading the minutes it is clear that the representatives from the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, participating in this meeting, put considerable pressure on the government to regulate fishing tourism. Among the regulatory tools discussed at this meeting were: a minimum size on fish, a limit on how much fish tourists may take out of the country, bag limits per angler or per company, increased control on the establishment of fish-

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The first proposal for a regulation of marine fishing tourism was launched in 2002 when the Directorate of Fisheries suggested a minimum fish size for tourist and recreational fishing (www.fiskeridir.no). After rounds of public hearings the Directorate decided not to implement a minimum size as a regulatory tool. The government explanation for this was that Norway prohibits releasing dead or dying fish (Fiskeridirektoratet 1993), that the fisheries authorities did not have the resources to enforce a minimum size rule, and that a minimum size would result in an unfortunate criminalisation of Norwegian recreational fishermen. The Directorate of Fisheries stated that it would prefer that fishing tourism was regulated through a limit on the amount of fish tourists could take out of the country, arguing that this would be a more ‘to the point’ tool. That is, it would restrict the fishing activity of foreigners rather than Norwegian recreational fishermen.

When the Norwegian–Russian fisheries commission decided to halve the quota on Norwegian coastal cod in the 2003 negotiations, the Directorate of Fisheries suggested an export limit of twenty kilograms of fish for tourists that visited Norway (Fiskeridirektoratet 2003a). In a Green Paper for the hearing round of a 2005 coastal cod management plan, it was stated that a limit of twenty-five kilograms had been decided upon, and that this limit would be implemented as soon as possible (Fiskeridirektoratet 2004). However, when a limit was finally implemented, in June 2006, it was set to fifteen kilograms and one additional trophy fish (Fiskeridirektoratet 2006a). Prior to this limit being entered into legislation, there were no evaluations of what would be the consequences of the regulation and there were at this time no reliable data or statistics on: 1) the number of fishing tourism operators/companies in Norway; 2) the number of fishing tourists in Norway; 3) motives among fishing tourists for choosing Norway as their fishing destination; 4) the motivation among tourists for taking part in recreational fishing; 5) tourist fish catches; or 6) effects on coastal economies from fishing tourism.

The tourism industry reacted negatively to the fifteen kilogram export limit, partly because the industry had prepared themselves and their markets for a limit of twenty-five kilograms, and partly because the regulation was put into force in June, which is the main season for fishing tourism. After the fifteen-kilogram limit was implemented, the Norwegian Hospitality Association appointed a consulting company to interview a limited number of fishing tourism companies about the effects of the Export Limit. From this round of interviews the consulting company argued that the quota had resulted in cancellations of bookings and in tourism companies putting planned investments on hold (Nilssen 2006). In spite of the protests coming from the tourism industry the fisheries authorities maintains that the fifteen-kilogram Export Limit is an appropriate regulatory tool.

In the period after the fifteen-kilogram limit was entered into legislation there were discussions in the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs and the Directorate of Fisheries on additional ways of regulating fishing tourism, among these being a reintroduction of the suggestion of a minimum size on fish. Also suggested was to allocate part of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for different fish stocks to the fishing tourism industry. Among other rules suggested relating
to Norwegian fishing tourism, are an obligatory boatman’s test and a change in rules for certifying boats for tourist traffic.

Discussion

What Seems to be the Problem?

When the fifteen-kilogram Export Limit was introduced in 2006, it was the result of a process involving mainly commercial fisheries interests, the tourism industry, and Norwegian fisheries authorities. Identifying and analyzing the discursive formation evolving in marine fishing tourism during this process, it seems like that the problem was defined as being: 1) salt-water recreational fishing, 2) by foreign fishing tourists, 3) buying their services from 3) the specialised marine fishing tourism companies offering not only accommodation and boat rental, but also facilities for gutting- and freezing some of the catch for the tourists to bring back home. From 2003 onwards another statement was added to this discursive formation as the problem also seemed to be: 4) that the marine fishing tourism was partly to blame for recruitment problems in stocks of coastal cod. This association between marine fishing tourism and decreasing stocks of coastal cod was also presented in the 2001 Catch Study. However, the link was not firmly established before 2004 when the Russian–Norwegian fisheries commission decided to reduce the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for coastal cod and a debate started on which fishery should ‘carry the burden’ of this quota reduction: commercial fisheries, recreational fisheries (Norwegians), or the fishing tourism industry (foreigners).

