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MAST (Maritime Anthropological Studies) is an international journal of anthropology on fishing and maritime communities. Published twice yearly by the Department of Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, **MAST** aims to disseminate knowledge of contemporary and historical societies and cultures of people exploiting maritime environments.

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O.Z. Achterburgwal 185
1012 DK Amsterdam
The Netherlands

Subscription price per volume (including postage): private individuals Dfl.40.00 (US\$ 25.00), and institutions, libraries, etc. Dfl. 90.00 (US\$ 50.00). Please transfer the amount in Dfl. or US\$ to our postal giro account no. 3691970 or to J. Verrips/MAST, ABN Bank account no. 545446406, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, or pay with a creditcard.

Cover design: *Yvon Schuler*

Printed by Krips Repro, Meppel, The Netherlands

ISSN: 0922-1476

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MAST

Maritime Anthropological Studies

Vol. 5, No. 2

1992

Contents

THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE. 'SUBSISTENCE,' 'COMMERCIAL' AND OTHER TERMS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT WHALING	1
<i>Brian Moeran</i>	
WHOSE WHALE IS THAT? DIVERTING THE COMMODITY PATH	16
<i>Arne Kalland</i>	
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AN IBERIAN EXAMPLE	46
<i>Edward LiPuma</i>	
RESEARCH REPORTS	74
ARTISANAL FISHERIES AND FISHERMEN'S MIGRATIONS IN LIBERIA	75
<i>Jan M. Haakonsen</i>	
THE MIGRATION OF GHANAIAN WOMEN IN THE CANOE FISHING INDUSTRY	88
<i>Irene Odotei</i>	
ARTISANAL MARITIME FISHERIES IN COTE D'IVOIRE	96
<i>K. Delaunay</i>	
BOOK REVIEWS	104
VIDEO REVIEW	112
BOOKS RECEIVED	117

The Cultural Construction of Value

'Subsistence,' 'Commercial' and Other Terms in the Debate about Whaling

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ABSTRACT This paper examines the distinction between 'subsistence' and 'commercial' forms of whaling, as used by the International Whaling Commission, and argues that it is underpinned by a Western-biased value system which is not necessarily accepted by either indigenous or non-Western peoples. In focussing on the cultural construction of value, on whaling and whales as a form of commodity exchange, and on long – as well as short – term transactional systems, the author argues that Japanese cultural attitudes towards money, gifts and capitalism in general are totally different from those found in Europe or the United States. This needs to be recognized by members of the IWC if they are to arrive at an equitable and sustainable development strategy for whaling in general.

Subsistence and Commercial

Over the past decade or so, there has been a long, drawn-out and at times confusing argument about the differences between 'commercial' and 'subsistence' whaling and whether 'small-type whaling,' or 'small-type coastal whaling' (Akimichi et al. 1988), really is a form of commercial whaling, as classified under the International Whaling Commission's Schedule. Recently, it has been argued that there are enough similarities in coastal whaling operations conducted in Greenland, Iceland, Japan and Norway to warrant the establishment of a separate management category for Small-Type Whaling (STW) by the IWC (ISGSTW 1992).¹ I do not wish to enter here into what is often little more than political wrangling, but merely wish to start by noting that an *ad hoc* Technical Committee Working Group of the International Whaling Commission has related 'subsistence catch' to the 'local consumption' of 'indigenous peoples' (IWC 1981:2-3), while the Commission itself has recognized a *qualitative* difference between commercial and subsistence forms of whaling (*ibid.*:10).

On the political front, in the forum of the IWC, the argument is now being put forward that both the concept of sustainable development strategies in human/environment relations and human rights doctrines in international law make the establishment of a new management category of STW desirable (Doubleday 1992; ISGSTW 1992). In this paper, however, I want to examine the cultural assumptions underlying the distinction between 'commercial' and (aboriginal) 'subsistence' types of whaling. By focussing on Japanese whaling in particular, I will show how a non-Western people has had to come to terms with the dictates of essentially Western concepts at the international negotiating table. My argument here is that the 'qualitative' difference between 'commercial' and 'subsistence' recognized by the IWC cannot be sustained logically, and that the two are in fact false oppositions, each category having been created, or at least adhered to, by

different sets of people who have adopted totally different value systems regarding whales and whaling. It will be argued, further, that these value systems are culturally constructed. The implications of such an argument are that many of those participating in the debate over whaling – particularly the conservationists – put forward as a ‘universal’ ethos what is no more than a culturally relativist opinion.

For non-whaling (or anti-whaling) groups, the value system is predicated upon a notion that whale stocks should be conserved, and that people should not be allowed either to kill whales, or to make money out of killing whales (which is one reason, perhaps, why permission has been granted to aboriginal people to harvest a limited number of an endangered species ‘at levels appropriate to their cultural and nutritional requirements’ [IWC 1981:10]). On the other hand, most whalers themselves adhere to a value system which stresses that they should be allowed to make a certain amount of money out of killing whales, because otherwise they (as opposed to the whales) will not survive, and that whales form an integral part of their culture. The idea of ‘subsistence’ thus appears to have been brought in as a kind of liminal stage between outright commercial capitalism, on the one hand, and outright environmentalism, on the other.

The *advantage* of the arguments about ‘subsistence’ whaling is that those making decisions about *technological* processes of whaling in general find themselves obliged, albeit reluctantly, to take into account the importance of local *cultures*, although not necessarily of local *whaling* cultures as such (Takahashi et al. 1989; Kalland & Moeran 1990:136-59). The *disadvantage* is that those arguing for the adoption of a ‘subsistence’ type of whaling have tended to separate local (indigenous) culture from other, overarching, national cultural forms and ideals.

In the case of Japan, this has meant arguing that although the Japanese in general may be, or may have been, involved in profit-making commercialism, small-type coastal whalers in particular are not. Three points need to be made here. Firstly, the generalist-particularist distinction has tended to weaken Japan’s case for small-type whaling as a form of ‘subsistence’ whaling. After all, if Japan really does consist of such a homogeneous people and culture as is usually made out by those politicians, businessmen, scholars and journalists who like to indulge in the promotion of that genre of works known as ‘*nihonjinron*’ (or ‘what it means to be Japanese’), then surely – the critics can justifiably argue – both large scale pelagic and small-type coastal whalers are ultimately operating within the same set of cultural suppositions and constraints? The counter-argument (put forward by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists in particular) denies that there is, in fact, the kind of homogeneity claimed and that there are major cultural differences between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in Japan, as elsewhere.

This leads to the second point, that although such cultural differences may exist – such as, for example, those between peripheral whaling communities and central government organs concerned with the administration of whaling – we cannot ignore the fact that those inhabiting and working in the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ of any one culture also *share* many assumptions with which those working in other cultural centres (government organs in – say – the United States, India, the Seychelles, Norway, the United Kingdom, Japan, and so on) will disagree. At the same time, thirdly, we must recognize that assumptions are shared between those inhabiting and working in widely dispersed cultural ‘centres,’ and that these assumptions are not shared by those living in any of the ‘peripheries’ attached to each of those ‘centres.’ The problem then hinges

upon precisely what these assumptions are and how they are interpreted within and between ‘local,’ ‘national’ and ‘global’ cultures.

Commodity Exchange

As mentioned above, the International Whaling Commission has recognized that there is a qualitative difference between commercial and subsistence forms of whaling. This difference appears to hinge upon the Commission’s distinction between ‘local’ and other forms of *consumption*. What is *ignored* in the argument over the nature of ‘subsistence’ and ‘commerciality’ in whaling is the indisputable fact that, whether carried out as ‘subsistence’ or as a ‘commercial’ venture, both whaling as an occupation and the whale as product deriving from that occupation are *forms of exchange* – in that people work together to hunt, harvest and flense whales which they then share with others, either through consumption in ritual events or as commodities on the market. Regardless of whether whaling is for ‘subsistence’ or for ‘commerciality,’ then, the end products that emerge (whale meat, oil, fertilizer, and so on) constitute *commodities*.

Now precisely what is meant by the word ‘commodity’ needs clarification. The narrow economic meaning historically attributed to the term ‘commodity’ is that of a special kind of manufactured good (or service) associated only with a capitalist mode of production, and therefore found only in those societies penetrated by capitalism. Recent research by anthropologists, however, suggests that this definition is unnecessarily limiting and that we should rather see a commodity as ‘*any thing intended for exchange*’ (Appadurai 1986:9). This approach rightly shifts the emphasis from the commodity *per se*, to commodity *exchange*, and has led anthropologists to argue that commodities are not essentially different from other forms of exchange such as barter and gift exchange – both of which have been brought into arguments about subsistence whaling (see, for example, Akimichi et al. 1988). The theoretical premise here is that both barter and gift exchange do *not* form a different category of exchange, but share much in common with commodities, and that all economic objects circulate in different ‘*regimes of value*’ which exist both in space and in time (Appadurai 1989:4).

In the light of this reconsideration of the meaning of ‘commodity,’ we can see that the category of ‘local consumption’ defined by the IWC is based on the false premise that a distinction *can* be made between ‘sale,’ ‘barter’ and ‘gift exchange.’ My argument, instead, is that, by accepting Appadurai’s discussion of the ‘social life of things,’ which he sees as passing through a commodity *phase*, being imbued with commodity *candidacy*, and found in a commodity *context* (*ibid.*:13-16), we need to reconsider the work of those who have argued that social life is constituted by various systems of communication (in the case of Lévi-Strauss [1966], those of goods, women, and words). Although never properly synthesized, these systems together can be seen to form part of a theory of consumption in which ‘the meanings conveyed along the goods channel are part and parcel of the meanings in the kinship and mythology channels, and all three are part of the general concern to control information’ (Douglas & Isherwood 1979:87-88).

I would argue, therefore, that whaling (of whatever kind) should be seen as part of an *overall system of consumption*, in which whale products as commodities, whalers’ kinship (and neighbourhood) systems, and whaling communities’ myths and folk tales

about whales are all inextricably inter-related (see, for example, Kalland and Moeran 1992). To illustrate this proposition, let us look at a particular cultural example, whalemeat. At various times in Japan's long history of whaling, whalemeat and other whale products have moved both in and out of commodity phases at a local and/or national level (the two not necessarily being identical). Thus we find that in one local community raw pilot whale has been preferred, while in another it is dried, marinated slices of Baird's beaked whale that have been seen as a delicacy. When right whale is no longer available in yet another community, people will shift to the salted blubber of fin whale (*ibid.*:148). In major cities such as Ōsaka or Tōkyō, on the other hand, totally different methods may be preferred, and these, too, may vary over the decades or centuries.

Nevertheless, the various kinds of whalemeat consumed, together with the methods of preparation used, and the associated forms of social and ritual communication involved, constitute a total system in which each part plays a cultural role. Change one of these parts and there is usually a knock-on effect of some kind or another among the other parts in the system. For example, the world-wide moratorium on whaling has led to some Japanese turning to dolphin meat for the first time. This is possible, firstly, because dolphin meat has already formed part of other people's (occasional) diet and, secondly, because dolphins are cetaceans and therefore can be categorized as 'whale-meat.'

At the same time, the moratorium should be seen merely as one more stage in the commodity phase of whales. For example, it may now be improper to *kill* whales and consume their carcasses, but it is clearly not improper to *watch* whales swimming about in the oceans (as profiteering tour operations – and a recent advertisement for Japan Tobacco's *Merit* cigarettes – will testify). Whether dead or alive, therefore, whales are – and probably always will be – commodities which, in the process of being 'consumed,' will bring people profit. In this respect, conservationist groups are guilty of the same 'commercialism' of which they accuse whalers throughout the world (cf. Kalland 1991).

The Cultural Construction of Value

It is clear from the above that the cultural construction of value is extremely important to our understanding of world issues. At the same time, we have to realize that values are always in the process of changing for one reason or another. Do whales exist to be eaten, or to be watched? Should they be killed or loved? Why is it 'right' for some, but not others, to kill whales? Why are members of a nation like the United Kingdom so vociferous in their condemnation of whaling, when their parents happily ate whale steaks during the Second World War and fed whalemeat-based pet food to their cats during the decades that followed? There are no easy answers to such questions, of course, but it must be recognized that *all* things have their social histories and cultural biographies, by means of which we should be able to trace the cultural construction of value.

In the case of Japanese whaling, the 'social life' of whales has been thus examined in some detail by Kalland and Moeran (1992), thereby making it unnecessary to reiterate that material here. What should be emphasized, however, is that it has been effectively

shown that there is an intricate relationship between a technology-based work organization, recruitment, kinship patterns, gift-giving, food preferences, beliefs, rituals and so on – all of which can be said to make up a total whaling culture. This allows me to propose here that the cultural role of commodities in general is intrinsically related to questions of technology, production and trade, together with the sets of knowledge and beliefs that surround such questions. Thus changes in any one (the development of refrigeration techniques, for example) can lead to changes in the others (long-term pelagic whaling and international trading in whale meat).

The inter-relational, relative approach to the cultural role of commodities proposed here means that we should recognize that goods themselves are neutral; it is their uses which are social and which allow them to be used as 'fences or bridges' (Douglas and Isherwood 1979:12). It is *we* who imbue things with values of one sort or another – values which are *not* inherent in the objects concerned. In other words, 'value is never a "quality" of the objects, but a judgment upon them which remains inherent in the *subject*' (Simmel 1990:63, my italics). From this Simmel has argued that at the centre of the relation of value to an object is 'desire,' so that we call 'valuable' those objects which resist our desire to acquire them. In the context of arguments about whaling, we find that both whalers and conservationists desire to 'possess' whales, although for very different reasons. Hence, whales become imbued with different values, depending on the kind of desire that different people feel towards them.

In a way, this difference is similar to that made by Simmel between the 'aesthetic' and 'sensual' enjoyment of female beauty. In the first instance – that, in the context of this paper, adopted by conservationists – we surrender ourselves to the object; in the second – that of the whalers – the object surrenders itself to us. Interestingly, in discussing the role of the 'aesthetic' in valuation, Simmel has pointed out that 'our appreciation of the object is not specifically aesthetic, but practical; it becomes aesthetic only as a result of increasing distance, abstraction and sublimation' (1990:74). Precisely because conservationists are *not* close to whales (in spite of their idealistic protestations to the contrary), they are able to appreciate their 'aesthetic' qualities. Similarly, because whalers *are* so close to the objects of their livelihood, they remain extremely practical. Thus the development of objects proceeds through objectification from utility value to aesthetic value. Or, in simpler terms perhaps, by calling something 'beautiful,' we immediately imbue it with a quality and meaning that somehow become independent of the practical arrangements that surround its everyday use. Not only this, but 'the more remote for the species is the utility of the object that first created an interest and a value and is now forgotten, the purer is the aesthetic satisfaction derived from the mere form and appearance of the object' (*ibid.*:75). This explains why conservationists can display sensuous photographs of humpback whales 'in flight,' put on whale watching tours in which it is possible to have one's life 'enriched' through 'positive interaction,' and generally believe that whales can 'educate' man (Barstow 1989; Kalland 1991).

It is in this *exchange* of values, as well as in the exchange of *values*, that we should perhaps place this discussion of whales, whaling and the cultural construction of value. After all, over the past decade and more, the argument has been shifted from human behaviour (whaling) to animal or mammal behaviour (whales) – an exchange of values which prompts me to propose an adaptation of Marx's notion of 'use' and 'exchange' values. My argument is that the distinction is not binary, but that there are always *four*

variables which need to be taken into account in the cultural construction of value. These I shall call *technical*, *conceptual*, *social*, and *commodity* values. Although I have discussed this idea in slightly different form in the context of the Japanese art market (Moeran 1990:131-36), I will outline them briefly here:

1. *Technical Values.* These are the values held by those who are closely involved in the technical production of any occupation (whether it be whaling, art, craft, advertising, or whatever). They are concerned with particular problems of how to achieve certain effects to do with the technology used in that occupation – such as a gunner ensuring that he hits a whale cleanly so that not too much meat is destroyed; an advertising designer removing unwanted parts of a photograph in order to heighten the effect of an image; or a potter using a particular type of material to obtain a particular glaze effect in his kiln.
2. *Conceptual Values.* These are values which stem from the ways in which an object is perceived and symbolized. In whaling, they focus around the beliefs (myths, ideals, folklore, rituals, symbols) held by whalers, on the one hand, and around other sets of beliefs held by conservationist groups, on the other, as well as by people who do not themselves whale but who have no objection to the (limited) harvesting of whales, on the other. In occupations such as art and advertising, conceptual values focus primarily on notions of ‘quality’ (however that word may be defined by those concerned), and are used for the most part by those involved in production (copywriters, designers, photographers, artists or potters) and by those who, for some reason or other, feel that they have a right to comment on the quality of their work (critics, journalists, museum curators, and so on). For the most part, they will develop a conceptual vocabulary that will be more or less specific to each field of production. These conceptual values will be shared to some degree by those consumers of specific products who will be ‘educated’ to appreciate their ‘qualities’ (cf. Bourdieu 1984).
3. *Social Values.* These values do not immediately appear in the appreciation of a product, but they are extremely important to its definition as a commodity that has a market value. Social values can be seen, for example, in the prestige that may accrue to someone who can afford to own an offshore whaling vessel or particular kind of fishing boat, as well as to an advertising agency that can secure a particular corporation’s account. More importantly, they derive from the social networks that are created between producers, marketers, ‘critics,’ media, and others involved in a commodity’s production and consumption. In a small-type coastal whaling community, we can see the operation of such values in the exchange of gifts, which enhance the prestige of a boat operator, as well as the value given to the commodity being exchanged (Akimichi et al. 1988:41-51). In the art world, we find that the price of a New York artist’s work may go up just because the curator of one of the major museums in that city *attended his party!* This has nothing to do with the artist’s work *per se*, but with the social connections between artist and important personages in his network.

4. *Commodity Values.* If the first three values outlined above are concerned primarily with *use*, commodity values are concerned with *exchange*. They are the price that will be fixed to objects on the market because of the combination of technical, conceptual and commercial values found therein.

It is, in my opinion, a combination of these four variables in the cultural construction of value that can be said to constitute what might be called a *whaling world* (or *art world*, *fashion world*, *advertising world*, and so on). It is this whaling world which constitutes a ‘culture’ which is partly of its own *internal fabrication* (specific ways of seeing, or modes of interaction, together with codes of ethics and etiquette), and partly *externally influenced* by the cultures of other worlds (for example, those of particular marketing institutions, and of business in general, together with all *their* modes of interaction, ethics, use of symbols, and so on, all within a particular ‘national’ culture, *as well as* those of ‘international’ cultures where other technical, conceptual, social and commodity values may be adhered to). Thus, these ‘cultures’ should *not* necessarily be seen as equivalent to ‘societies’ or ‘nations,’ even though it is likely that those sharing a ‘national’ culture may also share a number of conceptual and social values. Similarly, those from different national cultures but involved in the same occupation may well disagree about certain aspects of social value, but share much in common at the technical and conceptual levels.

Protestant, Confucian and Capitalist Ethics

The argument, then, is that all commodities consist of greater and lesser degrees of each of the values outlined above. As far as the debate over whaling is concerned, it would seem to be technical and social values, on the one hand, and conceptual values, on the other, which ultimately differentiate whalers from conservationists, and whaling from non-whaling nations respectively. Whalers unashamedly treat the whale as a ‘commodity,’ which they have seen in terms of technical and social levels of production (harvesting) and marketing. Conservationists, on the other hand, have brought the term ‘commodity’ into ideological contention by creating a whole new set of conceptual values regarding the ‘exploitation’ of whales. The whale is ultimately still a commodity, but it has been transformed into a ‘symbolic,’ rather than materially-based ‘physical,’ commodity. In this respect, conservationists have been involved in what Baudrillard has referred to as ‘a systematic act of the manipulation of signs’ (in Poster 1988:21-2), whereby not objects, but human relations, end up by being consumed.

We should recognize here that the ideological discourse on whales and whaling is not simply about what might be deemed to constitute ‘proper’ relations between humanity and various forms of wildlife. It also concerns, among other things, the relation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production, on the one hand, and cultural differences between those advanced industrialized nations that have, until recently at least, been involved in various forms of whaling, on the other. In the context of the latter two sets of relations, and of the fact that Japan is still (just) the world’s only non-Western advanced industrialized nation, it might be advisable to examine the way in which

slightly different sets of values have come to permeate the capitalisms (I use the plural form advisedly) of Japan and the West.

Given that the 'spirit' of modern capitalism has been defined as wanting to make money as long as one can (Jacob Fugger, in Weber 1930:51), and that both Japan and most Western nations have capitalist economies, can there really be such a difference between them? The answer is both 'no' and 'yes.' On the one hand, it has been argued that Protestantism (specifically Puritanism derived from Calvinism) encouraged a spirit of capitalism, which itself gave rise to a break with what might be termed 'traditionalism' in a number of European societies (Weber 1930). On the other, the suggestion is that in Japan Confucianism acted as a functional analogue to the Protestant ethic by providing a meaningful set of ultimate values upon which the morality of Japanese society as a whole was traditionally based and could continue to be so during its modernization process (Bellah 1957). In other words, Confucianism allowed Japan to develop into a modern capitalist state, while at the same time providing it with a continuous central value system. In this respect, Japan differed from most European industrializing societies in that it developed without a shift in its basic values, so that it did *not* have the same spirit of capitalism as did most European societies.

Where, then, did Protestantism and Confucianism differ? At the general level, one can say that Confucianism emphasized: firstly, the polity over the economy *per se*, and with it a combination of particularism and performance as means towards attaining the goals that society set itself; and secondly, cultural values which included an emphasis on learning, study and scholarship, on the one hand, and aesthetic-emotional values, on the other (Bellah 1957:13-7).

If we examine such differences at a more detailed level, we can see, firstly, that both Protestantism and Confucianism emphasized the ideal of work or occupation as a 'calling.' However, while Calvinists and Puritans argued that one should work for the divine glory of God, neo-Confucianists said that people should do so on behalf of *society* (Weber 1930:160-62; Bellah 1957:36). Such a difference in attitude may partially explain why Westerners now tend to see whaling as an abstract conceptual issue (concerning environmental protection), and why Japanese focus on it as a more pragmatic social issue. It certainly helps us understand why small-type whalers in communities like Ayukawa and Taiji have devoted much of their time to bewailing their loss of work, skills and traditions. By being deprived of their traditional occupation, whalers regard themselves as no longer able to contribute to society as a whole, and therefore as being no longer part of society as such. In this respect they conform to the Confucian concept of occupation (*shokubun*) as 'not merely an end in itself but a part of society. One's occupation in the fulfillment of what one owes to society, it is the part one plays which justifies one's receiving the benefits of society' (Bellah 1957:115).

Secondly, according to Puritan belief, 'man is only a trustee of the goods which have come to him through God's grace' (Weber 1930:170). This idea appears on the surface to be similar to that attitude adopted by most Japanese who regard their present wealth and well-being as being directly a result of the efforts of their ancestors, and who – in the context of the traditional household system – act as trustees of property and possessions that have come down to them through the hard work of their ancestors. Once again, however, the difference between the Puritan and Confucian attitudes can be seen in the fact that, while the former emphasizes a 'spiritual' entity, the latter is

concerned with an on-going set of social relationships. In the context of Japanese whaling, this sense of indebtedness to the ancestors has been carried across to one of indebtedness to the souls of whales which, by 'allowing' themselves to be killed, have helped whalers to survive from one generation to the next (Kalland and Moeran 1992:151-57).