Foucault states that discourse analysis is about identifying rules of formation, that is, regularities in ways of framing a part of social or political phenomena. He goes on stating that these regularities will involve thematic choices, the definition of certain problems as objects of discourse and the exclusion of others (Foucault 2006 [1972]). It is clear, from following the discourse on fishing tourism, that Norwegian recreational fishermen were not part of the discursive formation evolving around the question of salt-water recreational fishing in Norway during the period. Summed up the problem was rather that: ‘recreational fishing in the sea, performed by foreigners purchasing services from specialised marine fishing tourism companies, represents a non-sustainable activity contributing to recruitment problems in stocks of coastal cod’.

Texts That Leaves Traces

A discourse analytical approach makes it possible to go back in time and study the process leading up to this way of framing marine fishing tourism in Norway. Discourse analysis is a study of the ways networks of statements, practices, and institutions work in processes forwarding certain reality definitions. These are processes in which knowledge claims and institutional power are mobilised, resulting in definitions which illuminate some parts of reality while leaving others in the shadow.

These processes often involve the production of texts. Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy touch upon this tendency when stating: ‘... actions that lead actors to try to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy are likely to result in the production of
texts’ (2004:642). They go on to state that texts must be interpreted, distributed, and commented upon if they are to have any organising properties or an effect on discursive formation. Foucault focuses on the life of texts when he states:

...history now organises the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unities, describes relations ... history is that which transforms documents into monuments (Foucault 2006 [1972]:6).

The 2001 Catch Study is an interesting text to follow when analyzing the process leading up to the framing of marine fishing tourism in Norway. The study is an example of a document acquiring status as a monument in discourse. The main explanation for this is that, at the time the results from the Catch Study were published, there existed a ‘knowledge vacuum’ on marine fishing tourism in Norway due to a lack of previous studies on the activity. Further, it seems that the study strengthened an image of fishing tourism that existed prior to the report being publicised. Overall, this was a negative view, claiming that foreign fishing tourists catch large quantities of fish without contributing to the Norwegian economy. Foucault states that everything that is formulated in discourse is often already articulated in the semi-silence that precedes its formation, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it covers and silences (Foucault 2006 [1972]).

In following the steps of a text like the 2001 Catch Study, it is important to bear in mind that a research report or any other text may have a force independent of its ability to ‘mirror reality’. Instead of investigating the truthfulness of texts much can be learnt from studying the background of its production as well as from studying how it is linked to previous or later texts. In the words of Foucault:

The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network (Foucault 2006 [1972]:25-26).

Through following the networks of texts, statements and institutions in which the Catch Study was a part, it becomes clear that the study was the result of critique of fishing tourism mainly coming from commercial fisheries interests. Further it becomes clear that the conclusions from the study on the fish catches of foreign tourists became a central statement in the discursive formation evolving on fishing tourism in Norway during this period. Representatives from commercial fisheries interests and some politicians ‘embraced’ the study and used it to forward claims of increased regulation of what they labelled: ‘substantial fishing tourism’. The tourism industry was overall critical of the Catch Study, but because of a lack of other studies on fishing tourism, both the tourism industry itself and the consulting companies appointed to carry out later studies had to depend on the 2001 study (Hallenstvedt and Wulff 2002; Cap Gemini 2003; Maske 2005; Nilssen 2006). The same was the case for other studies and publications from both re-
search institutions (Borch 2004; Gjøsæter and Sunnanå 2005; Jacobsen 2005) and
government institutions (Fiskeridirektoratet 2003a).

Changing Institutional Power-Relations
With his relational-power perspective Foucault is among the scholars who argue
that not only power but also resistance is always present in any social or politi-
cal setting. He argues that resistance should be neither celebrated nor feared but
looked upon as a technical component of power, part of its operation, part of all so-
cial life (Smart 2004 [1985]). In looking for points of resistance Foucault reminds
us that resistance does not have to have the character of revolution or explicit pro-
test, but that it, on the contrary, can be quite diffuse (Scott 1985). When following
the discourse on marine fishing tourism in Norway, the work of the 1999 Fishing
Tourism Committee, the different tourism projects and studies from research
institutions and consulting companies, the fishing tourism conferences, the na-
tional marketing strategies, and the regulation measures implemented on marine
fishing tourism, may all be seen as a result of relations of power and resistance.
The 2002 Economy Study (Hallenstvedt and Wulff 2002), the Classification Pro-
gram run by the Norwegian Hospitality Association (www.fisketurisme.no), the
Review Study (Cap Gemini 2003), and the Coastal Cod Study (Maske 2005) are all
attempts at resisting the negative and narrow definition of marine fishing tourism