Thirdly, Protestant asceticism regarded wealth as acceptable if used for God's purpose in the community, although the pursuit of riches as an end in itself was highly reprehensible (Weber 1930:172). Similarly, both Confucianist and *Jodo Shinshu* Buddhist doctrines emphasized that 'profit' should be neither dishonest nor excessive. Rather, man obtained profit by working and the basis of such profit depended on profiting *others* (Bellah 1957:120). Once again, therefore, we find that same distinction between abstract divine good and pragmatic social good made by Protestantism, on the one hand, and by Confucianism, on the other. Not surprisingly perhaps, arguments over the accumulation of wealth and what has been seen to be 'profiteering' have plagued discussions of Japanese whaling in an international context. Unless the differences in cultural attitudes towards such notions of capital accumulation and profit-making can be accepted, or at least taken into account, the debate over the ethics of whaling will continue to create apprehension and fears of cultural imperialism (and possibly racism) among many Japanese (Kalland and Moeran 1992:197-99).

Cultural Attitudes Towards Money and Gifts

This brief comparison of some of the relevant attitudes underlying the separate 'spirits' of capitalism as found in Europe and Japan brings us full circle to what I see as a false distinction between 'subsistence' and 'commercial' and to a discussion of the notions of money and gift exchange that can be seen to underlie this distinction. The first point to make here is that money is as full of moral evaluations as is anything else in our society, including gift exchange. Both must be seen in the cultural environment into which they are incorporated in any society, and cannot therefore be attributed with the same meanings as those which we derive from our own culture (cf. Parry and Bloch 1989:1). This is not always recognized by anthropologists in their discussion of forms of exchange in 'exotic' societies. It is certainly not recognized either by Western members of the IWC who are convinced that the constituent elements of capitalism *must* be the same the world over, or by conservationists who are eager to argue their anti-capitalist view.

Money, of course, has been discussed in a number of ways by Western philosophers and economists. Some, like Adam Smith, have regarded money as having a 'benign' influence on society's happiness and prosperity. Others, however, including Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, have viewed money as 'evil.' For Simmel, money acted to promote social integration, while Marx, who linked money to production for market exchange, saw it as ultimately serving to break down *Gemeinschaft* and the bonds of personal dependence between members of a community.² Regardless of the differences of their approach, however, almost all writers have seen money as a powerful agent which profoundly transforms both society and culture. At the same time – and this is a point of direct relevance to the policy adopted by the IWC *vis-a-vis* Japanese

small-type whaling – because money *seems* capable of measuring everything by the same yardstick, it reduces differences in *quality* to those of *quantity*, and with it relations between *people* to relations between *things* (for the value of a commodity expressed in money terms is made to appear as an intrinsic quality of the commodity itself) (Parry and Bloch 1989:6-7).

The distinction needs to be made here, however, between *representations* of money and its *practice*. As Simmel points out, ideally ‘money represents pure interaction in its purest form’ (1990:129) and is thus ‘nothing but the pure form of exchangeability’ (*ibid.*:130). But in practice we find that neither interaction nor exchange is ever ‘pure’ – if only because the values referred to earlier will always differ, both between cultures and within a single culture. This is one of the problems facing small-type whalers in countries such as Norway, Iceland and Japan who are faced with representations of money (in the guise of such terms as ‘subsistence’ and ‘commercial’) which in practice mean very little to them.³ As we shall see below, all interaction and exchange in whaling communities are subject to whole sets of morals that are totally different from those underlying similar social transactions in, for example, the management and organization of the IWC, on the one hand, or of conservation groups, on the other.

Interestingly, Simmel posits the development of money as ‘an element in a profound cultural trend. The different levels of culture may be distinguished by the extent to which, and at what points, they have a direct relationship with the objects that concern them, and on the other hand by the extent to which they use symbols’ (*ibid.*:148). Simmel here touches on a crucial issue differentiating whalers from conservationists, for while the former are directly and practically involved with the hunting, harvesting and distribution of whales, the latter use them primarily as symbols to support their ideological viewpoint. Similarly with money, which for whalers is part and parcel of the morality – and thus quality – of their everyday lives. For conservationists and IWC members, however, money is seen as a symbolic representation of an abstract value (in the singular) that can be quantified, measured and compared.

A word of warning is in order here. Any tendency to equate ‘primitive’ or ‘aboriginal’ with ‘non-monetary’ societies is clearly wrong. Money is most certainly to be found in pre-capitalist societies. At the same time, we should note that Western ideology tends to oppose money (market exchange) to gift exchange. Is this really acceptable? Do money and gifts form discrete spheres of exchange? Most anthropologists would argue against the idea. Although gifts may seem to be voluntary, in fact they are given and repaid under obligation. They are thus not ‘discrete,’ since all social phenomena contain the threads of which the social fabric is woven, and it is *groups* rather than individuals which carry on exchanges of all kinds – of which ‘the market is but one element and the circulation of wealth but one part of a wide and enduring contract’ (Mauss 1966:3). This has been precisely the argument put forward in studies of Japanese whaling communities (Akimichi et al. 1988:43-51; Kalland and Moeran 1992:139-47), where, too, we find that every gift is separated into two parts – object and spirit – so that ‘a bond created by things is in fact a bond between *persons*, since the thing itself is a person or pertains to a person. Hence it follows that to give something is to give a part of oneself’ (Mauss 1966:10).

From this it follows that in gift exchange one gives away what is in reality a part of one’s nature or substance, and receives in return a part of someone else’s nature or

substance. Thus there is not simply an obligation to *repay* gifts received, but equal obligations both to *give* presents and to *receive* them (*ibid.*:10-1). This is precisely the philosophy underlying both the psychological relation of ‘dependence’ (*amae*), and the Confucian-based concepts of *giri* and *ninj*, used to describe relations of interdependence, obligation and spontaneity, and generally seen to underpin all social relations in Japanese society (Benedict 1946; Doi 1973). At the same time, the fact that Japanese whalers give thanks to local shrines for each year’s harvest and make returns in kind to the sea (see Kalland and Moeran 1992:151-7) shows that, for the Japanese too, gifts are ‘made to men in the sight of gods or nature’ (Mauss 1966:12). It is with the gods and the spirits of the dead that man first made contracts, since *they* were the owners of the world’s wealth and it was seen to be particularly dangerous not to recognize this. Gifts to gods, as to men, ‘buy peace’ by keeping evil spirits at bay. We thus find in all sorts of societies – from Eskimo Koryak⁴ to Polynesian by way of Japanese – that a kind of contractual sacrifice is necessary.⁵ People have to be generous because otherwise the gods, ancestors or spirits will take their vengeance on excessive wealth (*ibid.*:14-5).

As Westerners we tend to ignore the fact that there are many peoples throughout the world who work hard, becoming wealthy and creating large surpluses in the process, and who exchange vast amounts in ways with which we are not familiar and for reasons that we may not appreciate from our own cultural background. Thus we should realize that a gift is not simply a gift: it can be, in Mauss’s words (1966:22), ‘at the same time property and a possession, a pledge and a loan, an object sold and an object bought, a deposit, a mandate, a trust’.⁶

It is clear that in some respects money is *like* a gift in that neither is a depersonalized instrument of exchange. On the contrary, ‘like the gift in kind [money] contains and transmits the moral qualities of those who transact it’ (Parry and Bloch 1989:8). This means that, although money may seem to most Westerners to be impersonal and to signify a sphere of purely ‘economic’ relationships, this should not be seen as being necessarily the case for other societies (including Japan) where money can express relationships which are ideally personal (rather than impersonal), enduring (rather than transitory), moral (rather than amoral), and altruistic (rather than calculating). In other words, it is our mistake to see the ‘economic’ as somehow divorced from other social relationships and forming an autonomous domain.⁷ On the contrary, as a number of recent studies on Japanese whaling have been at pains to show (Akimichi et al. 1988; Kalland & Moeran 1992; Takahashi et al. 1989), the ‘economic’ is clearly very much ‘embedded’ in society as a whole.⁸

Finally, given the distinction that has been made above regarding the different spirits of capitalism in Japan and Europe, it would seem logical to accept Parry and Bloch’s argument that it is not money as such which gives rise to a particular world view, but that a particular world view (deriving from various combinations of the four values outlined earlier) tends to give rise to specific ways of representing money. Certainly one avoids thereby an unrealistic determinism, for money does not always symbolize the same kinds of things, nor does it carry with it the same symbolic load as it does in the West. Rather, ‘the meanings with which money is invested are quite as much a product of the cultural matrix into which it is incorporated as of the economic functions it performs as a means of exchange, unit of account, store of value and so on’ (Parry and Bloch 1989:21). Thus, just as the opposition between money and *yagona* drinking in

Fijian society is in fact one between kinship and morality, rather than – as a Westerner would see things – between commerce and instrumentality (Toren 1989), so, too, is the opposition between the gifting and sale of whalemeat in Japanese whaling communities like Ayukawa an opposition between kinship and community, on the one hand, and the impersonal market, on the other. Money as an ‘object’ of exchange is thus relegated to secondary importance behind the ‘social’ value placed on gift exchange. Not surprisingly, whales themselves become the idiom by which social change is expressed, for marketing, profits and incomes are closely related to changes in methods of hunting, harvesting and preparation of whalemeat, which themselves lead inevitably to the kinds of social changes discussed by Kalland and Moeran (1992).⁹

Long and Short Term Transactional Systems

Any discussion of the ‘commercial’ or ‘subsistence’ nature of whaling, therefore, *must* focus on the *transactional systems* operating in whaling communities, rather than on the abstract meanings of ‘money,’ ‘commercial’ and ‘subsistence’ as such. Moreover, such discussion must recognize that there are *two* transactional orders to be examined. One is *short term*, conducted for the most part with outsiders, and concerned with the arena of individual competition among – in this instance – whalers. The other is *long term*, conducted within the community, and concerned with the reproduction of the social and cosmic order. Each cycle is essential to the other’s existence. Individual acquisition among whalers *has* to be a laudable and legitimate activity in the long term since it contributes to the welfare of that individual’s household, on the one hand, and of the community, on the other (cf. Parry and Bloch 1989:24-6). Hence Japanese whalers make money in order to allow the community as a whole to flourish, and they make ritual sacrifices to support these long term aims, as well as the moral values of ‘community.’ In other words, money making in the short term is made morally positive because wealth is converted to serve the reproduction of the long term cycle (although there is always the fear that grasping self-seeking individuals will hive off resources for their own short term ends).

If we look at an example of these cycles at work in the Japanese whaling community of Ayukawa, we find, first of all, that when one of the whaling companies set up its flensing station in the village it made a large annual donation towards the building and maintenance of a local primary school. We find, too, that the Ayukawa Fishing Association (later Cooperative) not only provided essential services to fishermen; it also embarked upon major community projects such as the development of the village’s water supply and construction of a harbour bridge. At the same time, by obliging all whaling companies to sell whalemeat through its fish market, the local cooperative was able to use the commission it received to create a system of capital loans to fishermen and small-type coastal whalers. There was thus a series of long-term exchanges between the whaling industry and community and the cooperative and community, on the one hand, and between cooperative, fishermen and the whaling industry, on the other – all based on short term money transactions. As has been proved by the imposition first of quotas and then of a moratorium on whaling, any move to restrict or promote the workings of one cycle is bound to affect those of the other.

All this means, of course, that it is quite impossible to discuss or understand the meaning of money in Japanese whaling communities without taking into account the way in which the use of money permeates the wider symbolic and social orders. The same criticism is to be made of the IWC’s recourse to such blanket terms as ‘commercial’ and ‘subsistence.’ At the same time, we must note that these three terms can mean different things to different people within the *same* culture, as well as to those in *different* cultures. Within Japan itself, ‘money’ and ‘profit’ most certainly do *not* carry the same connotations for small-type whalers as they do for, say, giant automobile or electronics manufacturers. As a result, it is ‘not only impossible to say what money will “mean” irrespective of cultural context, it is even misleading to presuppose that it will have any fixed and immutable meaning in a given context’ (Parry and Bloch 1989:22). This is why the distinction between ‘subsistence’ and ‘commercial’ forms of whaling made by the IWC is, in my opinion, both false and wrong. What ‘money,’ ‘subsistence’ and ‘commerciality’ may mean are not only situationally defined; they are also constantly in the process of being renegotiated. It is for this reason that the Commission would be wise to reconsider its categorization of whaling in general, and to renegotiate its values with the unorthodox conservationists at the Whaling Wall.

Notes

1. The document concerned arose out of discussions by an International Study Group for Small-Type Whaling during a symposium on the ‘Utilization of Marine Living Resources for Subsistence’ at Taji, Japan, from January 21st to 23rd, 1992, where this paper was first presented. I would like to thank fellow participants in the symposium for their comments and ideas included, but not always overtly recognized, in this reworked article.
2. It is probably precisely for this reason that political and business leaders in Japan have always emphasized the vital importance of one-to-one personal ties between superior and junior in contemporary Japanese society. See, for example, Nakane (1970).
3. For an example of differing representations of money and of how much it was ‘right’ to earn in the context of the Japanese folk craft movement, see Moeran (1984).
4. Mauss (1966:13) mentions, in passing, a Koryak whale festival.
5. Note, incidentally, that for Simmel the notion of ‘sacrifice’ or ‘renunciation’ produces exchange, and exchange consists of the two processes of giving and receiving, *and* of the simultaneous cause and effect generated by the processes of giving and receiving. In other words, economic life is an exchange of sacrifices (Simmel 1990:85-8).
6. In this context we might note that, although the Japanese are often disparagingly referred to by Westerners as ‘economic animals,’ ‘it is only our Western societies that quite recently turned man into an economic animal’ (Mauss 1966:74).
7. We have already pointed out how economic values have always been subordinated to political values in Japan (cf. Bellah 1957:5-6).
8. For an example of the ‘legitimacy’ of money when used to maintain the solidarity and class identity of a Sri Lankan fishing village, see Stirrat (1989).

9. For a similar pattern of local people's relationships to money and their local community – this time one of potters involved in the Japanese folk craft movement – see Moeran (1984, especially p. 160 and 174).

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Whose Whale is That? Diverting the Commodity Path

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ABSTRACT Using concepts from Appadurai's *The Social Life of Things*, this paper seeks to analyze the simultaneous processes of decommoditization of meat, oil and other whale products and the commoditization of a symbolic 'super-whale,' i.e. how an old established commodity path (commercial whaling) has been interrupted by a new one (low-consumptive use of whales). Through the cultural framework of ecological and animal rights discourses, government agencies, politicians and industries have been able to acquire green legitimacy and protection in return for supporting environmental and animal rights organizations. This exchange has been legitimised through the annual meetings of the International Whaling Commission, whale rescue operations and other 'tournaments of value.' How the 'super-whale' is turned into a commodity and consumed raises also the important question about rights in whales, and the ways by which the anti-whaling movement tries to appropriate whales will be contrasted with the whalers' way of appropriation.

Around 1980, at a conference on marine mammals held in Bergen, some people got together and tried to estimate the 'low-consumptive' – i.e. non-lethal consumption – value of cetaceans.¹ They arrived at an estimate of about US\$ 100 million, which was about the same value as for commercial whaling (Scheffer 1991:17-18). Since then commercial whaling has ceased, at least temporarily, while the low-consumptive value has increased manifold. What we have witnessed during the last two or three decades is, to use a phrase taken from Appadurai (1986), a diversion of a preordained commodity path, i.e. the route a commodity – loosely defined as goods and services of exchange value – used to travel from production through consumption has been altered. The moratorium imposed on commercial whaling by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1987,² has left whale protectionists as the main economic beneficiaries of cetaceans, which, together with seals, have turned out to be the most important source of income for environmental as well as for animal rights and animal welfare groups.³

One of the aims of this paper is to explore how the protectionists have tried to turn meat, oil and other whale products into products of no exchange value and thus sought them removed from the 'commodity state' (Appadurai 1986:13). A number of strategies have been used by environmental and animal welfare groups to achieve this end. For many years the ecological discourse dominated the rhetoric. Whales were believed to be endangered, and the moratorium was introduced in the name of conservation. Recently our knowledge on the population of some species of whales has improved considerably, however, and it is now evident that some whales can sustain a carefully monitored harvest (e.g. Barstow 1989:10; U.S. Marine Mammal Commission 1991:2;

Butterworth 1992). This has caused some groups – but by no means all – to switch from an ecological discourse to one based on animal welfare. At the same time they have embraced the image of a 'super-whale,' which combines traits from a number of different species of cetaceans as well as from human beings (Kalland 1993).

A second aim of this paper is to show how environmental and animal rights groups have created a demand for a 'green' conscience or a 'green' legitimacy and how they have been able to bestow these highly desired characteristics on those who sponsor the 'super-whale' myth. By using the ecological and animal welfare discourses as the cultural framework for exchangeability (Appadurai 1986:13), companies have acquired 'green' legitimacy (and partial immunity) by economically supporting environmental and animal rights organizations, while government agencies have obtained the same in return for political legitimacy. Both exchanges have been wrapped in the metaphors of 'super-whale' and 'goodness.' Thus, the 'super-whale' has taken on a life as a commodity of its own. Decommoditization of meat and oil and commoditization of the 'super-whale' are simultaneous processes in the diversion of the commodity path, and both find legitimacy through the annual IWC meetings and other 'tournaments of value,' where 'central tokens of value in the society' are contested (Appadurai 1986:21).

Finally, the paper discusses concepts of rights *in* or ownership of whales in order to show how it has been possible to redefine the rules for appropriating nature. It is the symbiotic relationship between environmental and animal rights group on the one hand and some national governments on the other – brought about by skilful manipulation of the ecological and animal welfare discourses – which has enabled this coalition to appropriate almost all whale stocks, to the exclusion of whalers.

Whale Protectionists and the 'Super-Whale' Myth

'The Whale Protectionists'

'Save the whale' organizations have proliferated in recent decades. Corrigan (1991) lists 74 whale conservation and 'research' organizations in the USA and Canada alone. Some organizations – like the American Cetacean Society, the Cetacean Society International (CSI), the Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society (WDCS), and the Whale Fund are aimed specifically to protection of cetaceans, while others – Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature (alias the World Wildlife Fund, WWF), and the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), for example – are more general in their scope but nevertheless earn substantial parts of their incomes from sea mammal campaigns.

People are attracted to the 'save the whale' cause for a number of reasons. Some are concerned about the environment. Believing (erroneously) reports which claim that all whales are endangered, they take part in anti-whaling activities or in other ways support environmental organizations. They might lose interest and turn to other issues if and when scientific data convince them that a carefully monitored exploitation of certain whale stocks does not put these in jeopardy. This is the attitude of the largest Norwegian environmental organizations, which are no longer opposed to whaling.

Others are concerned about the well-beings of individual whales, and a distinction ought to be made here between animal rights and whale rights advocates. The former are concerned with all kinds of animal, at least in theory, as any animal has an intrinsic

value on its own (Regan 1984:264). But, as pointed out by Tester (1991:14), it has never been the intention of these advocates to extend rights to all animals. Rights are extended to an inner circle of mammals (although seldom to wild rats and mice) with reptiles, fish, and molluscs on the margins. Insects and bacteria have no rights.

The whale rights advocates take their rhetoric from the animal rights philosophers and explicitly use it to a limited number of species, i.e. cetaceans. To these people whales are uniquely special. Barstow, founder of CSI, for example, claims that whales are biologically, ecologically, culturally, politically, and symbolically special. This uniqueness, he claims, merits special moral and ethical standards (Barstow 1991:7).⁴ He stops short of claiming rights to whales, but in a lengthy article D'Amato and Chopra (1991) argue for whale rights while explicitly denying such rights to all animals.

There is a tendency among the whale rights advocates to indulge in the 'super-whale' myth, and in this they join company with those whose interest in cetaceans springs from spiritual sources. The director of Sea Shepherd and co-founder of Greenpeace, Paul Watson, for example, claims that in 1973, after he had been initiated into the Oglala Sioux at Wounded Knee, a bison approached and instructed him in a dream to save all sea mammals, whales in particular (Scarce 1990:97). Since then he has embarked on a violent crusade against whalers and sealers, in what he envisions as the Third World War (Gabriel 1991:56). But not all are violent, of course. In the New Age movement whales, especially dolphins, are often seen as sacrosanct; pure agents for a higher existence and awareness. In a leaflet distributed by a group calling themselves 'Sanctuary in the Pines,' dolphins are depicted as a kind of Messiah, having been sent to the Earth so that the 'crystalline energy within their brain will activate the energy of the earth's group mind.' Once this has been accomplished 'their mission will be done,' and they will leave our planet. This theme can also be found in science fiction⁵ and in the beliefs that dolphins and human infants have similar brain waves which facilitate telepathic communication between infants (or even unborn children) and dolphins (Dobbs 1990:181; Cochrane and Callen 1992:28). Equally speculative are the claims that we have much to learn from cetaceans (e.g. Lilly 1961).

Finally, there are those who see in the anti-whaling campaign the potential for profit-making as well as for influence and fame. Greenpeace's interest in whales and seals, for example, seems to follow such considerations. 'We are strategic opportunists,' says Harald Zindler, leader of Greenpeace-Germany (Schwarz 1991:105), a view fully supported by its international director, Steve Sawyer, who has stated that the philosophy of the organization is very pragmatic: the leaders choose issues they are able to win (Pearse 1991:40). Greenpeace pays opinion-research institutes to uncover popular issues among supporters (Schwarz 1991:99), but also readily join issues proven popular by other organizations. The whaling and sealing campaigns are cases in point.⁶ Both issues were developed by others and were well on their way before Greenpeace entered the scene. Others had opened the fields, but Greenpeace stole the show.

The odds of winning are important considerations when selecting issues and making strategies – not only because the money this gives the organizations, but also because success attracts people to the cause. A large number of members and supporters makes the organizations more able to function as strong pressure groups while at the same time enabling them to play the role of stewards of nature and distributors of 'green' legitimacy. Before a campaign is launched, the chances of winning must be considered

NÅR JORDEN
ER SYG...



Når jorden er syg, vil dyrene begynde at forsvinde,
da vil regnbuekrigerne drage ud og redde dem.

"When the earth is ill, the animals will begin to disappear. Then the rainbow warriors will set out and save them." From a Greenpeace-Denmark publication.

good, the issue must be 'in' and the campaign activities must be able to reach a wide audience through mass media (Eyerman and Jamison 1989).

The 'Super-Whale'

Sidney Holt (1985:192-93), one of the leading whale protectionists and scientific advisor to IFAW, has given two reasons why it should be easy to save whales, i.e. to win and thus divert the commodity path. One reason⁷ is that:

[whales] are extremely attractive forms of wildlife; some of them sing, and many people have become familiar with their underwater performances on film and video. In many cultures whales and dolphins have an ancient and revered place as intelligent and benign companions of humans...

Cetaceans are indeed animals which can easily be ascribed symbolic significance. Whales form an anomalous category of animals (Kalland and Moeran 1992:5-6) since they do not fit into our simple categories of mammals and fish. Whales are 'betwixt and between,' and it is, according to Mary Douglas (1966), exactly those animals which are difficult to fit into our cognitive maps that become the object of myths and taboos. Moreover, whales move in salt water. We know very little about what is going on in the oceans, which opens the sea to manipulation and myth creation (Pálsson 1991:95; Kalland and Moeran 1992:7-8). Finally, the ocean – consisting largely of salt and water which are both important purifying agents used in religious rites throughout the world – becomes *the symbol of purity*, and thus stands in sharp contrast to the polluted soil on which we land mammals tread. Various environmental and animal rights groups have skilfully played on our susceptibility towards whales because it is precisely our predisposition towards these animals which forms the basis for these groups' success in commoditising whales on their premises.