One important aspect of relations of power and resistance is legitimacy and
institutional backing. ‘When speaking with an institutional back-up one speaks
with extra force and the more arenas an institution has a legitimate position in,
the greater the space for action...’ (Neumann 2001:128; my translation). The Nor-
wegian fishing tourism industry has been lacking in institutional backing, as
the sector has not had any unifying, strong organisation to voice its interests and
participate in management. Overall the tourism industry has had a weak repre-
sentation on the arenas where fishing tourism has been debated. On the 1999
Fishing Tourism Committee there were three representatives from commercial
fisheries and only one representative from the tourism industry. However, this
representative was not from a commercial interest organisation for tourism, but
from a marketing organisation, the Norwegian Tourism Board. Further, there
were no tourism organisations on the list of bodies entitled to comment upon the
2003 Green Paper on coastal cod management in which the Export Limit on fish
was suggested. Moreover, even though the first government appointed coastal
cod group (with broad stakeholder representation) was established in 2003, the
tourism industry was not invited to participate before in 2007. In comparing the
overall status and focus of the commercial fisheries sector and the tourism indus-
try, it should also be mentioned that while Norway has an institution for higher
education (www.nfh.uit.no), a Ministry, a Directorate, and a research institution
(www.imr.no) with a special focus on and responsibility for commercial fisher-
ies, tourism has none of these.

Cheong and Miller argue that tourism policy is often entangled with and
subordinate to other policies and that this: ‘... may well hinder policy interventions
in development and weaken the representation of the stakeholders ...’ (2000:373).
Miller argues that, there overall is an academic and political neglect of tourism and a lack of legitimate institutions that can represent tourism interests (Miller 1993:193). Gill states that this neglect of tourism interests is especially challenging in contexts where natural resources form an important asset in tourism development: 'A major challenge for the tourism industry is how to “gain a place at the table” in resource management decisions which have been dominated by the traditional sectors such as forestry or fishing' (2003:1). In analyzing stakeholders in Norwegian coastal zone management using the variables urgency, power and legitimacy, it has been concluded that planners in coastal zone management consider the tourism industry to be an expectant rather than a definitive stakeholder (Buanes, Jentoft, Maurstad, Søreng and Karlsen 2004, 2005). One overall point in this article, which analyses the position of the tourism industry not in coastal zone management but in fisheries management, is that the tourism industry has urgent claims in fish stocks but that the industry overall has been lacking in institutional power to defend these claims.

However, it is important to add that even though the tourism industry has had weak institutional backing in dealing with marine fishing tourism in Norway there are some changes in this situation. The tourism industry is gradually moving from being a user group to becoming a legitimate stakeholder in marine resources (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). The explanation for this is, in part, that the Norwegian Hospitality Association over time has allocated resources to attend to the interests of the marine fishing tourism industry. The organisation now meets with the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, the Directorate of Fisheries, the Directorate of Maritime Affairs, as well as with the Ministry of Trade and Industry to debate issues of relevance for the management of fishing tourism. The Directorate of Fisheries has also participated in setting up a classification and quality program for the marine fishing tourism industry (www.fisketurisme.no). Further, the tourism industry has now been included in lists of stakeholders entitled to have a say in hearings on issues of relevance for the management and development of marine fishing tourism.

Parallel with this, there has been an overall change in the attitude of commercial fisheries interests to fishing tourism, resulting in less critique of the activity and an increased focus on the importance of cooperation to sustain coastal economies. In addition, the media now present news related to marine fishing tourism in a more nuanced manner than was the case in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This change is most obvious in the Norwegian fisheries press (www.fiskeribladetfiskaren.no). Fishing tourism is also being more seriously attended to through having been included in academic curriculums and research programs and as more universities and research institutions have projects related to fishing tourism in their portfolios. It may seem that through these processes the marine fishing tourism industry, as a fairly new stakeholder in fisheries, is contributing to opening up and changing the fisheries management discourse in Norway.

Discipline and Punish
As presented in this text, the discursive formation evolving on fishing tourism in Norway has resulted in several changes or suggestions of changes in regulations,
practices, and institutions relating to the activity. Among these are the fifteen-kilogram Export Limit, the Classification Program, the changed national marketing strategy for fishing tourism, the system to monitor tourist fish catches, the obligatory boatman’s test and changes in certification systems regulating the use of boats for tourist traffic.

Some of these institutions and practices have or will have punishing effects, as they have a statutory basis in laws and regulations; others will have only disciplinary effects. Among those with punishing effects due to their statutory basis in law, are the fifteen-kilogram Export Limit, the obligatory boatman’s test, and the certification rules for the use of boats for tourism purposes. As far as the planned system for monitoring tourist catches, the Directorate of Fisheries is investigating the possibility of making the reporting of fish catches an obligatory task for tourism companies. However, for the time being (2009), there is no statutory authority to bring weight to bear on this reporting task. Therefore, the Directorate of Fisheries and the Institute of Marine Research, who are developing the system, can only rely on the disciplinary effect from a monitoring system to persuade tourism companies and tourists to report catches. The same is true for the Classification Program, as the operator of the program, the Norwegian Hospitality Association, is not in a position to force companies to register on its database. Nor can the marketing program for fishing tourism run by Innovation Norway stop consumptive fishing tourists from entering Norway, but only hope that their campaign has a disciplinary effect, attracting fewer such tourists.

Conclusion

This article has presented a critical analysis of a period of increased focus and management discourse on marine fishing tourism in Norway. The aim of this has been to illustrate that this discourse, and the management suggestions that follow from it, is a result of struggle between coastal stakeholders and not a thorough evaluation of the consequences of the suggested regulatory tools on either marine resources or coastal economies.

The Norwegian government and the Norwegian tourism industry have highlighted that natural resources are the main assets in the development of tourism in the country. However, in spite of the potential Norway has to develop tourism on the basis of natural qualities, the Norwegian tourism industry is struggling to take its share of the growth of international tourism markets. Furthermore, while the Norwegian government as well as most coastal communities in rural areas are presenting tourism development as important to maintain the rural settlement pattern in the country, the main economic value generation from Norwegian tourism is taking place in the cities. Marine fishing tourism is an exception to this as it is a nature-based tourism activity experiencing growth and profitability (Hallenstvedt and Wulff 2002; Løvfall and Akselsen 2006) which is mainly on offer in rural areas. However, it is also important to add that for this to be a long-term economically viable activity, it is important to deal with the sustainability challenges that accompany its development.
Looking at both the sustainability challenges related to marine fishing tourism as well as the potential which rural communities along the Norwegian coast hold for sustaining future settlement through further development of marine fishing tourism, it is a paradox that Norwegian governments have not dealt with the issue in a thorough manner. One overall goal of this article is to argue that even though the opponents who have called for increased regulation of fishing tourism seem to have ‘rested their case’ after the implementation of the fifteen kilogram Export Limit, the Norwegian government should not.

For the management of marine fishing tourism in Norway to be a success both related to the protection and economically viable utilisation of marine resources, it is important that future political decision making processes on marine tourism be based on an understanding of the complex relations of marine resources, commercial enterprises, markets, and policy systems related to the activity. This presupposes the involvement of all coastal stakeholders, government institutions and research and educational institutions.

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Notes

1 Coastal tourism includes activities such as cruise ship landings, boat trips, diving, sunbathing, marine wildlife safari, fishing, and hunting (Orams, 1997).

2 Innovation Norway is a government institution, offering products and services to help boost innovation in business and industry in Norway, foster regional development, promote Norwegian industry, as well as market Norway as a tourist destination. www.invanor.no

3 The Central European Fishing Travel Project run by Innovation Norway. In 2006 the project distributed 200,000 catalogues as an appendix to German and Dutch sports fishing magazines.

4 It has been estimated that 900 companies offer a combination of fishing, boat rental, and accommodation to tourists visiting Norway to engage in salt water recreational fishing (Hallenstvedt and Wulff, 2001). These companies range in quality and size from private homes with small boats to professional fishing tourism companies with high-standard apartments, boats, and gutting and freezer facilities, making it possible for tourists to take some of their fish catch back home.

5 No fishing license is provided for salt water recreational fishing and foreign anglers may fish as much as they like provided they use a hand-held line or fishing rod.