Whale protectionists tend to talk about *the whale* in the singular, thereby masking the great variety that exists in size, behaviour and abundance between the about 75 species of cetaceans. By lumping together traits found in a number of species an image of a 'super-whale' is created.⁸ We are told that the whale is the largest animal on earth (this applies to the blue whale); that the whale has the largest brain on earth (the sperm whale); that the whale has a large brain-to-body-weight ratio (the bottlenose dolphin); that the whale sings nicely (the humpback whale); that the whale has nurseries (some dolphins); that the whale is friendly (the gray whale); that the whale is endangered (the blue and right whales) and so on. By talking about *the whale*, an image of a single whale possessing *all* these traits – whose validity is often questionable – emerges. Such a creature does not exist.

Whales are often anthropomorphised by given human traits as well. They are depicted as living in societies similar to our own. They live in 'families' rather than in pods (e.g. Cousteau 1988:191), the humpbacks 'compose' music (Johannsen 1990:83); and they think and feel like humans (e.g. Nollman 1990). The 'super-whale' is endowed with all the qualities we would like to see in our fellow humans: kindness, caring, playfulness. While commercialization has penetrated most human relations, leaving many people with a nagging bad conscience for not taking care of aging parents and for not giving the children the attention they need, whales are depicted as the guardians of old values. The 'super-whale' cares for the sick and dying, baby-sits and runs nurseries, without

charging anything for these services. Not only does it care for its own kind, time and time again it rescues humans in danger.

In short, whales 'represent the closest approach to civilization, not as defined in terms of machine or technology, but as realized among all intelligent beings, cetacean or human, where communication and social bonds transcended the mere exigencies of life' (Abbey 1990:80). What *Homo sapiens* is on land, cetaceans are in the sea (Barstow 1991:7). They are our brethren, they have become 'the humans of the sea' (Gylling-Nielsen 1987). In Lévi-Strauss' terms, whale society has become a metaphor for the lost human paradise or utopian world and caring for whales has become a metaphor for kindness, for being 'good.'


Turning the 'Super-Whale' into a Commodity

This 'super whale,' with all its cetacean and human qualities, has proved to have enormous economic and political potential. What has turned this image into a commodity, however, is the emergence of a new demand among individuals, companies and governments to appear 'green.' This demand has been created by the growing environmental awareness among people, fuelled by the crisis maximizing strategies of many environmental groups. In the ecological discourse, whales have come to play the role of a metonym for nature and the image of the 'endangered whale' has become a symbol for environmentalists. 'Saving whales is for millions of people a crucial test of their political ability to halt environmental destruction,' writes Holt (1985:192). If we cannot save whales, what else can we then save?

The whaling issue has become a symbol to the environmental and animal welfare movements because this issue provides them with an easily identifiable enemy and a sense of urgency, two factors a consultant to Greenpeace identified as the requirements for raising money (Spencer 1991:179). The creation of an enemy and an urgency are closely associated with the animal welfare and ecological discourses, respectively. Tournaments of value provide the arena and ecological and animal welfare discourses provide the cultural framework that protect transactions between companies, governments and environmental/animal welfare groups from being classified as bribes or blackmailing.

Creating an Enemy

The war metaphor is a favourite one among the 'Green Warriors.' At one level the metaphor is used to convey an image of a uneven fight between 'defenseless' whales and 'greedy' whalers, often ending in 'massacres.' In their rhetoric whales are depicted as 'lovely,' 'gentle,' 'peaceful,' 'graceful,' 'magnificent,' 'delightful,' 'beautiful,' 'playful,' 'loyal,' 'innocent,' and so on. The list of positively valued characteristics can be extended almost endlessly. 'Whales and dolphins are one-dimensional beings. They are only *positive!*' writes Paul Spong (1992:25), who brought the anti-whaling issue into Greenpeace (Brown and May 1991:32), and goes on to claim that we love to watch whales because 'they model such a perfect form of existence that they take us away from ourselves.' Another of Greenpeace's founding fathers, Patrick Moore, says that to get people 'save the whale you have to get them believe that whales are good' (Pearce



From an anti-whaling demonstration outside the hotel where the 44th Annual IWC Meeting was held, Glasgow 1992.

1991:27). That the killer whale is the largest predator on Earth is, on the other hand, concealed as is recent research showing that most species are promiscuous, suitors often engage in brutal fights over females, commit 'gang rapes' and might secure females by chasing and harassing them into submission (Carpenter and Schmidt 1992:60-1; Winton 1992:18).

The whalers are portrayed as the whales' opposite. They are 'cruel,' 'brutal,' 'reckless,' 'barbaric,' 'insatiable greedy,' 'butchers,' 'savages,' 'sadists,' and so on. They are 'pirates' engaged in 'evil' and 'criminal' activities 'defying' international law. D'Amato and Chopra (1991:27) suggest that whalers are more likely to commit genocide of 'inferior' human beings, and World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA Circular No. 881406) suggests that children exposed to hunting activities more likely will show violent, criminal behaviour toward others. One of the more extreme expressions – which emphasizes the contrast between peaceful, innocent whales and savage whalers – comes from Brian Davies (1985:1), the founder of IFAW.⁹ In his words the Faroese pilot whaling is:

a savage harvest ... the most brutal festival you can imagine. Peaceful pilot whales are herded together and then lured close to land through their loyalty to a captured comrade from their pod or family group. And there they are simply hacked to death. (Underlines as in original, italics added.)

The above quote brings to light yet another aspect of the rhetoric, namely how the whales are put to death. Some of the more moderate organizations claim that whaling methods are 'inhumane' and not worthy of 'civilized' nations without going into detail. But

others – and the mass media seems to take the lead – think that the crueler the slaughter can be depicted, the better. The Faroese whalers 'smash gaffs into the flesh' of the pilot whales and 'hack' them to death, and the 'gentle' minke whale is left 'to trash around for hours in its death throes' (*Daily Mirror*, June 25, 1992, p. 30).¹⁰

At another level the war metaphor seeks to divide mankind into 'good' and 'bad' people. In the world view of the whale protectionists, the positive qualities ascribed to whales are extended to people who 'defend' them and 'fight' against the 'bad' whalers and their supporters. Through this process the anti-whalers create a totemic dichotomy of mankind, with whales as the totem for themselves and with money as the totem for the whalers (Kalland 1993), a world view strongly opposed by the whalers.

One of the oppositions in this scheme, is that between the civilized (whale saver) and uncivilized (whaler). Whalers are uncivilized, and to Sir Peter Scott, who held the post as WWF's chairman for more than 20 years, 'no civilised person can contemplate the whaling industry without revulsion and shame at the insensitivity of our own species' (quoted in Davies *et al.* 1991:2). Caring about whales has become a mark of personal and societal maturity (Scheffer 1991:19) and a qualification for membership in the 'world community' (Fuller 1991:2). Envisaged is a convergence of national cultures (Holt 1991:8), where all people feast on the 'super-whale' myth. The whaling issue provides a cheap way to satisfy people's demands for being 'civilized' member of the 'global village.'

Whalers make excellent enemies. That there are few nations engaged in whaling means that the cost of the moratorium is born by the few and makes whalers easily identifiable and thus ideal scapegoats for environmental disasters and human cruelty to animals. Moreover, they tend to live in remote areas with only limited possibilities to influence central governments.¹¹ Nor are their products regarded 'necessary' by the anti-whalers. This is the second reason why Holt (1985:193) believes it is easy to save whales.

The 'need' argument has been introduced by animal rights advocates in order to solve the contradiction between life and death. For, as Albert Schweitzer (1950:189) once remarked, life depends upon taking life. To Peter Singer (1978:9), because 'animals should not be killed or made to suffer significant pain except when there is no other way of satisfying important human needs, it follows that whaling should stop.' Singer has nutritional needs in mind, but there are other needs to consider. Subsistence and cultural needs were taken into account when the IWC authorized aboriginal subsistence whaling (Donovan 1982). Most of the anti-whaling groups have endorsed this kind of whaling even though, compared with modern commercial whaling, it inflicts far more pain on the whales due to its simpler technologies.¹²

Whereas a concession has been given to aboriginal peoples who are allowed to catch whales to satisfy subsistence and cultural needs, this has been denied commercial whalers. Needs are seen strictly in material terms, and the whalers have no need to catch whales because they share the general prosperity of the capitalist societies in which they live and work. They can afford to buy pork, beef and turkey.¹³ But whaling is more than making a living. Whaling is a way of life and must be seen 'as a process whereby hunters mutually create and recreate *one another*, through the medium of their encounter with prey' (Ingold 1986:111). To deny them cultural needs, the protectionists take an extreme materialistic attitude, which may surprise many people who have taken their general

anti-capitalist rhetoric at face value. But by arguing that there is no need to kill whales, they turn whaling into a 'senseless' activity which can only be understood in terms of 'greed' and 'short-term profit.' Again the whalers can be presented in a negative way, making them easy targets for hate campaigns.

Exaggerating Crisis

A recent survey conducted in four non-whaling countries (Australia, England, Germany, U.S.A.) and two whaling countries (Japan and Norway) indicates that knowledge about whale populations is poor – particularly in the non-whaling countries where between 65 and 70 per cent believed (wrongly) that all large species are in danger of extinction (Freeman and Kellert 1992). But only a few species are in fact endangered (Aron 1988). The minke whale – which Greenland, Iceland, Japan, and Norway want to harvest – can hardly be regarded as endangered and, with estimated stocks at 750,000 animals in the Antarctic, it may well be more abundant there than ever (Gulland 1988:44).

It seems to be easier for the animal and whale rights groups than for the environmental groups to accept the new estimates of whale populations since the argument of the former is not based on ecological considerations but on the ethics of killing. Their argument is thus not 'endangered' by higher whale population figures. To groups who pretend to be concerned with ecological issues, however, the logical consequence of higher estimates ought to be a feeling of relief accompanied by a switch to more urgent matters. But this has by and large not happened. Some of anti-whaling advocates have changed their arguments from ecology to ethics, thus crossing the line between environmentalism and animal welfare,¹⁴ while others stubbornly keep to the ecological discourse or argue from both perspectives at once.

At the government level, the U.S. commissioner to the IWC, John Krauss, for example, said in an interview (*Marine Mammal News*, 17(5), May 1991, p. 4) that he would continue to defend the U.S. position against commercial whaling on ethical grounds since he could not do so any longer on a scientific basis. And the British Minister of Agriculture, John Gummer, turned to the argument of 'inhumane' killing methods after first pointing out that minke whales are plentiful (*The Guardian*, May 27, 1991; *The Times*, May 29, 1991).

In the anti-whaling organizations, the president of CSI writes that 'the science is now on [the whalers'] side. We can't even talk about extinction. Our arguments now focus on ethical, aesthetic, and moral reasons for the protection of the individual whale, not the population or the species' (Shields 1992). Michael Sutton of WWF-USA admits that the organization will 'have a hard time continuing' to argue ecologically (Bright 1992:69). So WWF has now taken the position that 'even if the IWC ... could guarantee that whaling was only carried out on a truly sustainable basis, WWF would remain opposed to the resumption of whaling' (WWF 1992:1) and wants to change the Whaling Convention from one regulating whaling into one protecting whales (Sutton 1992:2). Greenpeace has taken a similar position (Ottaway 1992:3).

Knowing that ecological arguments against whaling are more palatable than ethical and moral ones to a number of people, firms, and government agencies, and realizing that the 'terms of the [whaling] convention have required that this debate be conducted in a scientific guise' (Butterworth 1992:532),¹⁵ many protectionists are more than

reluctant to change their rhetoric from an ecological discourse to one based on animal welfare or rights. Instead they stick to the myth of the endangered whale by accusing the scientists behind the new estimates of being incompetent, biased and 'bought' by governments of whaling nations, by refusing to accept new population estimates, by refuting their relevance or by introducing new arguments into the ecological discourse.

Some continue to argue as if all whale species are close to extinction. Greenpeace launched a 'Save the last whales' as late as in 1992, just in time for the annual IWC-meeting, and writes that the Norwegian government 'seems hell bent on waging a war of eradication on marine mammals' (Ottaway 1992:13). And in its 'SOS Save the Whale' campaign WWF-Denmark recently rather emotionally appealed for support to save the last whale (WWF-Denmark 1990). Many of these organizations, as well as media, live by crisis maximization and, by giving the impression that the moratorium is about to be lifted (e.g. *The Mail on Sunday*, June 21, 1992), they exploit upcoming IWC meetings to launch fundraising campaigns.¹⁶

It is also claimed that the whale population is irrelevant because commercial whaling will – by a law of nature, it seems – lead to over-exploitation and extinction. They tend to take the history of pelagic, industrial whaling as evidence (e.g. Greenpeace International 1992:1). But such an argument ignores the progress in IWC's management procedures during the 1970s, when the IWC entered a short period of science-based approach to whale management (Hoel 1986; Freeman 1990). The argument further denies mankind the ability to learn from past mistakes. Finally, the argument overlooks important differences in whaling regimes. To liken contemporary minke whaling with the old industrial whaling distorts the issue because: (1) whereas the main product for industrial whaling was oil, the most important product for minke whaling has always been meat for which there is a limited market; and (2) the minke whaling boats are, with the exception of Japanese minke whaling in the Antarctic, small and family operated under an economic rationality different from that of the large pelagic expeditions (ISGSTW 1992). There is thus little continuity between the two forms of whaling.

A recent strategy used by protectionists is to bring in new arguments into the ecological discourse (Butterworth 1992), a strategy whaling nations perceive as foot-dragging. While the protectionists may accept the new estimates, they argue that our knowledge on fertility and mortality is insufficient; that we do not know the impact on whale resources from pollution, depletion of the ozone layer, fishing and other human activities; that we must manage the whales stock by stock and we have a long way to go before we can safely delineate separate stocks; that inspection and enforcement must be written into the revised management procedure; introducing concepts like 'protected status,'¹⁷ and so on.

Tournaments of Value

The images of enemies and crisis are brought into prominence during tournaments of value, and media has turned some of these encounters into major events. The most spectacular are the annual IWC meetings in which privileged participants compete for status, rank, fame, and reputation by contesting central values in an attempt to diversify 'culturally conventionalized paths' (Appadurai 1986:21). Member countries send dele-

gations ranging from the large Japanese and American ones with dozens of delegates down to the one-person delegation, each with one vote regardless of size. In addition to diplomats and bureaucrats, delegations may also include scientists (mainly natural scientists but increasingly also social scientists), environmentalists and animal rights advocates (in the case of anti-whaling nations) and whalers (in the case of whaling nations). Their task is to contest opposing values pertaining to whales and their exploitation (Moeran 1992b) and to give scientific legitimacy to their positions.

A large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are allowed to attend the proceedings, without rights to vote or speak.¹⁸ They tend to form two major blocks. The largest is composed mainly of environmental and animal rights groups, while the smaller is composed of groups working for indigenous peoples or for sustainable whaling in general. The NGOs have several tasks during the IWC meetings. Firstly, they lobby the delegates and try to convince the general public through the mass media that their world view is the correct one. In addition to press conferences and demonstrations, about 20 protectionist groups jointly issue a paper called *Eco* during IWC meetings, while the High North Alliance publishes *The International Harpoon*. Secondly, they report directly back to their followers without going through the whims of mass media, thus enabling them to control the distribution of information regarding their own activities. Finally, and this is the most important point for our discussion, the NGOs monitor the proceedings and report their interpretations and evaluations of the delegates' performances to their supporters or to the mass media that do not have access to the conference room. By this arrangement the NGOs are in a unique position to manipulate the flow of information, to put pressure on national governments and politicians, to endorse their opinions and statements thus enhancing their prospects of being reelected, and to create a 'ranking list' of the most 'progressive' delegations and nations.¹⁹

The last actor at the IWC meeting is the mass media without whose participation the meeting would have been a much less attractive arena for contesting the commodity path. But the press is severely restricted in their work as it has no access to the conference room, and only parts of the proceedings are transmitted to the press room. Instead, pauses in the proceedings have been turned into intense press-briefing sessions where the media rely heavily on the services of the NGOs and some of the delegates. With anti-whaling NGOs in majority and with most of the media coming from anti-whaling nations with strong anti-whaling populations, it should come as no surprise that anti-whaling sentiments dominate the newspaper columns and news broadcasts. Anti-whaling demonstrations also contribute to this situation. Moreover, the media willingly reports from the latest anti-whaling publications, particularly if they are sensational in character and grossly exaggerate crises. In short, the IWC meetings provide environmental and animal rights group a rare opportunity to get their message out to millions of people.

Whale strandings offer other occasions for tournaments of value, with different sets of participants. Whalers and their supporters are usually excluded, and these tournaments are left to protectionists, companies, and government agencies – which may compete in leadership, in suggesting solutions, and in getting credit for progress. For example, in a recent stranding of 49 false killer whales in Australia rescue work – undertaken by several animal welfare groups in addition to National Parks officials, employees of marine parks and Sydney zoo, the Army and the Salvation Army – suffered

from conflicting advice and priorities, culminating in the walk-out of the Organization for Research and Rescue of Cetaceans in Australia (Wheatley 1992:14-5).

At times rescuers make strange bedfellows, as when Greenpeace and the Alaskan oil industry in October 1988 joined hands with each other and with Eskimo whalers, U.S. and Soviet government agencies, and industrialists to free three gray whales trapped in Alaskan ice. The media may well have turned the case into 'the World's Greatest Non-Event' (Rose 1989), but were only a tool in the P.R. contest between the rescuers, each trying to outbid the others and not be left behind.²⁰ And most of all, the media attention and all the calls from people wanting to help made it possible for the anti-whaling groups to strengthen the boycott against Iceland's fish products in the attempt to bring an end to that country's whaling activities and thus further remove whale meat from the commodity state.

Direct confrontations during the hunt constitute another important arena which helps to bring about a diversion of the path. They usually take place far from shore and therefore provide the activists with the opportunity to invent news – a role much appreciated by Greenpeace's co-founder Robert Hunter (Pearce 1991:20) – or to monopolize news coverage. Although a nuisance to whalers these actions are not necessarily meant to bring forth an immediate termination of whaling activities, but they tell the world that the activists are concerned about the environment, that the issue is urgent and cannot wait, and that they fight against powerful enemies and great odds. The activists are always depicted as underdogs; it is the small zodiac against the big catching boat, or swimming greenpeacers in front of a Japanese factory ship. The situation is ideally suited for presenting a pictures of David fighting Goliath. By skilfully manipulating the mass media, an enormous sympathy to their cause is brought forth, which is one reason behind their success in removing whale meat from the commodity state and placing the 'super-whale' in its stead. It matters little that the picture is false and that with environmentalism being a multi-billion-dollar industry, it is rather the whalers who are the weak party.

Consuming the 'Super-Whale'

Through the mass media, the public can participate as spectators in such tournaments of value, which are, moreover, important marketing devices for 'low-consumptive' use of whales. Tournaments and 'low-consumptive' use of whales allow millions of people to partake in the 'super-whale' myth, which provides the backdrop and *raison-d'être* for whalewatching, movies, books and so on. But the 'super-whale' is a symbolic type of commodity and what is consumed is not really the symbol itself, but human relations (Moeran 1992b), for which the 'super-whale' is a metaphor. Therefore, the 'feasting' on the 'super-whale' does not exhaust the 'super-whale' but adds to its economic and political power, at least up to a certain point. Whalewatching in particular is seen as a means to educate people in the 'proper' way of appreciating the qualities of the 'super-whale' (Hoyt 1992:1) and thus give further impetus to the mystification of whales and the anti-whaling campaign. But, as we shall see in the last section of this paper, by becoming too successful, the 'super whale' might put itself in danger of being removed from the commodity state.

Whale Tourism

One of the first 'low-consumptive' uses of cetaceans appeared in the dolphinariums which still are very popular and have probably done more than anything else to foster a feeling of emotion toward cetaceans. But the dolphinariums are not completely 'non-consumptive' because the mortality rate is quite high for dolphins. Moreover, to view dolphins in captivity is not any longer regarded as authentic or the real thing. Animal advocates have turned against dolphinariums.

The 'real thing,' of course, is to watch the whales in the wild, and more than 4 million people reportedly spent more than US\$300 million on whale watching activities in 1991 (Hoyt 1992:1). Many of the environmental and animal rights groups organize whale safaris, and those organized by the WDCS from London must be among the most exclusive: a tour to Alaska from £2,995, to Baja California from £2,070, to Galapagos from £3,260, and to the Antarctic and Falkland Islands from £5,350.

Patricia Corrigan (1991) has been able to trace more than 200 commercial whale-watch operators offering more than 250 different tours in North-America alone. The tours range in durations from an hour to a fortnight, and prices vary from \$7 to \$3,000 (Corrigan 1991:7). They all offer special excitements. One operator invites us 'to reach out and touch nature' while we 'travel in safety aboard a comfortable cruise vessel, in harmony with nature and at nature's own pace' (p. 182). Some seek to enhance this 'one-ness' with nature by using small kayaks so as to be less separated from the water environment, while others prefer to observe nature through panoramic windows from a delux bar aboard a liner carrying 700 passengers.

Many of the tours also feature cultural attractions. One operator offers homemade Portuguese specialties and folk music; while a company in Newfoundland announces that 'the captain will sing for you and dance with you as part of the entire cultural experience' (p. 255). Some operators tempt potential tourists with such attractions as Indian and Inuit villages *en route*. Among the more bizarre attractions is one offered in Newfoundland, where the human/cetacean encounter has been turned upside-down by guiding 'people into our spectacular marine environment so that the whales can watch them!' (p. 250). In short, there is something for everyone. To bring that message home, many operators offer tailor-made trips which 'exactly suit the desires of the client.'

It is interesting to note that so many of the operators claim that they operate in an 'area where whales abound' and are able to guarantee sighting success or a new trip. This impression is underscored by Hoyt (1992:1), who can calm those believing the rhetoric of these same organizations that whales are on the brink of extinction, by stating that all 'the large whale species and many dolphins and porpoises can be seen regularly on a wide range of tours.'

These whale watching trips often develop into cult-like seances. Anybody who has witnessed the unison *oooohhhhh* from deck when a whale 'waves' its tail in 'goodbye' will be struck by the strong sense of community aboard the vessel. One tour operator at Hawaii exploits this and announces that those who learn a whale song during the voyages, which last from 1 to 3 hours, are 'treated to an unofficial initiation as honorary crew members' (p. 173).²¹



Whale watching is advertised in many ways. This bus operates from Ketchikan, Alaska.

Swim with a Whale

Not everybody is satisfied by watching cetaceans from deck, however. More and more people want to swim with cetaceans. In Hong Kong 'dolphin-lovers' have broken into the Ocean Park at night, in order to have a free ride (Carter and Parton 1992:5), and in West-Australia people are queuing up to be in the water with a group of dolphins (Winton 1992). Babies born in close proximity with dolphins are believed by some to be more harmonious and to develop exceptional talents (Dobbs 1990:181), and might even develop into *Homo delphinus* (Cochrane and Callen 1992:30). In the United States there are several licenced dolphinariums with 'swim-with-dolphins-programmes' (Hatt 1990:247), and these institutions claim that their programmes are of therapeutic value for handicapped and distressed people.²²

Others, who dislike that dolphins are kept in captivity, have taken these programmes into the wild. The relatively few friendly dolphins become famous and attract large crowds of people, some of whom are seeking therapy. To the initiate, dolphins like Jojo, Fungie, Donald, Opo, Percy, Simo, Horace, Dorah, and Jean Louis have become intimate friends and cult objects, and apparently it matters little in which corner of the globe they appear. Many of the 'dolphin lovers' seem to belong to the jet set.

One of the most celebrated 'dolphin therapists' is Horace Dobbs who holds a Ph.D. in psychiatry. In a series of books and movies he describes encounters with dolphins and the reactions among his depressed patients. Several of Dobbs' patients testified that they felt relaxed among dolphins. Being with the animal released them from the anxiety

of having to perform; to live up to other people's expectations. Together with the dolphin one can behave 'naturally,' as the following testimonial clearly shows (from Dobbs [1990:82-3]):

I felt like a Princess being taken away to another land by her Prince ... My Prince was taking me into his world beyond the realms of fantasy .. We were together as one ... I was him and he was me. Complete harmony and love....

I did not speak, we communicated with our hearts. I was totally and completely in love ... This beautiful dolphin loved me for what I was in my heart. It didn't matter whether I was old, young, fat or thin. I didn't have to impress him with a string of degrees. I was loved and accepted for myself, for the person I was. Simo was far superior to me in every way in the water. I did not have to compete, all the stresses of human values and life no longer existed.

Testimonials, through which individuals can share experiences and receive emotional support from a small group of likeminded people, is a common feature in many New Age sects. Those who share the experiences are typically described as good and sensible people. The only person mentioned in Doobs' book *Dance to a Dolphin Song* and who did not have a spiritual experience with the dolphin is described as 'the very fat, rich, American lady' who got only fleeting attention from the dolphin (Dobbs 1990:97). To be rejected by a dolphin can thus imply rejection by the support group, but when good people meet in the water marvellous things can happen (Dobbs 1990:95).

Whales in Literature and Arts

Whale-watching guide books have started to appear to cater for whale tourists, and books about friendly dolphins help to satisfy the 'searching minds.' Such books might well be the latest genres of whale literature appearing on the market. But it is by no means the only genres. Melville's *Moby Dick* was probably the first best seller having a whale as one of the main characters. Other novels have followed. Lloyd Abbey's book *The Last Whales* (1990) takes the genre in a new direction in that all the characters are whales. In his novel interspecies communication is common, and the oceans would have been a paradise had it not been for human beings and killer whales.

Whales figure also in other genres of literature. A steady flow of beautiful picture-books are being published, and Heathcote William's odyssey to whales – which combines exiting photographs and emotional poems – has already become a sort of a classic to whale lovers (Williams 1988). Some writers of science fiction are also intrigued by cetaceans. In *Startide Rising* written by David Brin (1983), for example, the space craft *Streaker* is crewed by humans and *neo-dolphins*, the latter being a result of genetic engineering. Interestingly, considering the Japanese positive attitude to whaling, the neo-dolphins communicate in Japanese *haiku* verses.

'Writers of science fiction have often speculated about what it would be like to discover, on a planet in outer space, a much higher form of intelligence,' write D'Amato and Chopra (1991:21), and continue: 'Stranger than fiction is the fact that there already exists a species of animal life on earth that scientists speculate has higher than human intelligence.' This is the whale.

Quoting Dr. John Lilly as proof, and ignoring all scientists of a different opinion, D'Amato and Chopra seem to have taken the step from science to New Age. They are

not alone in so doing. A number of books can best be described as examples of dolphin cults. Titles like *Dolphin Dreamtime; Behind the Dolphin Smile, Dance to a Dolphin's Song, Dolphins and Their Power to Heal, Pictures in the Dolphin Mind* and *The Magic of Dolphins* are all telling. At the same time, 'cetacean artists' have appeared on the stage painting pictures or recording music in praise of whales and dolphins. Books, movies, videos, 'whale music,' 'art objects,' stickers, posters, photos, stamps, bags, T-shirts, soft toys, buttons, jewellery, computer games, and so on provide nourishment and visualize people's commitment to the cause and thus help build a community of believers.

Selling Green Images

Individuals may go on whale watching tours, pay for a swim with a whale, buy some of the many artifacts carrying whale symbols, or send a check to one of the many anti-whaling organizations and get peace in mind believing they have done something for the environment. Government agencies acquire, as has been argued in this paper, their 'green' images by supporting, and thus giving legitimacy to, the anti-whaling movement. In this section we shall focus on industrial firms, some of which cause the greatest threat to marine life.

There has in recent years been a 'green' marketing boom in which companies try to take advantage of the ecological discourse. This can be done through 'totemic classification' by which a relationship between nature and product is established, or through 'eco-commercialism' by which a company can create an image that it is aware of the environment (Moeran 1992a:197-98). One way to do this is, of course, to claim in their ads that they are 'green,' by planting a tree for each car sold, for example. But the claim is more trustworthy if it can be endorsed by outsiders.

It is precisely here that the environmental and animal welfare groups have a role to play. In the rescue of the gray whales, for example, oil companies and other industrialists worked side by side with Greenpeace (Rose 1989), and the work was transmitted worldwide for everybody to see. It is in this context one must analyse many of the transactions between environmentalist and animal welfare groups and industrial concerns.

The WWF, for example, has on several occasions been willing to sell 'green images' to companies in need of one. In Denmark, WWF allowed the Norwegian Statoil company to use the WWF logo in ads and to announce that the oil company supported WWF's work for endangered species in order to get more Danes to fill their tanks with Statoil products. One million Danish *kroner* (about US\$150,000) seems to have been a reasonable price to pay for having WWF to legitimize advertisements for products that others might argue are harmful to the environment.

More companies than Statoil are in need of a 'green' images, and these may be actively targetted by environmental and animal rights organizations.²³ In a letter to Danish business leaders, WWF-Denmark (1990) writes (after first claiming that the whaling moratorium was about to be lifted, causing the eradication of all known whale species for all future):

Therefore I send you this SOS for assistance in WWF's fight for an extension of the moratorium. Here your company can give a cash contribution by sponsoring a whale for 50,000 *kroner*. The

sponsorship will in a positive way connect your activities with WWF ... Through a sponsorship your company has the opportunity to show your associates that it takes the environment and 'the green wave' seriously... I am sure that you will see the opportunities which a whale sponsorship will imply to your business. (Author's translation from Danish.)

The letter seems to have brought about the results it was expected to, and one of the companies that decided to sponsor a whale was the Danish chemical company, Børste. In order to celebrate its own 75 years anniversary the company placed an advertisement in the *Børsen*, the Danish equivalent to Wall Street Journal telling that: 'We bought a giant sperm whale from WWF, World Wide Fund for Nature, as a birthday present to ourselves ... We know from the seller that he has more whales, in many sizes.'²⁴

WWF has taken the lead in developing whale adoption as a fund raising measure. WWF-Denmark has alone earned more than £200,000 from persons and companies that have adopted, or 'bought' as it is frequently termed, sperm and killer whales outside the coast of North-Norway during the second half of 1990. The price is about £4,500 for a sperm and £450 for a killer whale. If this is too much, people are welcome to co-sponsor whales. Other organizations have similar programmes. WDCS, for example, offers 'peaceful' orcas off British Columbia (the term 'killer whale' is not used in the ads, for understandable reasons) (*Sonar*, No.7:4-5). Mingan Island Cetacean Study in Quebec offers 210 blue whales, each costing \$100 per person, \$1,000 for a corporate adoption (Corrigan 1991:311). Allied Whale announces that 'about 35 individual finback whales are available for \$30; a mother and calf cost \$50' (*ibid.*). Save the Whales International in Hawaii invites interested people to 'welcome a Hawaiian humpback whale into their extended family' (op. cit., 312). Through these programmes, people can adopt whales in distant waters, in the same way as many people in rich countries 'adopt' children in the Third World. And, as with the adoption of a child, the whale's 'adopted parents' are provided with a picture of 'their child' and annual 'progress reports.'

In all the activities we have analysed a feeling of belonging is created through the partaking in the 'super-whale' myth. This is most obvious on whale watching tours and in 'swim with a whale' programmes, but participation in whale saving operations and adoption programmes can also be a boost to company moral (cf. Rose 1989:234). By displaying the proper buttons, T-shirts, jewellery, photos, bags and art objects, one's belonging to the movement is communicated to the world. And through books, movies and computer games, consumers are educated to appreciate the qualities of cetaceans in the 'correct' way, which is a learning process that starts early in the childhood.²⁵ But the very success of the 'super-whale' poses also a threat to its exotism and its future. Although the 'super-whale' may survive, the cultural framework in which it has been commoditised may not. A cessation of all whaling activities will mean a *de facto* appropriation of the whales by the anti-whaling movement, leaving the ecological and whale welfare discourses meaningless.

Whose Whale?

Appadurai (1986) talks about the path through which a commodity travels from production to consumption. From a whaler's perspective, *he* is a part of such a path; he

is a step in a long chain of interconnected parts. His task is to hunt and capture whales and bring the carcasses to processors or merchants. Meat goes one way in the chain of exchange and usually money goes the other way, although a lot of whale meat is also bartered or gifted. The money thus earned, the whalers spend on various things, including equipment and provisions.

The whaler possesses only a fraction of the total body of knowledge which is required in order to bring a whale from the sea to the dinner table. But his knowledge is crucial, and includes how to find whales, how to identify the species, how to chase them, how to manoeuvre the boat so that the gunner can aim and hit a moving target from an unsteady boat, how to secure the animal once shot, how to winch it aboard and flens it, how to handle the meat so that it does not spoil, and so on. But knowledge regarding whaling also includes rules of the game. In this context the most important rules are regulations pertaining to rights in whales.

In fisheries which are based on free access to marine resources, ownership rights to fish are usually obtained through investment of labour. Fish trapped on hooks or in nets are not any longer nobody's property but belong to somebody, usually the owner of the gear. Rights in fish can also be acquired by spotting or initiating a chase, and in whaling all principles are at work.

Striking a whale implies in many cases ownership, even should the whale subsequently be lost. Old Norse laws, for example, have detailed regulations about ownership of whales found drifting with marked arrows, spears or harpoons in their bodies (Martinsen 1964; ISG 1992:22). Today, a whale is rarely lost and hitting a whale implies *de facto* ownership. But what about sightings?

In Japan and Norway, at least, sighting in itself is usually not enough to appropriate a whale. A chase has to be initiated. Only when a whale has been sighted *and* a chase has been started will the other boats recognize the claim to ownership. But the claim is void if the whale escapes.

If only one whale can be chased at the time, it makes little sense to lay claim on a school of whales. This has far-reaching consequences for communication between boats. In Japan, where boats operate near land and are obliged in most cases to land the carcass to a designated shore station before nightfall, a boat can seldom take more than a whale or two on any one trip. It might be optimal in such a situation to inform other boats about a school. In Norway, however, boats often operate far from shore and they may stay at sea for three or four weeks at a time. They winch the whales aboard, where they are flensed while the crew can pursue a second whale. The meat is laid on deck to cool. The limiting factor is deck space and the stability of the boat. Most boats may be able to keep 20 metric tons or more on deck. Only when the boat is 'shot full' – at which time the crew is forced to take a rest – might they inform others. Until then the crew might be tempted to keep silent in order to harvest the school alone, or together with a partner. Consequently, silence on the radio is often an indication that whales have been sighted.

Management information might be different in Japan and Norway as a result of different technologies and regulations, but in both countries whalers possess knowledge on how and when whales are appropriated. Ownership does not imply, however, that the whaler is free to dispose of the whale as he sees fit. In all societies there exist complicated rules as to how the animal shall be shared or the profit used. In the Faroe

Islands, the pilot whales belong to the community and the distribution of the meat follows set rules (Joensen 1990), as did minke whales captured in bays outside Bergen in Norway until the beginning of this century (Østberg 1929). In Inuit culture, sharing the prey with others is fundamental to the successful continuation of relations between whales and Inuits and serves to legitimize hunting (Wenzel 1991). In Japan people obtain rights in the catch by giving gifts of *sake* (rice wine) to the owners and crews before the commencement of the whaling season (Akimichi *et al.* 1988; Kalland and Moeran 1992). Moreover, whaling enterprises are obliged to support the communities from which they operate. These are 'long term transactions' which are 'concerned with the reproduction of the social and cosmic order' (Moeran 1992b). Such rules are also among the pool of knowledge required for a successful appropriation of natural resources.²⁶

It goes without saying that one must 'own' or have 'rights' in an object in order to turn it into a commodity of exchange value. But it is important to keep in mind that ownership is not a relationship between object and person but between persons. 'Any statement of property or of rights is a statement what can be done by the owner to the non-owner if these rights are infringed,' says Maurice Bloch (1984:204). Whalers rights' in whales are recognized only as long as the whaler is able, or his society is willing, to sanction infringements. In order to secure his society's favour and support, the whaler has to live up to the social obligation expected of him, which restricts his freedom to dispose of the carcass as he sees fit. In return for support and recognition of property claims, the whaler must forego some of his rights in the whale.

The protectionists play a different game in their attempts to deny whalers access to the whale resources. One strategy has been to make the resources of no value to the whalers by destroying their markets and thus removing their products from the commodity state through legal means. Norwegian catches of bottlenose whales, for example, came to an end when the UK banned imports of whale meat for pet food in 1972 (ISG 1992:32). A number of other restrictions have been introduced on the trade of whale meat. The Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which was established in 1973, covers several whale species. In 1979 IWC prohibited imports of whale products into member states from non-members. In 1986 a resolution was passed recommending that products from scientific whaling should primarily be consumed locally, which means that no more than 49 per cent may be exported. In 1981 the European Community (EC) introduced licences for importing whale products into the community, and in the U.S.A. the 1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act and the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act both prohibit imports of whale meat into the U.S.A. On the ideological level, the 'super-whale' has made it barbaric – bordering to cannibalism – to eat whale meat (*cf. Daily Star*, May 11, 1992). Today more people feel aversion to eating whale meat than most other kind of meat (Freeman and Kellert 1992:29).²⁷

But there are still people in Japan, Norway and elsewhere who cherish such meat, and a second strategy has therefore been to claim that whales are not a free good owned by nobody until spotted, chased or captured. On the contrary, attempts are made to turn whales from being '*res nullius*' to become '*res communes*' (Hoel 1986:28), which means that nations without previous interests in whales – like Switzerland, for example – share property rights and management responsibilities with the rest.²⁸ It is claimed that whales are everybody's property, as 'the heritage of all mankind.'



Goliath fighting David. A small Norwegian whaler (foreground) has been occupied by Greenpeace activists form the Greenpeace ship 'Solo' (background) at Glasgow harbour during the 1992 IWC meeting.

Whalers see the policy of the anti-whaling movement as an attempt to close the whale fishery and appropriate the whales for themselves in order to 'sell' them or give them away in 'adoption' (against a price, of course).²⁹ The whalers are facing a new, and to them incomprehensible, regime of appropriation with other rules and sanctions. The moratorium has – in many people's opinion, although not according to international law – given legitimacy to sanctions against the whaling nations.³⁰ Such sanctions are of two kinds.

The U.S.A. has introduced legal measures which can be used against whaling nations. Under the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act, the President is authorized to prohibit import of sea products from whaling nations, while the 1979 Packwood-Magnusson Amendment to the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act gives the Secretary of Commerce the option to reduce the fishing quotas of whaling nations within the U.S. 200-mile zone by 50 per cent and then cancel it altogether.

The U.S.A. has certified, or threatened to certify, whaling nations under these two provisions. Moreover, these laws have given the environmental and animal rights groups the legal tool by which they have sued the U.S. Government to force sanctions on Japan (Sumi 1989). It is highly questionable whether these sanctions stand up to international law, however (Hoel 1992; Sumi 1989). Also, the U.S.A has been criticized by a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel for its embargo of Mexican 'non-dolphin-friendly' tuna. It is therefore likely that consumer boycotts organized by the environmental and animal welfare groups will pose the biggest threat to the whaling nations. Boycotts of sea products have already been used against Iceland (with ques-

tionable result) and will undoubtedly be tried again. Several organizations have so far indicated that they will try to organize boycotts not only of Norwegian fish but also of other Norwegian products and services if Norway resumes commercial whaling in 1993.³¹ These sanctions all have one aim in common: to close down whaling once and for all and turn the whale resources into a 'common heritage of mankind.'

At first sight one should believe that low-consumptive use of whales, such as whale watching, and whaling could co-exist, particularly where tourists and whalers seek different species. The 'swim with a whale' programmes, as well as the use of cetacean in literature and art, should be even more able to co-exist peacefully with whaling. But this is not the case. The same cultural framework which has turned the 'super-whale' into a commodity, has also decommoditized whale meat and oil and created the 'evil whaler.' Consequently, the 'super-whale' cannot coexist with whaling. Moreover, western urbanites tend to impose their totems on others, and it is this blending of totemization of whales and cultural imperialism which has turned the whale issue into a stalemate. With powerful environmental and animal rights groups behind them, anti-whalers have gained political and moral recognition. WWF with its many members and royal patronage has gained a position from where it can appropriate nature and farm it out to those who will pay for a good conscience or a green image. Greenpeace with its millions of members has also gained power and international recognition sufficient to lay claim on being a steward of nature. Both organizations have been able to form coalitions with national governments, international bodies such as EC, UNEP and IUCN, and industrialists. In doing so these coalitions have redefined the whale as a commodity and managed to interrupt the path.

Appadurai refers to this phenomenon as 'diversion of commodities from their preordained path.' One kind of diversion is theft, and many whalers see the sales and adoptions of whales – and here they include sales of whale images which have contributed so importantly to the finances of environmental and animal rights groups – as theft; not only of the whales, which they feel belong to them through several generations' involvement in whaling, but theft of their livelihood, pride, and of their culture.

Notes

1. 'Cetacean' and 'whale' will be used interchangeably in this paper to mean all great whales, dolphins and porpoises.

2. The IWC operates with two main categories of whaling. The moratorium applies to *commercial* whaling, while *aboriginal* whaling for subsistence has been authorized. For critiques of this distinction, see Kalland (1992); ISG (1992); Moeran (1992b). Moreover, the member states are, according to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), entitled to issue permits for scientific whaling for research purposes.

3. The term 'environmental group' refers to a group of persons who through an ecological discourse expresses concern for the environment as a *system* in order to secure habitats and species diversity. Animal welfare groups are concerned with our treatment of animals, including killing methods, while animal rights groups condemn the killing of animals *per se*. They are engaged in an animal welfare (or animal rights)

discourse. (For simplicity, no distinction will be made between animal welfare and animal rights groups or between animal welfare and animal rights discourses in this paper.) There is no sharp line between environmental and animal welfare/rights groups (Wenzel 1991:36). Animal rights groups become increasingly concerned about ecological systems in order to protect the habitats of animals, and environmental groups have recently engaged themselves in the protection of non-endangered species. The confusion also afflicts U.S. lawmakers (Manning 1989). I have used the terms 'protectionist groups' and 'anti-whaling groups' interchangeably to denote groups of people who are against lethal use of whales.

4. See Kalland (1993) for a critique of his argument.

5. In the movie *Star Trek IV*, for example, two humpback whales were propelled into the 23rd century in order to communicate with an enormous space craft threatening to destroy the Earth. In Douglas Adams' *So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish* (1984), on the other hand, the dolphins gave up their mission as saviours and left the Earth in disgust with human ignorance.

6. Greenpeace-Germany, for example, jumped on the anti-sealing bandwagon in order to grow big:

It was surely important to Greenpeace at that time to get bigger. Greenpeace was very small. At that time I found it completely legitimate to use a cute animal with large eyes... That I found OK. That was no issue. (Wolfgang Fischer, leader of the German section's anti-sealing campaign in Bayrischer Rundfunk's TV program 'Live aus dem Schlachthof,' 15 January 1990. Translated from German by the author)

Today, Greenpeace has grown to one of the largest environmental and animal rights groups with an annual turnover of about US\$ 142 million, with DM 57 million being collected in Germany (Schwarz 1991:88-89). This is only surpassed by the US division which has 2.3 million members and a budget of US\$ 50 million (Gifford 1990:73). Only a few of the members have influence, however. Greenpeace, like many of the anti-whaling groups, is centrally controlled. Of the 700,000 German members only 30 are entitled to elect the seven board members (Schwarz 1991:88-89), while in Sweden only 11 of the 150,000 paying members have the right to vote (Eyerman and Jamison 1989:106). In the last couple of years there has been a economic set-back for the organization and the Danish newspaper *Politiken* (Dec. 4, 1991, p. 8) attributes the falling membership in Denmark to the 'Leninist' leadership structure. It will be interesting to see whether some very critical coverage recently in the press (Fox 1991; Schwarz 1991; Spencer *et al.* 1991) will have a further negative impact on Greenpeace.

7. The other reason will follow later.

8. I have elsewhere (Kalland 1993) analysed in greater detail the creation of a symbolic 'super-whale,' which has taken on characteristics of a totem for the environmental and animal welfare groups, particularly in western urban society.

9. In all fairness it should be stressed that not all anti-whalers partake in this rhetoric. The president of the WDCS, Roger Payne (1991:22), for example, asks his colleagues to stop accusing all whalers of cruelty, and Robbins Barstow apologized for insulting remarks made by British politicians and others at an anti-whaling rally in Glasgow in connection with the IWC meeting there in 1992.

10. Cases of long sufferings are told again and again, but such incidents occur in all kinds of hunt and is rather the rule in bull-fights, fox hunts and executions of convicts. Yet, the governments in Spain, the U.K. and the U.S.A., all strongly against whaling because of its 'inhumanity,' equally strongly defend bull-fights, fox hunts and executions. In the rhetoric of the protectionists whaling is never compared to hunting or other sports involving animals, but only to what goes on in abattoirs and slaughterhouses.

11. The sealers make good enemies for the same reasons. Environmental and animal rights groups have gone against hunting of seals off Newfoundland, although by no means were the seals endangered (Wenzel 1991). At the same time 'international conservation organizations [including Greenpeace and WWF] are allowing one of the world's most endangered species [the Mediterranean monk seal] to slip silently into extinction' (Johnson 1988:5). The monk seal of which there are only a few hundred left, is victim of massive degradation of their habitat due to military activities, high population concentration around the ocean and millions of tourists flocking to its beaches every year. It is almost impossible to identify and give 'face' to the enemy, and the forces behind the depleting of monk seals are powerful and influential. Add to this that there is no 'face-to-face' confrontation between the monk seal and the killer, no dramatic deaths and no blood. Compare this with the seal hunt off Newfoundland which is conducted during three short weeks in a very limited area. The white ice makes the perfect photographic background for slaughter and spills of blood of white pups with big, black eyes. These are the ideal conditions for making dramatic footage, while the Mediterranean setting is not.

12. Aboriginal whaling does not pose a problem to the most of the protectionists, perhaps because it is defined as *subsistence* whaling which, almost by definition, prevents products from these whales entering the commodity state. See Appadurai (1986) and Moeran (1992a) for a critique of the notion that commodities are confined to goods under a capitalist mode of production.

13. The argument, of course, begs the question of how to decide what we need without being ethnocentric or cultural imperialist. And why is there apparently a need to hunt foxes and big game for sport when there are non-lethal recreations like cinemas and soccer games?

14. This caused an editorial in *The Times* (June 30, 1992) to observe that 'the moratorium was flawed. It was introduced originally in the name of conservation, at a time when the extinction of virtually all whales seemed imminent. Its continuation is demanded now in the name of animal welfare. Iceland and Norway are entitled to accuse the anti-whaling majority of nations in the International Whaling Commission of changing the rules half way through the game.' The editorial concludes that 'the IWC's mistake has been to present the moratorium on minke harvesting as an issue of preservation, needing international cooperation. It is not. Norway and Iceland have at least taught the world a lesson in candour.'