6 In Norway, commercial fishermen are organised in the Norwegian Coastal Fishermen’s Association (NCFA; in Norwegian ‘Norges Kystfiskarlag’) or in the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (NFA; in Norwegian ‘Norges Fiskarlag’). Most of the critique of marine fishing tourism during the period covered in this publication was channeled via the NFA.

7 The overall aim of modern fisheries management is a sustainable utilisation of fish stocks, economic efficiency and a just distribution of rights between stakeholders.

8 It has been argued that for commercial fisheries interests, the urgency to protect these stakes has increased with the introduction of a management regime of transferable vessel quotas (Hersoug 2005).

9 The data forming the basis for the analysis was collected in the period 1999–2008, from participant observation in ten marine fishing tourism companies, from interviewing fisheries managers, studying archives of stakeholder organisations, government documents, media texts, reports from universities, research institutions, and consulting companies as well as from participating in a classification project for fishing tourism companies (www.fisketurisme.no) and two advisory groups on coastal cod management led by the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.

10 According to the Act of June 17, 1966 No. 19 relating to Norway’s fishery limits and to the prohibition against fishing, etc. by foreign nationals within the fishery limit, it is prohibited for any person who is not a Norwegian national to engage in fishing, whaling, or sealing inside the Norwegian fishery limit. This prohibition does not apply to sports fishing using hand gear. The sale of catch is prohibited for foreign citizens.

11 According to the Act of June 3, 1983 No. 40 relating to Sea-Water Fisheries, etcetera, Norwegian citizens may fish with a hand-held line, a fishing rod, one motorised trolling-line, one or more 210 meter fishing net(s), a line with 300 hooks, and twenty fish traps, fish pots, or lobster pots. There is no tradition of catch and release in salt water recreational fishing in Norway. Norwegian recreational fishermen are allowed to sell some of their catch.

12 The first letter of complaint on fishing tourism, sent by a member to the NFA, is dated August 10, 1990 (source: NFA archives).

13 Letter from the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association to Professor Hallenstvedt at the Norwegian College of Fishery Science dated September 29, 1999.

14 Fishing tourism in Norway was mentioned very briefly by the Norwegian Minister of Fisheries in a 1994 Nordic Council conference on recreational fishing (Petersson, 1994). The activity was also mentioned in some relevant government documents during this period (Fiskeridepartementet 1994; Miljøverndepartementet 1996, 2000; Nærings- og handelsdepartementet 1999). Fishing tourism was not included as a subject in other relevant government documents like Miljøverndepartementet 1998; Miljøverndepartementet 2001; Miljøverndepartementet 2002.
The results from the study were included in the debates of the Norwegian–Russian fisheries commission, when the Russian delegation included tourist fishing in Norway in the quota negotiations. This was the background for the Arctic Fisheries Working Group (AFWG) in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) publishing a note on tourist and recreational fishing in Norway (Nedreaas 2005).

The total fish catch was spoken about as being half of the catch of the Lofoten coastal fishery; which is among the most substantial cod fisheries in the world and a fishery of both economic and symbolic importance in Norway.

A representative from the Coastal Party used statements such as ‘substantial fishing tourism’ and presented marine fishing tourism as an activity that ‘completely overtakes the fiords’ in a ‘Questions to the Presidium’ in the Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget, June 13, 2001.

In a press release the Norwegian Tourism Board stated that there has been ‘explosive growth’ in marine fishing tourism www.ntr.no , January 4, 2001.

The tourism industry also met the critique through initiating a Classification Program for marine fishing tourism companies, www.fisketurisme.no, through changing its marketing program to attract less consumptive fishing tourists www.visitnorway.com as well as through assisting the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in setting up a system to monitor tourist fish catches www.imr.no.

These estimates included only direct spending by tourists, not the indirect and induced effects from this spending on different levels of the economy.

In a 2005 White Paper on marine resources the government applied this revised estimate, rather than the estimate from the 2001 Catch Study (Fiskeri – og kystdepartementet 2003).

The Secretary of State from the Ministry of Fisheries, April 29, 2002.


This was stated in phone interviews with two representatives from the Directorate of Fisheries during August 2002. In these interviews it was also stated that the Directorate would suggest a limit in the range fifteen–thirty-five kilograms.

However, as far as the studies on which this article is based has been able to reveal, the first time this regulatory tool was suggested was in a letter to the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (NFA) from one of the regional chapters, ‘Fylkesfiskarlaget Sør’. In this it was suggested that a limit should be set at fifty kilograms of fish (letter of February 2, 1995).