15. Since this is becoming more and more difficult to do with integrity, WWF and U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, among others, have voiced the opinion that it is time to rewrite the whaling convention so that it can take account of 'non-consumptive values' of whales (e.g. U.S. Marine Mammal Commission 1992).

16. Often this approach goes hand in hand with a tendency to exaggerate the potential scope of commercial whaling. 'Once again the blue whale... will be ruthlessly hunted, although there are probably less than 1,000 remaining from 250,000 that used to roam the oceans,' complains *The Mail on Sunday* (June 21, 1992, p. 8). Beside offering an incredible low figure for the remaining blue whale population, the newspaper fails to mention that blue whales have been protected since 1965 and that there is still unanimity as to upholding this protection.

17. The South-African mathematician Butterworth takes issue with scientists pursuing this strategy and, with special reference to the Antarctic minke whale population, thinks the time is overdue 'to speak out against the near-farcical pronouncements of some international organizations regarding endangered species' (1992:533). The 'protected status' is imposed on any whale stock below the 0.54K level (54% of original abundance) 'to give the public the impression that a stock placed in this category would be in danger of extinction' while the 0.54K value was originally 'related to catch-maximization considerations and had nothing to do with any likelihood of extinction' (1992:532).

18. It was the U.S. government that took up the issue of admitting NGOs and mass media to the IWC meetings, apparently in an attempt to mobilize international public opinion (Sumi 1989:344) and to have its own 'greenness' reported to the electorates.

19. The EC parliament as well as some national parliaments can also be seen as tournaments of value where NGOs are given the opportunity to lobby for cessation of whaling and to endorse opinions and voting behaviour of the politicians, thus providing politicians and political parties arenas where they can compete in being 'green.'

20. In his book *Freeing the Whales*, Tom Rose (1989) vividly narrates the \$5.8 million rescue operation and the prizes at stake. To Greenpeace the event meant the biggest source of new money and members in its history and for the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which led Operation Breakout and activated a new satellite ahead of schedule in order to provide the Soviets with ice information, it meant its 'coming of age.' The oil industry improved its image considerable only to lose much of the new-won goodwill in the *Exxon Valdez* oil-spill five months later. But its involvement in freeing the whales helped VECO, Alaska's largest oil constructing company, to land the prime contract to clean up the mess after the spill. The Eskimos benefitted by suddenly being pictured as good-natured humans and not as greedy whale killers and, by his personal interest in the affair, President Reagan tried to shape up his environmental record, as did the Soviets who, by providing ice-breakers, presented a 'human face' to the faltering regime and made the world forget that Soviet is the only nation hunting gray whales. Industrialists got their products advertised worldwide.

21. The song goes (Corrigan 1991:173):

Yo ho, yo ho, a sailor's life for me!
Yo ho, yo ho, a sailor's life for me!
We sail this ship upon the sea
in search of humpback whales.
We see them breach,
We see them splash,
We see them wave their tails!
Oh ... ooooh, yo ho, yo ho, a sailor's life for me!

22. The effect of animal therapy is, however, controversial and scientifically poorly documented (cf. Beck and Katcher 1984; Cochrane and Callen 1992:32-37).

23. Such offers are not always accepted. In 1992 Greenpeace-Denmark approached the association of supermarkets in Denmark with a suggestion that the organization should, against a token payment of course, give the shops' products a 'green' stamp. The offer was perceived by the association as an attempt at extortion and therefore declined (*Politiken*, January 18, 1992, 3. section, p. 5).

24. The advertisement continued by appealing to congratulators to donate money to WWF rather than to send flowers to the company. Their contributions would be displayed at the 'birthday' reception. Thus, the chemical company mediated 'green' images between WWF and its own business partners.

25. During a quick browse in a small book-store in Juneau, Alaska, I observed in 1992 about a dozen children's books on whales.

26. That the loss of such knowledge can cause conflicts was clearly expressed when a minke whale was killed in a bay outside Bergen in 1960. Not having caught any whale for decades, a controversy took place between the farms around the bay as the tradition of distributing the meat had been lost (Friland, Bergen Fishing Museum, personnel communication).

27. In the survey of people's attitudes to whales, only seal meat met with the same disapproval as whale meat among the following alternatives: chicken, deer, horse (ranked 3rd after whales and seals), kangaroo, lamb, lobster, seal and wildfowl.

28. This interpretation of whale ownership might well contradict the principles of the New Ocean Regime as well as the Convention for the Regulation of Whales, but I leave it to people more competent in international law to discuss that matter.

29. When organizations singlehandedly appropriate whales to be used in 'adoption' programmes, they not only contradict their own ideology that wildlife is everybody's property, but also face the problems of recognition of such claims and of sanctioning infringement. Some have tried to solve these problems by shooting photographs of whales and giving them names. A few species can be identified by their flukes or colour patterns, and it is precisely these species which are appropriated by WWF and other organizations and offered for adoption.

30. The importance of photos for claiming ownership to individual whales surfaced in a recent dispute between WWF-Denmark and the Center for the Study of Whales and Dolphins (CSWD) in Sweden. CSWD photographs whales outside northern Norway in order to identify and name individual animals, while WWF, who has sponsored these activities, sent such photos to the adopted parents of whales. An agreement was finally reached out of court when WWF-Denmark paid compensation for the use of the photos and promised to curtail the adoption program.

31. Norway is, for example, not legally bound by the moratorium since the country in accordance with the whaling convention has objected both to the moratorium and to the classification of the Northeast Atlantic stock of minke whale as 'protected.'

32. It is worth pointing out that both the U.S. imposed sanctions and consumer boycotts hit innocent third parties, which might be intentional in the hope that this will cause internal conflicts in whaling nations. But it might very well have the opposite effect because whaling is becoming a symbol of national sovereignty (Brydon 1990; Kalland and Moeran 1992:192-95; IWG 1992) as well as of an enlightened environmental policy securing sustainable exploitation of marine resources according to best scientific advice. This may increase their resistance to economic and diplomatic hardship.

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Social Identity and the European Community

An Iberian Example

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ABSTRACT This article analyzes the interrelationship between the rationalization of the Galician fishing sector – animated and implemented by the European Community (EC) – and construction of social identities within a fishing community: specifically, how the construction of occupational and national identity informed the trajectory of Spain's negotiations for admission to the EC. The account illustrates that processes of identity formation in these fishing communities influenced, and have been transformed by, Spain's participation in the EC's Common Fishery Policy. Inclusion within the EC, by recontextualizing the concepts and practices of local fishermen, has redefined the conditions for the construction of subjects and subjectivity. The argument is absorption into the EC reconfigures the basic set of relations shaping collective self-definition and thus what it is to be a fisherman.

When I am fishing, I complain incessantly and cannot wait to go home; when I am home for no more than a week I cannot wait for the next voyage. (A crewman.)

The objective of this article is to describe and explore the interrelation between the rationalization of the Galician fishing sector – animated and implemented by the European Community (EC) – and construction of social identities within a fishing community. The critical focus is on how the construction of occupational and national identity informed the trajectory of Spain's negotiations for admission to the EC. The account documents how the processes of identity formation in the fishing communities along the ria de Vigo both fundamentally influenced, and have been transformed by, Spain's participation in the EC's Common Fishery Policy. My aim, to paraphrase McCay (1978:397), is to illustrate how the cultural concepts and practices of this fishing community imbue 'a wet and fishy productive regime' with meaning and how EC membership recontextualizes these concepts and practices, hence transforming what it means to be a fisherman. I have argued elsewhere (LiPuma and Meltzoff n.d.) that the encompassment of local communities within the European Community redefines the structures and strategies by which these communities objectify and represent themselves in the public sphere. Here, I would attempt to broaden this argument by depicting how encompassment redefines the very conditions for the construction of subjects and their self-understanding. The issue is the way in which absorption into the EC reconfigures the basic set of relations shaping collective self-definition and thus what it is to be, in the words of the local saying, a person who lives facing the sea.¹

To live facing the sea is equally a description of community. It means that whatever occurs, without question, is shaped by the presence of the sea and of fishermen. The shopkeepers open their bars and stores at 6am because that is when the sardineros return from their early morning venture. Situated on an inlet along the ria de Vigo, the dock and adjoining park with its *paseo* (i.e. the promenade where local people present themselves publicly) are the central features around which the town of Aldan is geographically organized. Whether a person is a fishermen or waiter, a builder or a baker, it is the sea which defines time and space and labor.² The presentation of food at important occasions, such as weddings and baptisms, features heaping plates of shellfish (e.g. scallops, oysters, shrimp) followed by valued varieties of fish (e.g. hake). On the liturgical calendar, the major fiestas celebrate fishermen and specifically beseech the powers of the Lord to safeguard them.

And, it is on these terms that the people of Aldan, Cangas, Moana and the other fishing communities contrast themselves with 'those who live with their backs to the sea.' For the fishing villages, being integrated into the European Community involves more than a change in the objective structure of the fisheries, it involves a transformation in subjectivity. It transforms the way people see themselves as part of a 'community,' both immediate and imagined. In 1986, the captain of a medium-sized trawler, a man in his late 50's, put it this way: 'when we enter the Community, this will no longer be Aldan [as I have known it], it will be one of a thousand fishing towns along the coast of Europe.'

Since we are dealing with the relationship between structures of different design and magnitude, the analysis must of necessity move back and forth between, and attempt to connect, these levels. The account begins by describing the EC's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and the 'nationalist' issues inherent in its actualization. The account then shifts gears and delineates the structure of the Galician fishing fleet in and around the main port city of Vigo,³ Spain's largest and most productive fisheries port located on its rocky northwest Atlantic coast (Map 1). The ethnography sets out the processes of the making of occupational and regional identity in these fishing communities, particularly the community of Aldan where I conducted fieldwork for some two years. The account then returns to the field of inter-nation affairs and describes Spain's prolonged negotiations for admission into the EC. My focus is on how the character of collective identity inflected the trajectory and outcome of the negotiations.⁴ Central to an understanding is the turbulent and contradictory relationship between that form of international capitalism intrinsic to the charter of the European Community and the construction of specific collective identities. This contradiction, though general, is most palpable and powerful in the field of primary industries, such as fisheries, and in the symbolic embodiments of nationhood, such as national language and currency. It is the first of these that constitutes the subject of this analysis.

The Common Fishery Policy

On 25 January 1983, the European Community, then composed of ten member states, ratified a common fisheries policy. The main and official purpose was to establish community wide rules, plus an enforcement mechanism, in order to manage fishery

stocks that observe no national boundaries. A parallel reason was to create an instrument for exercising control over community waters given the spread of 200 mile exclusive fishery zones (Farnell and Ellis 1984:1-16).⁵ The Community's common policy has five dimensions:

1. the '*rational*' management of resources;
2. fair distribution of catches, paying special attention to the needs of *traditional regions highly dependent on fishing*;
3. effective controls on the conditions applying (e.g. state subsidies) to fisheries;
4. adoption of measures to oversee the capacity, design, and operations of the fishing fleet;
5. fisheries agreements with third countries such as the US.

Beneath the technical and legal reasons for such common cause was a more fundamental set of ambitions that would bring national culture, international capitalism, and the concept of a European Community into conflict. The terms of conflict and the nature of the contradiction were inscribed in the original plan. Consider, for instance, that '*rational*' management is precisely what is not needed if the Community aim is to support those regions that have historically depended on fishing. What is rational and fair from a formal economic or biological perspective may be irrational and unfair from the standpoint of local fishing communities. They do not accept the fact that excess capacity in relation to available resources (as determined by some bio-economic model) automatically requires that some owners and crewmen be denied the right to make a living. Indeed, while the CFP assumes that '*rational*' does not entail special clarification (because it is the unmediated result of the bioeconomic assessment), just what is '*rational*,' and what constitutes rational fisheries management, would become a bone of contention throughout the negotiations and into the future.

The industrialization of some sectors of the fishery coupled with the small scale, producer-owner attributes of other sectors created a twofold problem. First, starting in 1968, the catches of EC members began to stagnate or even decline 'largely because investments during the boom [1956-65] pushed productivity to such a point that stocks had insufficient time to regenerate and some of the most common species became seriously depleted' (European Documentation 1985:12). The industrialized sectors soon reached the point of overcapacity. In addition, worldwide acceptance of the Law of the Sea often led to the exclusion of this industrial fleet from third nation waters (esp. Canada). Second, the small scale middle-distance and inshore producers had a difficult time competing with the industrial sector for capital, labor, markets, etc. The effect was indirect but exceptionally powerful and the result was an evisceration of the small fishing and agricultural towns – towns that were understood by the French, Italians, Scots, Greeks and others, including the Spanish and Portuguese who were standing in the wings, to be inseparable from the embodiment and reproduction of the regional and national cultures. This is not to say that small capital always perished (See, for example, the work of Durrenberger and Pálsson 1987, Apostle and Barrett 1992, Hoefnagel 1991, and Gonzalez Laxe 1983), only that in many cases it was progressively marginalized and subject to economic forces that it could neither understand nor control.

The two convergent sets of problems led to the invitation for the Community's administration to formulate common policy. From the standpoint of the Eurocrats, who

envision a united states of Europe in which all of the countries and cultures pull together, the common policy was an awaited opportunity to institutionalize and extend their authority and influence. To implement a common policy entails substantial coordination between the fisheries of each nation, and between those of different nations. To do this, the EC administration has attempted to formalize and rationalize, and sometimes standardize, local institutions and practices. So the implementation document for the CFP explicitly calls for the establishment of institutions (e.g. producer's organization, PO), procedures (e.g. pricing guidelines), and policies (e.g. quotas) that are uniform throughout the member nations (with the partial exception of Greece).

Institutionally, the EC segments fishing into three formally distinct divisions: Structures, Treaties and Quotas, and Markets. Structures organizes the construction and retirement of vessels; Treaties and Quotas defines fishing operations and makes accords with third countries; and Markets regulates the sale of products. The Fishery Directorate has a powerful set of tools to formalize and rationalize the fisheries. These range from the setting of fish quotas to financial incentives that encourage building certain types of vessels and scrapping others. Nonetheless, making and implementing a Common Fishery Plan (CFP) has been a non-stop and yearly confrontation, pitting the EC bureaucracy against the member states. This conflict between the EC bureaucracy and the member states is characterized (e.g. in various newsletters that report on the EC) as a clash between ambitious, overweening, but also inept and insensitive, Eurocrats versus self-interested and self-serving member states. This is only the surface form of a deeper contradiction that the inclusion of Spain, with its large and diversified fleet, is exacerbating.

In Galicia and Euzkadi (Basque), as in many other regions of Europe (e.g. Britanny), national and ethnic identity have become attached to primary industries, such as fishing but also farming and winemaking. The reason is that labor in its full capitalist form has not totally replaced kinship and community as the means of organizing production. There, the cultural and institutional homogeneity fostered by capitalism is still held at arms length. Ethnic and regional identities which are founded on the logic of differentiation can be articulated precisely because the sectors have not been rationalized and formalized. For example, Euzkadi forms of work organizations, recruitment, patterns of ownership, notions of fishing, participation in industry organizations, and so forth, are rather different from those that exist in Galicia, pais Vasco, or other areas of Iberia (e.g. Portugal, Cole 1991). This recognized differentiation, possible because the indigenous community still shapes the relations of production, is the basis of specific collective identities. Politically, strong forms of social identity run against the model of civil society – based on individual competition, rights, and freedoms – that underlies the Community's view of political economy. What this means is that the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy has the effect of replacing the manifold forms of collective identity, such as regional nationalism, with capitalism, where the formalizing and rationalizing of industry generates social homogeneity, hence to forge a unified Europe. What may be rational for the industrial fisheries will effectively subvert the regional and occupational identities that define – and Davis (1991:11) would argue help to humanizing – its nonindustrial counterpart.⁶

The critical point is that this view of political economy and civil society – inscribed as presuppositions in the EC 'model' of the rational fisheries – has little room for a notion of community or for collective, as against individual, identities. This will be most

problematic in those fields, such as fishing and farming, where occupational, ethnic, and regional identities are connected, powerful and enduring. For the EC, this has meant slow progress and conflict in creating common policy because the policy itself has two contradictory purposes: first, to create a united Europe through a unified policy; and second, to reproduce the community and familial based primary sectors which underwrite occupational, regional and national identities. It is not possible for the EC to rationalize and formalize the fishing sector and also conform to the interests of the member states in maintaining the ethnic, regional, and occupational identities inscribed in their primary sectors.⁷ Fishing, because it involves Galician boats manned by kin and community members, is an objectification and inculcation of these social identities. Hence, during Spain's negotiations for admission into the European Community, fisheries was a forum for evaluating and redefining political relations between Madrid and the provinces, specially Galicia and the Euzkadi area. They assumed that the extent to which Madrid was willing to negotiate hard to defend their coastal fleet was an index of the degree to which it supported Galician and Euzkadi regional identities. It is no accident then that the agreement on fisheries was the last and combative chapter of the negotiations. A Spanish negotiator and Galician cogently put it this way:


It is easier to negotiate petrochemicals where billions of pesetas are at stake than it is to reach an agreement on a few million pesetas worth of megrim or hake. When we deal with the petrochemicals, it is business and people will be rational; when we deal with the fish, the business part is drowned by everything else. When a man owns one boat, and works with his lifelong friends and relatives, when he has fished every day of his life and it is how he supports his family, he cannot understand that it is not 'rational' for him to fish. He will always find a way; he will continue to fish until he can no longer pay for the gasoil.

The diplomat is saying that given the structure of ownership and labor within the small and medium capital fisheries, being a fishermen is not a job (i.e. labor is not fungible) but an occupation and mode of labor which is inseparably tied to a person's identity. A fisherman's self-image, his presentation of self in the public arena, the resources that he uses to define his place in the community, his kin relations and village friends, and the trajectory of his family are intrinsically bound to fishing. It is this network of relations and meanings, determined by life in the fisheries, which defines the ground in terms of which people construct their subjectivity. The diplomat is calling attention also to the fact that because of the structure of the fisheries, and people's inculcated personal commitment to their fellow crew members, boatowners have a significant capacity to cut operating expenses. To understand why this is the case it is necessary to examine the structure of the Vigo-area fleet.

The Structure of the Vigo-area Fleet

The fishing industry of the Vigo region is neither a unified endeavor nor a single fishery. It can best be conceptualized as the organization of marine and socio-economic space. Within the Vigo fishery, there are three recognized fleets which correspond to forms of technology, means of commercialization, and concepts of labor. There is, for of all, a *gran altura* or distant water fleet comprised almost entirely of large freezer trawlers


(built at nearby shipyards). The freezer-trawlers are broken down into fisheries, two of the most notable being the hake and cephalopod producers. The *gran altura* fleet is capital intensive, increasingly unionized, and technologically driven – the vessels ranging in size from 300 to 1000 tons. Around six thousand crewmen work on the long distance trawlers, spending from one to three months at a time at sea. While most boatowners are from the indigenous community, and have previously owned and worked on smaller boats, 'outside' *socios* or financial partners are increasingly accepted. The *gran altura* fleet also includes a small though sophisticated tuna fishery.




Map 1. The Central Port City of Vigo and the Surroundings Satellite Fishing Communities of Aldan, Cangas, and Moana.



The fish market in Aldan



The wife of a sardinero marketing fish in Vigo




A stern trawler in the Gran Sol



A seiner in the Aldan harbor



The village of Bueu



The lighthouse at the end of the ria de Vigo (Donon)

The second fleet is the *altura* or high water fleet. This is exclusively a 'fresh fish' fleet that sells its product to local merchants and to the Madrid market via a network of fish vendors. The *altura* fleet employs a variety of technologies – ranging from side and stern trawlers to longliners and seiners. The fleet is organized into three fisheries: the vessels that fish the narrow continental shelf off of Portugal, those that ply the waters off the Western Sahara (southern Morocco), and also 'Gran Sol' boats that work the rich seas near Ireland and England. These vessels aim for species such as hake and monkfish that are highly prized and lucrative in Spain (the most robust fish market in Europe by absolute and per capita consumption). Many of these boatowners, in contrast to those of the *gran altura*, practice 'minimal input management' – meaning that most monitor their operation by simply seeking to spend as little as possible (on repairs, gear, etc.). However, the organizational, administrative, and capital demands on this fleet have been increasing markedly in recent years, and boatowners now generally acknowledge that owners who are willing to modernize will be the truly successful. The impetus for this transformation comes from two sources. First, some of the those boatowners who graduated to freezer trawlers have retained their *altura* boat. Second, EC fishing regulations place more emphasis on productive efficiency by forcing owners to share licenses and thus shortening the time any one owner is permitted in EC waters. Still, an overwhelming majority of boats have a single owner and most owners have only one boat. No matter who owns the boat the crew is related and recruited on the basis of kin/community ties. There are approximately sixty boatowners and a thousand crewmen, almost all of whom are lifetime participants and know each other personally.

Finally, there is the *bajura* or littoral fleet, mostly made up of hundreds of near shore, small-scale, fishing ventures that resemble those in other parts of Iberia [e.g. Barandiaran Irizar 1981 (pais Vasco), Alegret 1987 (Catalonia), Meltzoff and LiPuma 1986 (Andalucia)]. These vessels work the waters off of Galicia and northern Portugal, using a wide and changing variety of gear types and fishing for whatever species are available. The boats are invariably skippered by their owner; the crewmen is composed of kinsmen and friends; and, part of the day's catch is marketed by local women. Though their products have for a long time been sold as commodities in Vigo, the organization of work, the means of production, and the control over production have historically rested in community hands. Rather than earning a standard wage, crewmen receive fish, a share of the net value of the catch, and a variety of additional payments that depend on their individual circumstances (e.g. their wife had a baby). There is no precise tabulation of earnings, crewmen relying on their 'sense' of what is fair and right given the results of a particular fishing trip or *marea*. The auction and marketing of fresh fish has been done 'traditionally' by the local *cofradia*, the fishing fraternity or brotherhood of boatowners, crewmen, and fresh fish sellers. The extension of maritime jurisdictions and the advent of the EC have had an especially dramatic imprint on the *bajura* fleet, not least because several of its traditional fishing grounds now lie within Portuguese territorial waters, and because the internal structure of the *cofradia* has no place in the EC concept of what a fishery is and how it should operate.

The most telling change in the Galician fisheries has been the formation of boatowner associations, beginning in 1977 following restoration of Spanish democracy (See LiPuma in press for a more complete account). Since that time, all of the fisheries, right down to the small-scale, kinship-based sardine fleet have formed boatowner associ-

ations. There are now eight associations in the Vigo-area, all under the auspices and umbrella of the Vigo-based institute, *Cooperativa de Armadores de Pesca del Puerto de Vigo*⁸ (ARVI). The purpose of this structure in which associations are embedded within a cooperative is to produce the advantages of an organization in which the members cooperate and the interests of the various associations can be coordinated (by ARVI management) with the familial and community structure that defines fishermen and the fishing sector. In other words, these associations have two tiers: one that preserves and encourages individual/familial ownership and operation, and another that promotes the interests of fishermen in national and international arenas, such as those involving the European Community.

Fisheries and Forms of Identity

To be a fishermen is, for Galicians, a specific and powerful form of identity. On the local account, the identity is specific because fishing is thought to instill a distinctive, recognizable type of personality; it is powerful because this form of identity is thought to have salience across a wide range of contexts, from the way fishermen treat their children to the type of houses that they construct. The distinctiveness of fishing and its separation from other forms of work arise from cultural concepts that define the fishing trip, or *marea*, as the simultaneous production of mutually sustaining social and material relations.

For a Spanish crew, family members and friends fish together, while fishing together imbues these structural relationships with practical force. The unity and solidarity of the crew exists by virtue of transcending and masking differences among factions and between individuals. The fishing practices define the sharing of space, tasks, food, and danger, as the terms for the construction of the group. The inevitable tensions that arise from working in the confined quarters of the boat under stressful conditions produce not only verbal and sometimes physical fights but the social bonds that unify a crew. Fishermen underline the point when they explain how sharing food or working side by side in rough weather engenders a mutual indebtedness and camaraderie that can never be acquired on land. Less obvious to fishermen and analysts alike is that crewmen share a common set of dispositions, including social agreement not to publicly acknowledge certain dispositions. For example, that fishermen know and experience common dangers at sea, yet assent within the silent complicity of practice not to openly acknowledge fear, elevates that physical reality of danger into a principle of identity formation. True fishermen do not show fear of the sea and not showing fear of the sea is an index of being a true fishermen. There is, in different words, a dialogue between public and private images of the self. These images are mediated by, and defined in terms of, the concepts and practice of fishing. In this way the labor of fishing is simultaneously and powerfully the construction of a specific kind of self.

The senses of the fishermen – his ability to grasp clues given by the seascape – is a cultural product reproduced only by working at sea. Fishermen can identify the important features from among the innumerable sea signs by referring unconsciously to the universe of possible clues. They can evaluate the familiar faces of the sea – the colors of the water, the orientation of the currents and wind, the presence of various

kinds of seabirds – without ever being able to state explicitly the criteria for their evaluation. Such practical interpretation is linked to the autonomy of fishing because it requires, indeed is inseparable from, special cultural competence earned only through experience at sea.

A key element of the fishermen's identity is the competition between boats working out of the same port, especially those that chase the same species. Fishermen state emphatically that every fishery possesses fish and that they will inevitably be found and caught by a skillful *patron de pesca* (fishing captain). The only thing that prevents this is if the fish have already been captured and locked in the holds of competing boats. The social result is a game of recognition and status whose yardstick is the quantity, quality, and species of fish brought to dock. Fishermen are thus partly defined by this sense of mutual and measurable competition.

But perhaps nothing characterizes the Spanish fisherman more than his movements. There is perpetual rotation between the all-male, physically trying, emotionally intense, and often dangerous sealife and the family and community routines onshore (e.g. going to a neighborhood bar). This is nothing less than an oscillation between two distinctive forms of familial life, each with its own characteristics, rewards, and opportunities. The young wife of a crewman explains: 'fishermen farm, they make wine, but what sets fishermen apart is that once fishing is in their blood, they must always return to the sea' (Juanita 1983). Underlying these forms of familial life is the notion that each is enriched by absence – a man can better appreciate his wife and family after a period of separation and longing. Almost all crewmen carry a photograph of their wife flanked by their children; it is not a family portrait (the crewman himself is never included) but an objectification of family life, a reason and reward for enduring the hard conditions at sea, and an icon of their desire to return home (Zulaika 1981: 35-41).⁹ Such enrichment by absence flows in the other direction as well, and thus after several weeks of familial life, fishermen long to return to sea again. Thus it is that each voyage outward to sea engenders an overpowering longing to return home, and each homecoming and return to familial lifeways energizes the upcoming marea. The oscillation is embodied as a permanent disposition in the fishing community and an index of identity that is reproduced with each trip. It is also inscribed at another level in fishermen's ways of speaking and maintaining silence, in an inclination to concentrate in a waterfront barrio, in the way that they treat their family and define their male relationships (e.g. they often avoid their shipmates while ashore), and in their relatively high rate of endogamy (ranging from nearly 70 percent for the littoral fishermen to 25 percent for the *gran altura*).

As these rates of marriage endogamy suggest, having a fishing identity is graduated. The identity is understood to be stronger and more deeply ingrained for littoral fishermen who still mostly define themselves and the organization of their boats in terms of kinship and community relations. This identity is thought to be slightly less salient for those who operate in the *altura* fishery and to move down still another notch for the unionized, formally-contracted, wage labor, job specific, government regulated, fixed hours, *gran altura* fishery. Observe that in the local conception the salience of the identity is inversely linked to the degree of capitalist and state penetration. It is difficult as one crewman commented, 'for fishermen to be fishermen when we are being taken over by *capitalistas*' (Jorge 1986).




Chart 1. Cycles of Production

Fisheries and the Development Cycle

Pálsson writes that there is no point in creating 'a unitary category of fishing' because fisheries is part and product of the social economy (1991:23). This is especially true for Galicia in that the structure of community and often the developmental cycle of the family joins and transcends the separation between fishing and farming. Let me illustrate this by describing the history of one family which is unique only insofar as it combines almost all of the distinctive features.

The Family of Ramon Pesquero

In 1955, Ramon Pesquera (a pseudonym), the owner of a small sardine boat (20 tons) that fished the waters off northern Portugal and Galicia, married Elena Vendador, the daughter of a *patron de pesca*, or fishing boat captain. Soon after the marriage, and with the assistance of his inlaws, Ramon bought a second-hand Gran Sol boat. His younger brother, Martin, took command of the sardine vessel while he worked with his father-in-law fishing the Irish coast. Elena did two types of work (in addition, of course, to managing the house): she farmed a small plot of land (approximately one half hectare which is the characteristic size of farmlands in Aldan) and sold fish both at the local market in Cangas and at the main market in Vigo. She marketed the sardines caught by Martin in conjunction with his wife, and part of the Gran Sol catch (the greater part being sold to middlemen who shipped it mostly to Madrid). In the harsh months when bad weather made it difficult to fish the Irish coast, Ramon would plant grapes that would be used for production of vino verde, the local wine. In the first five years of marriage, they had three children, two sons and a daughter. In 1970, Ramon began the construction of a new house, made of traditional stone on the outside but with a more modern design inside. In that same year, Ramon sold his old Gran Sol boat, and using family capital, had a new vessel built to his own specifications at a boatyard, owned by an Aldan family. The house took about eight years to build, partly because Ramon and his relatives did the greater portion of the work themselves, and in part because he did not need a third story until his daughter married, and moved into the upstairs apartment with her husband, a man who worked with his own

father who owned the nautical supplies store where Ramon had, for a quarter of a century, bought his nets and other equipment. In 1975, Elena's father retired, and her son Juan, who had worked first as a crewmen on the sardine boat and then on Ramon's Gran Sol vessel, assumed the role of fishing captain. In 1980, Ramon acquired another small tract of farm land, and in that same year he stopped going to sea, managing his boat from ashore. In 1988, Ramon and Elena retired from fishing and fish marketing to full time farming and winemaking.

Notice that the Ramon Pesquera family is involved in fishing, fish selling, farming, and winemaking. Unlike other communities (e.g. Ireland, Peace 1991), there is no real distinction between farmers and farm families and those who create their living from the sea. The majority of families (72%) involved in fishing are also engaged in either farming, commerce (e.g. working in a dockside tavern), or both. The evidence from Galicia indicates that three forms of occupational composition/alternation characterize small capital. Due to the existence of minifundia—the division of land into progressively smaller plots—and recruitment to the fishery based on kinship, almost everyone has the opportunity to fish and/or farm. This characteristically takes the form of the division of familial labor: women engage in parttime agriculture and marketing; men fish as their primary occupation. The family is a complex productive unit where the occupational identity of men, as fishermen, is intrinsically tied to, and defined against, the women's partial farming identity. The second is a seasonal alternation as when fishermen labor at farming during the winter months. This is specially true of Gran Sol fishermen, the North Atlantic seas so often stormy and turbulent from October through March. Finally, there is the alternation based on the lifecycle of the family, specifically the fact that fishermen retire to be farmers. As a fisherman becomes older and closer to retirement, most retiring between forty-five and sixty years of age—he goes to sea progressively less frequently and becomes more interested in farming, his grandchildren, and the lifeways of the shoreside. While everyone lives facing the sea fishing is the core identity for such men; their participation in farming in part and product of the oscillation between sea and land, the boat and the house. They are alternately separated and then rejoined in a continuous cycle of production and reproduction over time. These relations of opposition and complimentarity between land and sea, fishing and farming, is represented in Chart 1.

As stated earlier, these special and distinctive features of the cycles of fishing production place their stamp on the entire community. But even more than that, people's sense of community, being Galician, and personal identity is intrinsically linked to the fishery. As mediated by the fishing associations and by the government negotiators, these forms of identity were influential in inflecting the course of negotiations for accession to the EC.

Spain and the EC Negotiations

For more than a decade, Spain's attempts to enlist in the EC were turned aside on the grounds that it would be inexcusable to join hands with a totalitarian regime. So just more than a year after the resurrection of democracy (1977), Spain tendered a new, and in its eyes, now unreproachable bid for community membership. For its part, the EC had motives for including Spain. Inclusion would secure a Spanish democracy that,

particularly in its early moments, was fragile, as the aborted coup in February 1981 amply underlined. Some members of the EC bureaucracy argued that this was the Community's chance to prevent a 'Latin American' pattern: meaning, a political pendulum that swings between limited reform and savage repression. Advocates of a strong European Community also envisioned Spain's accession as the opportunity to solidify and extend the EC's political and geographical authority. There was also a powerful economic incentive. From 1965 to the negotiations, Spain had the fastest growing economy in Europe (Tamames 1985) with particularly vibrant growth in industrial and capital intensive sectors. Numerous business and government interests in member states (especially Germany) argued that Spanish accession would open-up a promising new arena for their capital investment and expansion—a prophecy that has come to pass.

Although there were sound political and economic reasons for admitting Spain, this view was not shared by the primary sectors in the relevant member states. Indeed, the more influential the primary sectors, the more that nation opposed Spanish admission. As a result progress on Spain's petition to join the EC was best measured in angstroms. France foremost, then Italy and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Britain, tried to delay admission. A key reason for this was their fear that Spain's fishing fleet—which was larger than the rest of the Community combined—coupled with Spanish farming, silviculture (i.e., olive oil), and wine-making would endanger their own primary sectors. What was not said was that member nations understood these sectors as the repositories of national and ethnic cultures, imbuing them with a social thus political value far beyond their economic contribution.

In 1977, the EC formally extended its marine jurisdiction to 200 miles and exercised the right to exclude all foreign vessels from what would come to be named the Community Pond. Though the Law of the Sea (LOS) had made provision for the continuance of historical fishing rights, what constituted a traditional presence was abandoned to the discretion of the home nation, rendering such rights useless. The French decided, for example, that the Basque presence in the Bay of Biscay, having only begun during the reign of Charlemagne (800-814), failed to qualify on grounds of historical longevity. Of equal significance, the Irish decreed that the Galician (Gran Sol) fleet was excluded from all fishing grounds within 50 miles of the Irish coast, no matter what history lesson might be cited. To add to the irony, the Spanish were interested in megrim, hake, and monkfish (Port of Vigo records show that these accounted for 67.1% of catches), species that are unmarketable on either Irish or English markets. So it was that starting in 1978 the Spanish were compelled to negotiate with the Community to maintain fishing rights in waters that were, and had historically been, vital to the existence and survival of the fishing communities such as Aldan.

Unlike other nations that were simply expelled from EC waters, the Community agreed to extend 240 licenses to the Spanish fleet, partly out of respect for Spain's petition for membership. From the start, the EC aimed to decrease the Spanish fleet so that it would be entitled to a lower allocation after accession, but not so drastically that the fisheries would sustain permanent damage. As it turned out, licensing agreements would go on for more than a decade. And, real negotiation for Spain's admission to the EC could not begin in earnest until the Community ratified a Common Fisheries Policy—that is, a policy that the large Spanish fleet would have to accept as a condition of accession. From the last quarter of 1978 through 1984, the number of EC licenses

conceded to Spain would decline at approximately 16% per annum, ending up at 106 licenses.¹⁰ In the Vigo area, there were seventy Gran Sol vessels (sixty three of which were in the association), but only twenty-seven licenses. In the town of Aldan, there were sixteen boats and eight licenses.

Apart from their own internal troubles, the chances that the EC and Spain could quickly reach an agreement were slim. For as far as foreign water fishing was concerned, the EC and Spain had responded very differently to the Law of the Sea. Early on, the Community decided that foreign water fishing was doomed and that it would be more profitable to consolidate resources in its home waters. The decision was enshrined in professional forecasts as well as official pronouncements. By contrast, the Spanish fleet had decided to make the best of the extension of maritime jurisdictions by forging treaties, joint ventures, and by discovering new fishing grounds outside the 200 mile limit. Namibia became, for example, a source of hake and a flounder fishery was founded outside of the Canadian 200 mile zone.¹¹ Such treaties and joint ventures were created through the initiative of the associations rather than Madrid. The Spanish pressed on with fishing because their fleet was made up of family owned boats from villages like Aldan where fishing was a way of life and a social economy, less an economic investment. For example, in the Gran Sol fleet, 85% of the companies in ARPOSOL, its association, have only one boat (ARPOSOL 1985), and more than 90% of the crew on any vessel were born within walking distance of one another. Community position and individual identity, senses of well-being, duty, life-cycle, and personal reward were all bound up with fishing. The peoples of the ria de Vigo had no alternative; either they gave up their social identity and also suffered economically or they found new ways to continue fishing. In the words of boatowners, captains, and crewmen, they had no choice because fishing was their way of life (as opposed to simply an occupation/business). So contrary to all but their own predictions, Galician boatowners have fared well since the 200 mile limit was declared. Fish catches, after falling by approximately 15% the first two years, have rebounded so that they now exceed pre-Law of the Sea levels.

Because of the original decision to consolidate resources in its own territorial waters, the essential basis of the CFP would have to be conservation through the rational, meaning biological, management of marine resources and the restructuring (mainly the reduction) of the Community fleet. The EC Commission focused on how to achieve these objectives rather than on why they might be necessary or what alternatives might exist (e.g. quotas were the only conservation measure considered).¹² From the start, the EC Commission acquired the practice of jumping immediately from the biological assessment of total allowable catch (TAC) for a given species to a method of implementation, without taking account of the social, economic, and cultural impact of a decision to limit fishing. McGuire (1991), McGoodwin (1990), Pálsson (1991) among others have noted that biologically-based management schemes are inclined to underestimate, misrecognize, and overlook the social and cultural. Sinclair (1990) points out that when a management strategy is imposed on a fishery-dependent community, fisheries policy necessarily turns into a social policy that is unintended and often misguided. Although the CFP assumes that it can treat even the smallest fishery like any other expression or sector of capitalist production, this viewpoint was (is) barely acceptable to member states, and was rejected outright by Spanish fishermen and their associations. These associations, the regional media, provincial politicians, and indirectly secessionist

movements such as *Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna* [more commonly known as ETA (See, Clark 1984)], in turn, placed considerable, continuing pressure on the Spanish government to defend and maintain the regional fisheries.

In a city-wide labor strike aimed at protesting the 'failure' of the government to support ailing shipyards in Vigo, the pamphlet (1982) written by strike leaders accuses the Socialist regime of discriminating against Galicia by turning its back on the plight of the boatbuilders and regional fisheries.

From the perspective of Gran Sol boatowners and crewmen, the EC demand for a drastic reduction in licenses was irrational and incomprehensible. From association meetings to conversations at the local bars, people asked why the EC would reduce licenses at a point when the fish were plentiful and people still struggling to deal with the effects of the LOS. The Community's answer was that as no biological assessment had been done for hake and other species of interest to Spain, the reduction in licenses and thus catch was simply a wise precautionary measure against depleting these stocks (Lopez Veiga et al. 1988:110). At a village level, people were bewildered that, in their words, the Community would show more interest in safeguarding the fish than it did in helping fishermen and their families. Their practical categories of thought and action did not allow for any situation in which fish were more important than community. In fact, given the logic of community, only two explanations were conceivable: those who ran the EC were irrational and out of touch with the reality of fishing (for fishermen knew, from their own experience, that catches had not decreased) or that the Community was an enemy interested in dismantling the Galician fleet for its own advantage.¹³

Not surprisingly, the response of the Gran Sol fishermen was to continue fishing in EC waters, with licenses but mainly without. Given the nature of the Spanish fleet, plus boatowners and crew for whom fishing is a mode of life and community, there was no way that the Galician or Basque vessels were going to respect the licenses and quotas instituted by the Community. One result was that the EC negotiations would be conducted in a politically charged atmosphere. The Galician vessels were regularly pursued, boarded and searched by the Irish authorities; their owners were fined, their captains jailed, but the illegal fishing continued. The boatowners association, ARPOSOL, retained Irish council, and were perpetually busy with their members' trials. The fisheries newspapers and trade sheets (e.g. Eurofish report) demanded that stiff sanctions be levied against what the papers would call the 'Spanish Armada.' From 1979 to 1986, 106 vessels from the Vigo cooperative alone would be arrested in Irish seas not to mention scores of Basque boats in French territorial waters.¹⁴ At least forty other Galician and Basque vessels were arrested in English waters during this same period. More legal strategies were also used, the most common being the 'flag of convenience.' Galician boatowners who wanted access to Irish fishing grounds registered their boat in England. Approximately ten Vigo-area vessels, all in serious financial trouble (often because they had been caught and heavily fined for illegal fishing), employed this strategy.¹⁵ All of this underlined to the Spanish government and the EC that, given the position of fishing in the Galician social economy and politics of identity, steps would have to be taken to accommodate such regions highly dependent on fishing.

When negotiations began in 1978, many Spanish felt that they were in a poor position to field a negotiating team. Between the variegated local institutions of Spain's fishing communities and the EC there were no substantial mediating institutions or links. Until

the 1970's, the government fisheries department was a slim administration, buried in the Ministry of Commerce and under the command of the Merchant Marine. From time to time, it was moved from one ministry to another (such as Transportation), but never elevated to even a sub-ministerial level. Its main offices were doled out to ex-navy men to help cushion their last years before they retired to their pension. Indeed, the 1978 accord with the EC was negotiated by the first civilian director of fisheries.

In response to the changing political climate, the fisheries administration was professionalized and restructured in 1979-1980. Three subdirectors were drafted from the professional diplomatic corps: one to oversee the *bajura* or inshore fleet that worked in Spanish waters; and two others to negotiate treaties in northern and southern hemispheres respectively. The renovation in Madrid now brought the administration into what would be an underground but continuing conflict with the fishing associations, specially those in Galicia. The associations and the administration would henceforth be competing for power and control over the fisheries even as they had to join hands to be successful in international negotiations, not least those for accession to the Community.

In 1980, the Community and Spain ratified a 'frame agreement' that was supposed to set out the grounds for the negotiations so that talks might advance smoothly and to a successful conclusion.

But from 1980 to 1983 accession talks went nowhere; an inspection of the negotiating documents shows that they were directed mostly at collecting information. Though the Spanish did not know it at the time, little progress could be made in the negotiations until the EC had traveled its own difficult road and finalized a common fisheries policy.

Social Identity and the Outcome of the Negotiations

Given the political economy of Spanish fisheries and the fact that Spain had to accept the structure of the Community's CFP as is (non-negotiable), Spanish negotiators were at a disadvantage, at least from a technical standpoint. But several factors worked in Spain's favor to produce better results than the fishing sector had dared anticipate. One of its main advantages throughout the negotiations was an absence of information on the activities, catch rates, and organization of its fleet. On the Spanish side, this stemmed from a combination of related factors, not least of which is continuing familial organization of production. It has been able to reproduce itself in a changed political environment through the creation of associations. A result is a lingering – though diminishing – heterogeneity, closure, and fragmentation at the level of immediate production. This structure combines with historical memory to produce a deeply-seated distrust of central government and its intentions. Even the industry's associations have a difficult time obtaining the basic information from their membership. In good measure, this occurs because information is personal rather than corporate; particularly in the littoral and Gran Sol fisheries, people do not distinguish between public and private information. Further, this concept of privacy is linked to autonomy and independence. Said another way, the statistical gathering procedures that the Community relied upon presuppose a species of managerial capitalism in which firms define their own behavior and set their course of action through the accumulation and recording of information about themselves.

The factors are inseparable from each other and from ethnicity and community identity: positively, because culture and forms of local organization are inseparable from relations of production; and oppositionally, because ethnic identity is defined against a 'Castilian' central government identity, typically summarized in the notion of Madrid. Certainly in the discourse of the fishing community Madrid is not simply a place. It is the key symbol of the opposition between land and sea, the local community against the central government, and finally, being Galician versus being Spanish. The Basque fishermen, as usual, expressed these values most vocally noting at one point that they refused to accept any treaties negotiated between foreign, inland cities – meaning here Paris and Madrid. Given such political values, data is withheld irrespective of its economic import, though as things turned out the dearth of information was a negotiating advantage.¹⁶

For example, the EC argued that Spain should reduce that part of its fleet operating in Community waters (i.e. Gran Sol fleet of Vigo and La Coruna and the Basque fleet in the Bay of Biscay). The EC position was that a reduction was necessary because stock assessments for hake and megrim were vague and uncertain, and it was safer to assume scarcity. Though the associations knew that these assessments were extremely conservative, they pressed that no assessment program be undertaken by the Spanish Oceanographic Institute. The only instance in which, against the instincts of many of their members, the associations had provided data to the EC had proven disastrous. After telling a French representative to the Euro-Parliament that ARVI had found a black bream fishery in EC waters – a species valued only by the Spanish market – the EC immediately set a black bream quota and then divided it up among existing EC members. The EC was, from a Spanish view, trying to appropriate the species of interest to the Spanish in advance of accession so that they could export to the Spanish market. Thus the Spanish negotiators, using data furnished by the Vigo cooperative, let the EC set relatively low quotas (called TAC or total allowable catch) for species valuable to Spain. For example, in negotiation, Spain received 30% of the TAC of 11,000 metric tons of megrim. In the future, as it becomes evident that the figure is too low, Spain will receive 30% of an increasing total amount. The cooperative knows that this TAC is extremely low because its private statistics show that this tonnage of megrim is offloaded yearly in the port of Vigo alone.

Another advantage for Spanish negotiators was that, given the significance of its fisheries, Spaniards would, after accession, come to occupy high posts in the EC Fisheries hierarchy. The EC negotiators thus had to adopt a firm but conciliatory bargaining stance, pinned as they were between their responsibility to forward the interests of current members and their future interests and status following accession. One of the reasons fisheries is significant is that its political importance transcends its economic value. Throughout the negotiations, the associations were able to link what it means to be Basque or Galician to the fates of fisheries, and particularly those fisheries in EC water which had long histories. The tacit argument was that ethnic identity is most linked to those sectors that provide food, directly deal with nature, and whose evolution is inseparable from the history of a people. This argument was given immediacy and force by the separatist movement in Galicia and especially, of course, by ETA in El País Vasco. The associations and local media were able to turn Madrid's performance in the EC fisheries negotiation into a referendum on its concern for, and willingness to support,

local regional culture and autonomy. Further, the negotiations became, especially for small and medium-scale fishermen, a referendum on whether the Community was willing to support local community and regional identity – both of which they viewed as inseparable from the maintenance of the fisheries. In petitions, demonstrations, and through their associations, the fishing communities from the ria de Vigo and elsewhere made it politically clear that if they could not retain access to traditional fishing grounds they were opposed to accession. Interviews with Spanish and Community negotiators reveal that this stance had a double effect: first, it meant that Spanish negotiators had no options (i.e. they did not even devise a fall back position on this issue) but to press for its traditional fisheries; second, it played upon that dimension of the CFP devoted to supporting those regions very dependent on fishing. In effect, the weight and interests of the diverse and dispersed fishing communities, powerfully motivated and silently coordinated by the logic of identity, and partly orchestrated by their newly-created associations, produced an agreement that the Spanish fisheries view as 'just.' That is, they obtained better and increasing access to Irish seas for the Galicians and French seas for the Basque.