The Secretary of State from the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs stated in a phone interview (June 2006) that the limit had been set at fifteen kilograms because this was already the limit for importing recreational fish catches from Russia to Sweden (www.jordbruksverket.se). In a media statement, the same Secretary of State said that the limit had been set on the basis of a study of fish catches by tourists travelling by car in Norway (Jacobsen 2005). When questioned if the limit had been set to protect stocks of coastal cod he answered that this had not been part of the process. As a way of defending the export limit he also stated that fifteen kilograms of fish products is double the amount of fish which a Norwegian family consumes during any one year (source: Fiskeribladet, May 27, 2006).

In a newspaper interview the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs supported the choice of this regulatory tool by stating that fifteen kilograms of fish products is the equivalent of sixty dinners for a Norwegian family (Aftenbladet, June 11, 2006).

In 2005 the official name of the Ministry of Fisheries was changed to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs.

Information from a meeting in an expert group on fishing tourism, Oslo, October 2006 and from a meeting of a governmental advisory group on coastal cod management in Tromsø, May 2007. Minimum size as a regulatory instrument was also discussed by the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs in a speech at a National Conference on Fishing Tourism, Stjørdal, January 2007.

An allocation of part of the TAC to the tourism industry was on the agenda in a 2003 meeting between the fisheries authorities and commercial fisheries interests. In 2005 this instrument was suggested by an undersecretary at the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs in a television interview and later, by the same undersecretary, in a speech at a fisheries conference in Bø, July 2007. (Available at www.regjeringen.no.) During the fall political elections, politicians in the north of Norway suggested allocating part of the regional fish quotas to the fishing tourism industry.
A governmental working group has suggested that an obligatory boatman’s test be introduced in Norway (Sjøfartsdirektoratet 2007).


In estimating fish catches it is interesting to note that the Catch Study focused exclusively on catches by foreign fishing tourists not those of Norwegian fishing tourists.

The stock of coastal cod that has been the focus of stock assessment programs in Norway has concluded that there are recruitment problems is the coastal cod north of 62 degrees north. The official label for this stock, which is genetically different from the Northeast Atlantic Cod, is ‘Norwegian Coastal Cod’. Both the Northeast Atlantic cod and the Norwegian Coastal Cod are specified as Gadus Morhua.

This was the case in spite of the fact that one-third of the discussion document dealt with issues related to fishing tourism.

The Norwegian Hospitality Association represented the tourism industry, for the first time, in a Tromsø meeting in a government group on coastal cod management in May 2007.

It is interesting to note on the homepage of the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, that what is highlighted as the main task for the Ministry is not the management of marine resources to the benefit of all coastal or marine industries but: ‘a responsibility for the fisheries and aquaculture industries’.

In an evaluation of marine research in Norway, marine fishing tourism is not mentioned as belonging to the marine research area (Sundnes, Langfeldt and Langbakken, 2005).

Marine fishing tourism has, over time, become a case of symbolic importance for the Norwegian tourism industry. The same month as the fifteen kilogram Export Limit was entered into legislation, one of the largest tourism transportation companies in Norway financed a professorship in Experience Economy at the Norwegian School of Management. In a newspaper interview the company director said that the fifteen kilogram limit illustrated the need to strengthen tourism research to avoid these types of ‘mistakes’ being made in future tourism-related political decision making (source: Dagens Næringsliv, June 6, 2006).

Among others, these included the University of Tromsø (the Norwegian College of Fishery Science) and the Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Fishing tourism is highlighted as a prioritised area in two ongoing programs of the Norwegian Research Council, ‘the Ocean and Coastal Areas’ and ‘Area and Nature-based Industrial Development’.

Among others, the Institute of Transport Economics, the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, the Institute of Marine Research, and Norut Northern Research Institute.

A formulation from Foucault (1977).

In this, which is an Internet-based program, fishing tourism companies are classified according to the quality of their accommodation facilities, boats, fishing facilities and security routines.

As only members can sign into the system, the Norwegian Hospitality Association attempts to motivate companies to join in through offering a reduced membership fee. The service was opened January 2007 and by May 2009 only thirty companies had registered in the system.

In 2008 less than thirty percent of the employment effects from Norwegian tourism were generated in rural areas (Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no).

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