But this is more the beginning than the end of the story: for the fishing communities along the ria de Vigo, membership in the European Community has set in train forces that are transforming the terms of identity construction. In the past five years, the small capital fishing sector has increasingly adopted industrial practices, world views, and organizational forms. Not least has been the advent of Producer Organizations as mandated by the EC. These organizations presuppose a division and opposition between boatowners and crewmen, this in sharp contrast to the indigenous fishery which understands boatowners and crewmen as bound by the same social relations of production and community. Intrinsic to these Producer Organizations (PO) is a 'utilitarian' rationality which grasps boatowners and crewmen as the owners of capital and the sellers of labor respectively. In addition, there exists no EC structure which corresponds to the structure of the relations of community-based production insofar as these relations combine fishing, farming, and marketing – as exemplified by the family of Ramon Pesquera. The questions of the future are whether and how the contradiction inscribed in the CFP will be played out in the fishing communities on the ria de Vigo; whether local conformity and compliance with EC institutional objectives will preempt and subvert the social identities and intimacies of family, kinship, and community; whether the ethos of community-based reliance and self-help will give way to dependence on the European Community; and whether the regional nationalisms will continue as critical forms of collective identity.

Conclusion: The Dialectic of Change

The absorption of Spain into the European Community and the ensuing imposition of EC policies and programs on Spain's local communities has set in motion changes in both the objective and subjective aspects of social life. Set in train is a dialectic between the forms of rationalization intrinsic to EC capitalism and the forms of resistance put up by local communities. These two dimensions of the dialectic differ fundamentally: the forms of rationalization are consciously-structured, bureaucratically-implemented,

based on and legitimated by science and scientific-like analyses, and, in general, part and product of the systems world; the forms of resistance are mostly non-conscious, highly pragmatic, based on and legitimated by tradition and experience, and grounded almost totally in the life-world.¹⁷ In Bourdieu's terms (e.g. 1985), this is a distinction between the structures of the state and technologies of power on one hand and those of the 'habitus' on the other.

In the Galician fisheries, the contrasts between the systems and life world, the operation of the European Community and the contours of local practices, are critical along two dimensions. First, the ownership of vessels, the recruitment and payment of the crewmen, the marketing of the catch, and other relations of production have historically been organized in terms of kinship and community. Within this orbit, the forms of domination were overt and interpersonal – as when the captain or *patron de pesca* would exercise almost absolute control over crewmen when at sea. But relations of production based on kinship and community have gradually and partially been eroded and preempted by capitalist relations of production. Nonetheless, in the littoral and Gran Sol fisheries it is still mostly one-boat/one owner with a crew made-up of kin and community members, although all the elements of transformation (starting with industrialization in the 1960s) are now very much in place. Certainly the encompassment of the Galician fisheries by the EC sets in motion their formalization and rationalization with a greater immediacy and power than had existed before. The institution of the EC and its policies are defined in terms of, and presuppose, fully capitalist relations of production. The partial unwillingness of Galician fishermen to go along with the rationalization of their fisheries because it erodes the institutions (specially family) and traditions of the fishing life constitutes an implicit form of resistance.

Second, the European Community subscribes to and presupposes a form of civil society based on individual rights, identities, ownership of property, and maximization. Within this framework, the EC defines its mission as exercising a regulatory role over the operation of society (e.g. production of fish) by compelling classes of individuals (e.g. fishers) to behavior in a certain, prescribed way (e.g. harvest only a stipulated tonnage of fish). But as Chatterjee (1989) has argued, this view of civil society has no space for a concept of community or for the existence of collective identities. This view of civil society runs counter to the view indigenous to the community-based fisheries; there, occupation, ethnicity, and regional/nationalism are crucial and enduring forms of identity. To the extent that fishing communities such as Aldan sustain these forms of identity, they offer resistance to the underlying premises and logic of EC fisheries policy. Within this framework, there is a continuing evolution of institutions and practice, each step of which brings Spanish fishermen closer to a rationalized fishery, though one in which these rationalized institutions and practices bear a distinctly Spanish stamp. In effect, the forms of resistance intrinsic to the Galician fishery influence the form and trajectory of their rationalization.

In Spain's negotiations for admission to the Community, the forms of identity present in the fishing communities determined the way fishermen responded to EC policy, put pressure on local and national politicians, defined their associations, and ultimately inflected the orientation and outcome of the negotiations.

Such forms of resistance were possible and partially successful in part because of the contradiction that lies at the center of the Community's Common Fisheries (and also

Common Agricultural) Policy. Indeed, if the Community applied its political economy in an unrestricted way, its form of capitalism would soon overwhelm, preempt, subordinate any relations of production founded on kin and community; its view of civil society would erode and sublimate (as a kind of cultural defense mechanism) local forms of identity. But the EC cannot enact a fully capitalist regime because nationness is the 'most universally legitimate value in political life of our times' (Anderson 1983:12). And, as I and others have argued, the very concept of the nation, imagined as distinctive and particular, is tied to primary industries, such as fishing. The consequence is the animation of countervailing forces, some of which encourage the dissolution and dissembling of 'traditional' fishing communities, and others that encourage their preservation. On one side of the social equation, the EC fosters organizations which oppose boat owners to crewmen, thus dividing kin and community loyalties. It requires associations, especially Producers' Organizations, that are instrumental (e.g. based on economic objectives) and voluntary, thereby undermining identities and associations based on kinship and community (i.e. essentialist). The CFP assumes and encourages individual maximization. Quotas, for example, are set for fisheries rather than for vessels. On the other side of the equation, the EC provides monetary aid to areas historically dependent on fishing, thereby allowing kin and community based producers to survive. Also, by bypassing the national fisheries administration (e.g. that based in Madrid), it promotes regional fisheries administrations, such as that of the Galician autonomous government. Not surprisingly, a major change since Spain's accession has been the emergence of a Galician provincial fisheries administration led by none other than the former head of the Vigo cooperative who, ironically, is on leave from the EC's fisheries directorate. Community support for local fishers and regional governments bolsters regional and occupational identities. These social changes are both systemic and contradictory because the EC serves as a source of rationalization and as a resource for strengthening local communities and regional nationalisms.

The ethnography of Galician communities indicates that their encompassment within the EC reconfigures the very conditions for the construction of subjects in at least the following ways. It encourages, presupposes, codifies and legitimates stronger forms of individualism. People are self-consciously aware of this and view increasing egoism as one consequence of the general changes that define modern life. EC policy also motivates people to see their relation to other workers as mediated by labor rather than by kinship and community. Subjects are increasingly defined and subjectivity constructed in terms of individuals' ability to own capital and sell their labor, rather than in terms of their network of and community relations. Similarly, people increasingly understand being a fishermen as a work type – interchangeable and commensurable with other types of work – rather than as a special particularistic occupation. The rise of the EC is also part of, and shapes, a form of domination which is sensed as abstract and distant. Spain's accession to the European Community, following upon the industrialization of the 1970s, has placed in motion a new set of sometimes contradictory relations and conditions that not only reshape the character of collective self-definition but give it an unpredictable future.

The small fishing communities along the ria de Vigo, elsewhere in Spain from Catalonia to Andalucia and the Basque area, and throughout much of coastal Europe are not of great economic importance. I would, however, submit that they are nonetheless

less important, for they are an index and a metaphor, a social stage on which some of the most crucial conundrums and contradictions inherent in the construction of collective identities are being played out.

Notes

1. My ethnography is founded on two years of field research in Aldan and the central port city of Vigo (in northwest Galicia) where the fishing associations are located and where most boat-owners sell their fish and bring their vessels for maintenance. The account is amplified with three months of investigation in Brussels, at the headquarters of the European Community Fishery Division. Here, I examined (among other things) those documents and records pertaining to Spain, and interviewed (over three year period) most of the participants in the fishery negotiations. As most of the Aldanese vessels operate in Irish waters, information (e.g. court records, fishing newspapers) was amassed on the Irish perspective and reactions to the Spanish presence. Finally, the analysis was supplemented by four months of field study in Madrid, focusing on the Spanish bureaucracy and the interrelation between the government and the local communities.
2. The organization of the market place illustrates the centrality of fishing in production and consumption. Markets in Vigo, Cangas, and even smaller villages are two story buildings, with the meats, vegetables, and fruits lumped together on the second floor while the first is reserved entirely for fish and shellfish.
3. The relationship between Vigo and the satellite villages is an entire study in itself. Over the past twenty years, Vigo has come to provide all of those technical and banking services, docking and maintenance facilities, and marketing channels that the local ports are too small and under-capitalized to offer. What is more is that each fishing community exists not only in relationship to Vigo, but in relationship to each other. It is thus impossible to study one village or community without reference to the others. Accordingly, though my focus is on Aldan, it is necessary to refer to both Vigo and to the other villages within its orbit.
4. Levine (1989) observes that fishing rights have emerged as a key issue in New Zealand ethnic politics, the Maori measuring the extent to which they are politically accepted by mainstream white New Zealand by their success in preserving 'traditional' fishing rights.
5. The action by the European Community in July 1977 to extend its maritime zone to 200 miles and produce a CFP was a mostly defensive reaction to external events – particularly the extension of maritime jurisdictions by the United States, Canada, and Norway – rather than a well-planned and articulate policy. EC contemplation of a Common Fisheries Policy really begins in 1976 with a set of working papers that assessed the impact of the Law of the Sea (LOS) on Community fishing. These papers noted that if EC vessels were limited to the Community Pond and foreign vessels were excluded than: (1) 60% of the Community's resources would be located within the British zone, (2) the amount of fish caught would remain nearly constant, but its overall value would decline moderately, and (3) the open EC market would generate serious price competition. Given the circumstances, the Community concluded that a CFP was essential.
6. Vestergaard (1990), writing on the changing character of fishermen's identity in Denmark, approaches this same problem eloquently and from a slightly different angle. He argues that: the Danish fisheries are a social segment whose identity is not exhausted by its place in the modern interpretation of civil society, particularly as this interpretation sees them only as uncoordinated competitors who need regulation. Yet it would be untenable to do away with the distinction between fact and value that underlies

our notion of individual rights (p. 29-30). Davis (1991) notes that as small capital fisheries come under the sway of 'capitalist-industrial formal institutions and their rationalities' they become 'dehumanised' precisely because community and familial identities are subsumed and preempted by the imperative and logic of capitalism (p. 13).

7. In sum, the EC has two contradictory objectives. The first is to neutralize forms of occupational and regional identity through its policies and programs. The neutralization of identities will allow to emerge agreement on a notion of 'rational.' This notion has an evaluative and motivational component: the first says that the accuracy and truth of information is a function of scientific analyses, and that such analyses should constitute the main basis of fishery policy; the second asserts that a fishery is made-up of individuals whose sole objective is to economically maximize (i.e. extract the most fish at the lowest cost) against like competitors. The second EC objective is to support traditional fisheries which implies forms of community and collective identity. And, these communities use a notion of rationality (and maximization) that overlaps with but is surely not the same as that presupposed by rational management.

8. The associations in the ARVI cooperative are the following:

ANAMER – Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Congeladores de Pesca de Merluza.
 ANAVAR – Asociacion Nacional de Armadores de Buques Congeladores de Pesquerias Varias.
 AGARBA – Asociacion Gallega de Armadores de Buques de Pesca de Bacalao.
 ARPOSOL – Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Pesca de Gran Sol de Pontevedra.
 ARPOSUR – Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Pesca del Litoral Espanol Y Sur Portugal de Pontevedra.
 ARPOAN – Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Pesca de Anzuelo y Palangre de Pontevedra.
 ARTEMAR – Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques Artesanales de Pesca de Pontevedra.
 CERCO – Asociacion Provincial de Armadores de Buques de Cercos de Pon.

9. Zulaika presents a harsher picture befitting life aboard the now defunct pair trawler. He defines life aboard these boats in terms of deprivation – no family, no sex, no community, no power over one's life, etc. The figure for EC licenses are as follows:

fourth quarter of	1978	240
	1979	200
	1980	168
	1981	142
	1982	114
	1983	111
	1984	106

10. Spain and Canada have had a difficult and combative relationship for the past decade. The difficulties of Spanish fishing in North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) waters originate in the deadlock reached during the Spanish-Canadian negotiation. Trouble began early on when Spain refused to sign the NAFO convention because of the special status awarded coastal states. By 1981, relations between Spain and Canada had dissolved, as the associations rejected the final Canadian offer because they felt that Canada wanted great access to the Spanish market in exchange for meager quotas. In principle, this forced Spanish boats to fish beyond the 200 mile zone of Canada, though given the Canadian arrest records for the period there was also much illicit fishing by Spanish boats. By the end of 1983, the Galician *gran altura* fleet had discovered two fisheries outside of Canada's 200 mile zone. The first was a mixed fishery whose most important species was flounder. By 1984, eighteen trawlers depended on this fishery. The second was a redfish fishery.

11. In a capitalist model of a capture fishery, its distinctive economic features are that (1) fish are hunted, (2) the resource is self-renewing, and most critical, (3) it is a common property resource. Because of these

features, the fishery is believed to violate the basis of capitalist production, i.e., private ownership and control of the factors of production. A result is that all the mechanisms that normally enhance productivity (and which have empowered the global expansion of capitalism) serve here to undermine the fishery. They lead to overcapitalization and thus overproduction of the lowest cost input – the fish (see McCay and Anderson 1987 for a review). Within the orbit of this economic, and also economicistic model, there are two basic solutions to the problem: redefine access to the fishery in terms of individual property rights and/or limit the quantity captured. The EC has employed the second solution by placing quotas on the amount of fish that can be captured. Unfortunately, both these solutions are an objectification of capitalist ideology, as that ideology has become embodied in bioeconomic analyses. They presume that the social and political economy of a fishery are reducible to, and a product of, individual maximizing interests. And, having purged the cultural and institutional dimensions of the fishery, the modelers cannot help but apprehend the social interests of local communities as barriers to economic progress.

12. The view that they have been marginalized runs rather deep in the Galician collective memory. Galicians generally and fishermen in particular hold that they are marginal and marginalized by the central Madrid-based power structures.

13. A good illustration is the June 1985 issue of Fishing News International – the primary trade publication. The headline was: 'Spanish fishermen frighten Euro-MPs,' noting that at that May's session of the European Parliament concern was expressed over the EC ability to control such 'unruly fishermen.'

14. A case in point is the vessel, Cachamuina, which in the space of four years, and operating under various names, was heavily fined three times, its catch was twice confiscated, and once its fishing gear was confiscated for violating net size limits. Its owner, no longer able to withstand the financial pain, registered the vessel in England in 1985.

15. For its part, the EC knew little about the economy of Spanish fisheries. In part, this is because its analysts, even those who specialize in fishing, have viewed Spain as on the border of European society, economically, socially and politically. Its peninsular geography was an index of its marginal status. Spain was both socially traditional and economically retarded, making it a fascinating, affordable place for vacation, but not to analyze as part and product of European society.

16. I am, of course, taking the distinction between the systems world and life world from Jürgen Habermas.

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Research Reports

In November 1990 the IDAF Project organized in Kokrobite (Ghana) a Round Table on Fishermen's Migrations in West Africa. On that occasion several specialists with first-hand knowledge of the artisanal fisheries in West Africa presented papers, which appeared in the proceedings entitled *Fishermen's Migrations in West Africa* edited by Jan M. Haakonsen and M. Chimere Diaw (IDAF/WP/36, April 1991, Cotonou:FAO/DANIDA/NORWAY). Thanks to Dr. Haakonsen, who used to be attached as a socio-economist/anthropologist to the IDAF programme in Cotonou, we gained permission to publish a few of the papers read in Kokrobite in a slightly revised form. We kindly thank him for his endeavors in this respect. Since it concerned working papers on research still in progress, the editors of MAST thought it a good idea to publish them in a new rubric called Research Reports. From now on our pages will be open for everybody engaged in the field of maritime anthropology to submit pieces in which he or she presents the results of work in progress, which may be of interest to our readership.

Artisanal Fisheries and Fishermen's Migrations in Liberia

Jan M. Haakonsen

Introduction

Liberia has one of the longer coastlines in West Africa, 590 kilometers, slightly longer than that of Ghana or Senegal. However, fish resources are much poorer due to a combination of conditions unfavourable to large scale fish reproduction: narrow continental shelf, no major upwellings and a lack of long-term temperature gradients (Smart & Sheves 1979). Yet, if the available resources were fully exploited they would go a long way towards meeting the population's modest fish requirements.

One problem in this connection is the poor knowledge we have on Liberian maritime resources which is basically based on the quick surveys by research vessels. Estimates about potential yields vary greatly but normally fall within the ranges 9,000-15,000 tons for demersal species, 19,400-41,000 tons for coastal pelagic species and 1,200-1,600 tons for shrimp (Ssentongo 1987).

Poor catch statistics over the years do not help clarify the situation to any major degree.¹ They do indicate, however, that artisanal fisheries have played a very prominent role in the country's fish supply, at least until 1991 when all maritime fishing activities have come to a halt as a consequence of the civil war which is still raging in the country.

At one point, Liberia possessed a fairly large industrial fishing fleet which particularly went to the rich shrimp resources in the northern end of the national waters and also to some extent in Sierra Leonean territory (Smart & Sheves 1979). The industrial era in Liberian fisheries started in 1955 and witnessed the growth of one particularly large company, Mensurado, which was supplied by up to 30 vessels by the late 1970s (Eppier 1986). This company effectively went bankrupt after it was taken over by government just after the 1980 coup which brought the late Samuel K. Doe to power, and although other companies continued to exist, in name at least, and new ones emerged,² total landings by Liberian vessels have been consistently lower than artisanal ones throughout the 1980s according to official figures (see Table 1).³

The Development of Artisanal Fisheries and Early Migrations

The first known reports of fishing and fishermen in Liberia or rather, what was originally labeled the Grain or Pepper Coast by the first European explorers, are those by Duarte Pacheco Perreira (see e.g. de Surgy 1969; Chauveau, 1986). In his famous voyage along West Africa's coast 1506-1508 he mentions 'the negroes' living beyond 'rio Cestos' (Cess river or Rivercess) and those in 'Grand Sesters' (Grand Cess), whom he refers to as: '...great fishermen who go fishing two to three leagues ⁴ at sea in some canoes resembling a weaver's shuttle' (de Surgy 1969:1).

Table 1. Total landings by sector in Liberia, 1980-88 (in tons)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Ind. fisheries - shrimp	n.a.	280	601	844	502	622	181	222	213
Ind. fisheries - other	n.a.	2,416	3,643	4,592	4,169	1,087	7,158	6,543	4,957
Ind. fisheries - total	5,473	2,696	4,244	5,436	4,671	1,710	7,339	6,765	5,175
Art. fisheries - total	8,318	6,578	5,909	6,280	6,766	6,367	7,108	7,966	6,870

Sources: Flowers (1986), for years 1980-85; Bureau of Fisheries (1989), (partly processed data sheets) for 1986-88.

There is little doubt that these were the people who became widely known as the Kru or Kroumen and who are still based on the same coastal stretch. Some sources claim a more recent origin for the Kru, for instance Hayden, who refers to five sources in support of the claim that the Kru only 'reached the coast perhaps 200 years ago after a series of intermittent stops during a journey from some area west of the Sudan' (1971:2). Most historical and anthropological evidence suggests otherwise, however.


There is nevertheless considerable confusion around the term Kru or Krou, as it often refers to a whole cultural area or assemblage of related ethnic groups, 6 in Liberia and 12-15 in Côte d'Ivoire (Schwartz 1974; Massing 1980). The sea-faring Kru are thus usually referred to as Nanakrou in Côte d'Ivoire, while in Liberia and Sierra Leone they are simply called Kru, while the other sub-groups are called by different names (e.g. Grebo, Krahn, Bassa, etc., see map).

The first Europeans in West Africa were very impressed by these people adventuring themselves at high seas in minuscule canoes, and Portuguese, Dutch, French and English engaged them as both seamen and longshoremen to transport people and goods across the dreaded surf. The following quote by a 19th century sea-captain exemplifies the high regard of the Europeans for the Kru:

I must not forget the Kroo-boys – fine good-natured fellows, instinctively watermen, almost amphibious. Their native home is the country of Sinou in the central part of the Republic of Liberia. They are to be found all along the coast; in fact I don't know what the coast would do without them. They are invaluable, and represent the most generally useful – whether ashore or afloat – and important tribe on the West Coast of Africa. Without them it would be difficult to work, on this malarial coast, our men-of-war, mail steamers, foreign vessels, all loading and unloading being done by them (Moloney 1883:20).

Their association with ships and often actual employment as ship's crew, have led many people to believe that the very name Kru (or Krou) comes from the English word 'crew.' However, the terminology dates back to before the English expansion in West Africa. Schwartz, first tracing the employment of the name to the Portuguese version *Krao* in the late 16th century calls its resemblance to the word 'crew' simply a 'phonetical coincidence' (1974:1).

It is perhaps curious that a group of people with such an obvious familiarity with the sea, regardless of its dangers and almost unrivaled in terms of seamanship, should never evolve into an equally skillful assemblage of fishermen. Fishing has always appeared



Map 1. The Kru Culture Area (KCA)

to be an important activity among the Kru, especially certain clans referred to as the *kle-po*, literally fish-men (Massing 1980:240), and indeed many travel accounts from the Liberian coast of the 19th century in particular, refer specifically to these 'Fishmen.' However, even today their fishing methods and craft are basically unchanged from when Perreira first encountered their 'shuttle-like' canoes nearly half a millennium ago.

This has not prevented Kru fishermen from migrating out of their relatively narrow coastal strip in what are now Sinoe and Grand Kru counties. First of all, they spread along the Liberian coast and established distinct fishing communities in the coastal towns as they grew up, and today we find specially named Kru-towns in Monrovia, Robertsport, Buchanan (Zetterstrom 1969) and Harper. They also dominate the coastal strip from Sasstown well into Maryland county.

Migration across present national borders also took place at an early stage, probably because of the great demand for Kru as longshoremen. In Freetown, there was an established Kru community by the beginning of the 18th century, at one point counting 2,000 individuals, and although they may have been employed in other tasks, de Surgy is probably right in suggesting that there must have been some 'Nanakrou' (i.e. fishermen) among them (1969:133). The migration of Kru fishermen into their western Côte d'Ivoire settlements probably took place at the end of the last century with the establishment of official trading posts in Tabou, Bérébi, San Pedro and Sassandra, though the establishment of more or less permanent fishing communities came much later. De Surgy (*ibid.*) suggests 1940 for Tabou and 1952 for Sassandra.

More important for Liberia's fish production however was the arrival of Ghanaian migrants, in this case Fanti and Anlo-Ewe, to the country. According to the Fante community in Harper, Fante fishermen first started coming there in the 1920s. Gruvel (quoted in de Surgy 1965 & 1969) reported the presence of Fante fishermen in nearby

Tabou and the Ivoirian side of the border in 1912, so the report from Harper appears realistic, a continuation of the gradual westward and, from Harper (Cape Palmas) on northwestward movement of the Fanti in the early part of this century. Von Gnielinski (1972), however, says the Fante came to Liberia only in the 1930s, but it is not clear where this information originates.

In the 1940s, there appears to have been almost no Fante fishermen in Liberia, possibly because of the war, and when they returned, they were looked upon with suspicion as they were suspected of kidnapping local children for ritual purposes. It is interesting that a similar accusation, as de Surgy (1969) mentions, used to be made against the Ewe in Côte d'Ivoire, though probably unfounded. Possibly the Fante were being used as scapegoats to cover human sacrifice committed by secret societies of particularly the Americo-Liberians, as happened in 1986.⁵ In any case, a FAO master-fisherman could in 1952 report 110 'Accra' (Ghana) canoes of an average length of 8 m along the Liberian coast, half of them in Monrovia (van Pel 1954). He also estimated the yearly catches of Fante and 'Popoh' fishermen at 2,640 tons. Two years later, one of his colleagues reported that 'many' Fanti were operating out of Rivercess and 'some' of Greenville. He made no mention of Monrovia though (Fredriksen 1957).

Less is known about the origins of the Anlo-Ewe migrations, but it is likely they are of more recent date, probably after World War II. It is interesting that they are referred to as 'Popoh' in Liberia, though it is established beyond doubt that they are Anlo-Ewe, though some have lived in both Togo and Benin and may even have been born there.

Structure and Distribution of Artisanal Fishermen in Liberia today⁶

National Fishermen: The Kru

Most official estimates give a total of 700-900 canoes. The latest government census in 1985 gives the figure of 859 (Thornes 1986) operating from some 35 landing beaches in seven regions. However, in an extensive EEC sponsored survey of the Liberian coast in 1988, Ratcliffe & Lindley arrived at a figure of 'not less than 1,000' (1988:22). The corresponding estimated catches of the Kru were less impressive, an average of 1 ton per year or a total of about 1,000 tons.

The reason is that most Kru fishermen continue to operate pretty much in the same way as they always have, from small 1-2 man canoes (mostly one) and using almost exclusively simple handlines. The standard Kru canoe is 3-6 m, about 40-50 cm wide and with an extremely low freeboard. They are equipped with rudimentary sprit sails mostly made out of old sacks which are raised whenever there is a bit of wind, which is usually away from shore in the morning and towards shore in the afternoon. This also influences the fishing pattern: Kru fishermen usually go out to sea in the early morning and come back in the early afternoon.

The sails notwithstanding, the hand-paddle remains the principal means of propulsion of the Kru canoe and it can be hard work for the fishermen to reach out to the rocky bottoms favoured by the Kru. As a result, it is rare for a fisherman to go fishing more than every second day or three days a week, the physical strain is such as to prevent daily excursions.

The gear used is mostly limited to handlines with baited hooks of various sizes: a sea-bream line for rocky bottoms is usually composed of three N 6-8 ringed bent hooks, a grouper line for more muddy bottoms of two N 2-4 ringed bent hooks and a sandy bottom line of seven N 9-10 ringed back hooks for small breams and mackerels. For surface and midwater, a line with one N 2-4 ringed bent hook is used (Anum Doyi & Wood 1988:46). Fishermen usually carry a selection of hooks and lines with them. In addition, trolling lines, sometimes with artificial lures, are used on the way to and from the fishing ground.

Nets are rarely used, the Kru complaining that they are unable to repair them. In Harper, a large number of nets was apparently introduced to the Kru in the 1940s (Wentholt 1987), but the effort lasted only as long as the nets. Another factor restricting the use of nets is the canoe size: from the smallest ones it is virtually impossible to set and pull even the smallest gill net. The situation is different for the larger 2-4 man Kru canoes which are sometimes built and can be up to 8 meters long, with a wider beam and a higher freeboard, showing some Ghana-canoe influences. A few, less than 20 in the whole country, are provided with wells for the mounting of engines of 10-25 hp, and these canoes are being used by Kru fishermen for more advanced methods such as gill-netting. Yet Ratcliffe and Lindley could during their survey only identify 'less than a dozen Kru fishermen who had made significant progress' (1988:21), exceptions they saw as 'motivated individuals who have broken free of the Kru community's social attitudes' (*ibid*:23), a somewhat bombastic and Eurocentric statement, perhaps.

Nevertheless Ratcliffe and Lindley are touching upon a factor which cannot be neglected, namely the socio-cultural organization of Kru society which may be a real impediment towards a more technologically developed fishery than that pursued today. All too often (e.g. Jorion 1986; Eppler 1986; and even Ratcliffe and Lindley 1988), Kru fishermen are dismissed as unskilled, part-time fishermen. This can be challenged. Regarding their poor fishing ability, an experienced Ghanaian fishing technologist brought up in a typical Adan line-fishing community comments: 'The Kru fishermen are generally described as crude and unskilled, but from my observations in Harper, I am convinced that these line fishermen are highly skilled in their profession' (Anum Doyi & Wood 1988:48).

As for their alleged part-time fishing, it is true that some (but by no means all) Kru fishermen in the towns, Monrovia in particular, adhere to their shipping traditions and now work mostly as dockworkers and stevedores, fishing only in their spare-time or when there is no work in the port. However, in rural areas they do little other economic activity than fishing. Even in their home territories where they own agricultural land, little time is spent on the farm. In the Kru traditional farm system, based largely on the slash and burn technique, the men are only responsible for clearing the land, which may take only a few weeks a year. All other activities like planting, weeding and harvesting are women's work. Thus the men are largely free to pursue fishing which they may not do as often as other fishermen in part because of the physical strain and the need for rest days.

Another factor is the relatively poor returns from line fishing outside the main population centres. Although the Kru catch mostly high quality fish, it seldom commands very high prices outside Monrovia or Buchanan. Quick market surveys conducted in Harper in 1986 and 1987 (Haakonsen & Sheves 1986; Wentholt 1987)

indicated that prices of species like snapper and grouper were only 25-50% higher than those of for instance caranx or barracuda and within the range of Liberian \$ 1-1.50 per kg.⁷

Catches are also mostly moderate. During a visit to Grand Cess in November 1986 the landings of all 24 canoes that had left for sea were observed. Except for two canoes which had caught a large shark each, and one with a sailfish of about 20 kg, most catches were well under 10 kg, and a few between 10 and 15 kg. It is doubtful that the total value of the fish landed from the 24 canoes that day exceeded Liberian \$ 200, Grand Cess market prices being lower than Harper (Haakonsen & Sheves 1986).

Somewhat better were the results from the three landings of 18 Kru canoes followed in Greenville, also in November 1986. Catches here, which were quite mixed, totaled 591 kg for an average of 10.9 kg per canoe per landing. By comparison, the catches of six Fante fishermen using 2' to 3.5' gillnets from six locally built larger 'Kru-type' canoes, were an average of 18.1 kg, almost exclusively butternose (*Polydactylus*) and/or cassava fish (*Pseudotolithus*).

We have to remember, however, that capital and operating costs for the Kru are very low. A small canoe costs \$ 50 to \$ 150 and lasts several years, sail and paddles are similarly not very costly, the same goes for lines, weights and hooks. The only real operational cost they potentially face is bait which preferably is sardineila bought from the Fante, but can also be caught by the Kru themselves with castnets.

National Fishermen: The Grebo

The Grebo are closely related to the Kru (Massing [1980] suggests they should be called the Eastern Kru), but do not have the same maritime tradition. Nevertheless they pursue some fishing, though close to shore, often with good results. Ratcliffe and Lindley reported castnet fishermen in Harper (most probably Grebo but not 100% confirmed) catching up to a bucket of small mullets in one throw and which they rightly pointed out was 'more than many Kru fishermen catch in one day' (1988:21, appendix 3).

The Grebo are otherwise known for two specialities within fishing. One is diving for gigantic oysters of up to 15 cm which they get loose from their rock-beds with hammer and chisel. The second, regrettably, is to use dynamite, one of the very few instances where this method is used for marine fishing in West Africa. Besides being very damaging to fish breeding areas and wasteful, as only a small part of the stunned fish is recovered, fishing with dynamite is obviously dangerous, something a few blind and hand-less ex-fishermen in Harper can attest to. As a whole however the Grebo's contribution to national fish production is insignificant.

Immigrant Fishermen: The Fante

Good descriptions of Fante fishermen have been presented in many other publications (e.g. de Surgy 1965 & 1969, Vercruisje 1984, Christensen 1977). Therefore only their main characteristics as relevant to Liberia in particular will be dealt with here.

We have seen that the Fante have been active in Liberia for a long time, with a possible break during World War II and occasional 'withdrawals' in the 1960s and 1980s due to conflicts with the administrative authorities. Today, most Fante fishermen come from Komenda, British Komenda in particular (as opposed to Dutch Komenda a few kilometers away). This conforms well with de Surgy's (1969:241) observations from

Côte d'Ivoire on the basis of which he concludes that Fante fishermen abroad tend to group together according to place or village of origin.

Today's Fante's appear firmly established and almost absorbed into Liberian society (though with continued Fante socio-cultural characteristics). Probably because of the long distance to Ghana, company contracts appear to be longer than in other countries the Fante migrate to, namely 3-7 years. It is usually only a 'big man,' i.e. the canoe owner, who can afford to go home on visits during a contract period, ordinary crew members have to wait until it ends. Many of them may then go on for a second, third or fourth company contract in Liberia. Yet, the apparent integration does not make the fishermen fullfledged Liberian citizens, even those having lived there for 20 years or more retain their Ghanaian citizenship. Most also live under rather poor housing condition, not quite daring to invest in a proper house and good furniture for fear of loosing it all of a sudden one day. Such investments are usually made in their home village in Ghana.

Figures for the development of the number of Fante canoes, here included a handful of 'Popoh' canoes, have lead some people to conclude that artisanal fisheries has been stagnant or even declining, in the 1980s in particular (e.g. Ssentongo 1987; Eppler 1986). However, the problem may again be poorly kept statistics (see for the official figures and most quoted estimates Table 2).

Particular attention should be given to the 1988 figure taken from the Ratcliffe & Lindley survey and which is no doubt the most accurate frame survey in recent years. It also gives the highest number in nearly four decades indicating anything but a decline in Fante fisheries in Liberia. Moreover, it should be remembered that while the canoes counted by van Pel in 1954 were an average of 8 metres, the ones accounted for in 1988 were between 9 and 17 m and equipped with 25, 40 and 50 hp outboard engines.

Not knowing the exact distribution of these canoes by type or size, no accurate estimate can be made of the number of Fante fishermen in Liberia. But an educated guess, based on an average of 12 crew members per canoe (apprentices included) would give us a total of about 3,000. In addition come the families, most of them also Fante. Just as at home, the wives and other Fante women are the smokers, traders and in some cases also credit suppliers. A few Fante fishermen have married local, usually Kru, women but this has little overall impact to the traditional pattern.

Table 2. Ghana Canoes in Liberia

1950	-	1960	44	1970	86	1980	167
51	-	61	42	71	65	81	182
52	-	62	80	72	50	82	206
53	-	63	52	73	48	83	192
54	110	64	65	74	54	84	188
55	-	65	91	75	88	85	147
56	-	66	26	76	83	86	246
57	-	67	53	77	87	87	-
58	-	68	43	78	179	88	262
59	-	69	63	79	252		

Sources: Van Pel (1954); Eppler (1986); Flowers (1986); Ssentongo (1987); Haakonsen & Sheves (1986); Ratcliffe & Lindley (1988).⁸

Most Fante canoes operate from naturally sheltered bases, of which the Liberian coastline offers a few, a factor contributing to lengthen the canoe's life.⁹ This can be very important, as new canoes can only be obtained in Ghana and brought by sea route. Although *Triplochiton sclerexiton*, the raw material for the Ghana canoe, grows in Liberia in some quantity, there is no canoe building tradition of this type.

The fishermen use basically the same gear as they use in Ghana, among the more important being the *watsa* (purse seine) and *ali* (sardinella drift net/surrounding net) and which are used to catch the principal artisanal fish resources such as sardinella (*Aurita* and *Maderensis*) and bonga (*Ethmalosa fimbriata*). Support gear for the off-season and principal gear for smaller canoes include *tenga* set net (50-65 mm mesh size, 2 m deep), *tengaf* set net (100 mm mesh size, 2 m deep) *epabua/kafani* (caranx)/shark net (180-270 mm mesh size, 9-10 m deep) and *cedi* drift net (100 mm mesh size, 10 m deep) (Anum Doyi 1987:5). It should also be recalled that some Fante set netters have taken to use locally built canoes, which may account for the relatively many larger and higher free board 'Kru canoes' observed by Ratcliffe & Lindley.

Marketing and market outlets appears to be no problem for the Fante fishermen, smoked fish being appreciated all over Liberia and some also ending up across the border in Guinea. The fishermen's women follow the same procedure as in Ghana and smoke the fish, especially small pelagics. Only when they cannot handle the whole catch do they sell some fish to Kru-women for smoking. Kru-women otherwise do some retail trading of fish, particularly fresh fish in coastal towns while most smoked fish destined for inland markets appears taken up by traders from the Mandingo and other ethnic groups (Akerele 1979).

The main constraint faced by Fante fishermen in Liberia, in recent years anyhow, appears to be the local lack of engines, spare parts and nets of all kind, besides of course the problem of replacing a canoe.

Immigrant Fishermen: The 'Popoh'

As explained earlier, the 'Popoh' are actually Anlo-Ewe beach-seine fishermen. They are all concentrated in two locations, Popoh Beach in Monrovia and Robertsport. The beach seine companies are probably 7 or 8, some using very old Ghanaian dug-outs, some locally built, large 'Kru canoes.' Company sizes are said to be as small as 8 individuals (Jorion 1986:9), and the beach seine observed are also small and in worse shape than normal. Some Kru people are hired on a daily basis to haul in the seines.

The 'Popoh' seem to have been settled a long time in Liberia, the chief fisherman in Robertsport, for instance, had arrived in 1960 after having lived in Togo and Benin, though born on the Anlo peninsula. The 'Popoh' also complain about the lack of netting material, but seem to be in a state of general decline in contrast to the Fante community. Their contribution to the country's fish production is also extremely modest.

Immigrant Fishermen: Others

There is yet another category of foreign artisanal fishermen, though to call them 'immigrant' is misleading as they stay in Liberian waters for only a few days at a time and never touch land. These are Lebou and Ga line fishermen based in San Pedro (Côte d'Ivoire), some 120 km from the border. Equipped with up to 600 litres of fuel and ice

for a week, they venture into Southern Liberian waters where the many rocky grounds offer high quality fish which fetches extremely good prices in Côte d'Ivoire. That this activity is illegal, goes without saying, but it is uncontrollable and probably much less damaging to Liberian fish resources than, say, the dumping of unwanted by-catch from the many shrimp trawlers.

It is interesting to note that there have been reported attempts by foreign line fishermen to establish themselves in Harper, but this caused indignation and generated vigorous local opposition: hook and line has been and will always remain a Kru activity in Liberia, this is one area where foreign fishermen are definitely not accepted.

Government Policies and Impact of Migrant Fishermen in Liberia

Fisheries policies in Liberia are generally inadequate or nonexistent, and in any case poorly enforced, except perhaps on a local level. The government has generally been very tolerant towards immigrant fishermen like the Fante, but this seems due more to 'laissez-faire' than to an actually established policy.

The regulation affecting the artisanal fishermen most directly is the yearly canoe licence fee reported to be \$ 40 or 50 for large (Fante) canoes and \$ 10 or 15 for small (Kru) canoes. There is no doubt that fishermen, especially migrant fishermen, do pay these fees to local fisheries officers, though it does not always appear in the records of the Bureau of Fisheries in Monrovia.

More obscure is the applicability of the rule that each foreign fishing company is only allowed to operate with a 51% Liberian partnership, apparently aimed at industrial companies. However, in Sinoe county this is (or was in 1986 at least) being applied to Fante companies, too, who solve the problem by employing the services of a local 'partner' who puts himself down on paper as the responsible Liberian for an initial fee and a certain percentage of daily catches. Similar 'local enforcement' of other regulations, real or imagined, seems not unusual, to the chagrin of the fishermen.

There appears to be no general legislation regarding artisanal vs. industrial fishing zones, and even if there were, it would probably have been unenforceable, too. This gives at times rise to conflicts between the two sectors, usually because artisanal gear is being destroyed by industrial vessels and their trawls. These conflicts, however, are generally restricted to the northern part of the country where the best trawling grounds are. Further south, rocky bottoms severely restrict the trawlers' range of operation.

When it comes to the impact of migrant artisanal fishermen to Liberian fisheries, this must be looked at on two levels; one dealing with the technical impact (educational, technology transfer, etc.), the other with the fishing sector and the economy as a whole.

On the first level, the impact must be said to be modest at best. In terms of fishing technology, nearly three quarters of a century's intimate contact and cohabitation (the Fante usually live in or near the 'Kru towns') the Fante seem to have been unable to teach their Kru 'counterparts' even the simplest technical innovations, such as for instance repairing nets. Not that they have tried, most Fante would scoff at the mere suggestion of hiring a Kru crew member on their canoes, but on the other hand, a Kru would never accept to lower himself to be ruled by a bosun and adhere to a company contract. Yet, there appears to be

Table 3. *Estimated Composition of Liberian Fish Supply*

Supplier	Tons/year
Fante fishermen	14,000
Kru fishermen	1,000
Local trawlers	1,200
Foreign trawlers (by-catch)	2,500
Imports (frozen)	13,200
Total	31,900

Source: Ratcliffe & Lindley (1988:30)

little animosity between the two groups, each does its own fishing and not only is there no conflict between the two, they even complement each other.

The impact of migrant fishermen on fish production in Liberia, on the other hand, is dramatic and, in this observer's view, overall very positive. First of all, they provide the local population with a local fish supply, most of the artisanal catch being consumed locally. The contribution to total fish production may in fact be much higher than suggested in Table 1. Ratcliffe & Lindley suggest the artisanal landings to be at least twice as much as reported in official statistics and suggest the country's actual fish supply may be as represented in Table 3. This means that the Fante are responsible for 93% of artisanal catches, 76% of total domestic catch and 44% of total marine fish supply in the country!

The same authors also calculate certain direct economic benefits of the immigrant fishermen to the Liberian economy: for one thing, the Fante bring in considerable investments, 'a conservative estimate' of the replacement value of the Fante owned fleet and gear (most brought in from abroad) being US \$ 8 million; secondly, fish caught by the Fante (and which would surely not have been caught by the Kru or the local trawler fleet) represents an import substitution value of 'at least' US \$ 10 million (Ratcliffe & Lindley 1988:2). These are significant figures in a poor country of only 2 million people. The more indirect economic impact for Liberians is more difficult to assess, but is there nonetheless. Although most processing of Fante-caught fish is done by Fante women, the marketing of the processed product is handled by Liberians. Thousands of people must depend directly on this trade and thousand of others more indirectly (e.g. drivers, mechanics, people preparing food for or lodging long distance traders, etc.). Or to take another example, the fuel wood supply for smoking and which generally is brought by lorry at \$ 150 a load to the smoking women by Liberian drivers after having been cut by Liberian lumberjacks: How many lorry loads are needed to smoke nearly 14,000 tons of fish? How many local jobs are created just for this operation?

The exact answers, of course, cannot be given, but the examples presented should be sufficient to illustrate that the overall impact of migrant fishermen in Liberia is most probably good for the country and, not to forget, the fishermen themselves. At the moment, because of the tragic circumstances in Liberia, there is no fishing done at all in the country. Many fishermen have been evacuated back to Ghana,¹⁰ and people are starving. Hopefully, the war will end soon, Fante fishermen may again be able to help feed the Liberian people.

Notes

1. The Fisheries Department quite readily admits (unofficially) that its statistics is based on inadequate and dubious field data. The last can readily be confirmed by our own attempts to obtain local catch statistics in 1986 and 1987 in Harper, Greenville and Robertsport. Despite four visits and many promises, not one figure was seen in Harper; in Greenville a day's statistics from the landings of 7 canoes showed a more or less evenly distributed selection of such diverse species as barracuda, sardinella, ilisha, caranx, shark, sailfish, blackfish, butternose (threadfin), babablee, mackerel and bonga, all canoes but one having landed at least 15 kg of each. In Capemount, finally, all recorded catches of all species were 45 kg per canoe except for a few cases of 35 kg, again with great varieties in the catch composition.

2. According to unpublished government statistics (Statistics 1989) there were as many as 45 Liberian trawlers in the country, most of them in the 150-500 tons range. This seems rather excessive compared to previous years as shown in the table below, but may well take into account 'flag of convenience' vessels

Number of industrial trawlers in Liberia

1971	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
32	13	11	18	24	25	13	34	29	45

Sources: FAO Data base for 1979-87, Bureau of Fisheries for 1988

registered in Liberia and operating in West Africa, but outside Liberian waters. A relevant point here about industrial fishing vessels operating in Liberia is that most are actually foreign fishing for a 'joint venture' company. Officers are usually European, Greek in particular, while the crew members to a large extent are Ghanaians, usually Fante: another example of fishermen's migrations.

3. A few additional remarks should be made here. First of all, the quality of the statistics is such that they must be treated very cautiously. Second, industrial shrimp catches have dropped dramatically, officially at least, from the 1970s (from 1973 on they were at least 1,300 tons to the 1980s. And third a recent and well-founded estimate (Ratcliffe & Lindley 1988) puts artisanal catches at about twice the official figures in recent years, i.e. about 15,000 tons, while industrial catches are calculated to be only around 3,700 tons.

4. A sea league is equivalent to three nautical miles or 5.556 kilometers.

5. In the beginning of November 1986 the mutilated corpses of two young boys were discovered in the outskirts of Harper, obvious victims of ritual murder. 33 Fante fishermen were promptly arrested as 'suspects,' but this resulted in violent actions by students of the local Polytechnic and other members of the population who, rightly it seems, suspected members of the town's elite to be the culprits. After heavy demonstrations November 5th, the Central Government agreed to an inquiry and at the end, several prominent people in Maryland county, including the county judge and the representative of the ruling party, were found guilty of the crime and sentenced to death.

6. 'Today,' of course, refers to the situation immediately preceding the current devastating civil war.

7. This was just after the introduction of the so-called 'Doe-dollar' which at the time was 25-30% less than the official rate of Liberian \$ 1 = US \$ 1.

8. Thornes (1986) gives a figure of 317 large canoes for 1985, but it is in contradiction with all other figures from his Ministry.

9. Ratcliffe & Lindley report 'a lifespan of up to 35 years' for the Ghana canoes in Liberia (1988:11), but this is clearly unrealistic.

10. In connection with the evacuation from Liberia of thousands of West Africans by ship in the beginning of September 1990, including 780 Ghanaians from British Komenda, this village was visited September 21 and 23 to find out about the fate of Ghanaian fishermen in Liberia. Here are extracts of the report (Haakonsen 1990):

Ghanaian fishermen seemed to have fared better than many other groups during the civil war though they have not been allowed to fish since May/June.

The only confirmed casualties (by September) among Fante fishermen are from Buchanan where four were shot and killed when the rebels occupied the town. In Monrovia, some fishermen and their families have been wounded by stray bullets, but their main residence area (Westpoint) has been outside the main battle fronts.

The fishermen based in Capemount (Robertsport) have managed to slip across the border to Sierra Leone with their canoes and gear. Similarly, a few based in Harper have crossed to Côte d'Ivoire, though some fishermen have been reported to be arrested by rebel forces in their 'escape attempts.' All other Fante canoes are still in the country.

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The Migration of Ghanaian Women in the Canoe Fishing Industry

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Introduction

In Ghana, fishing is one of the major occupations in which gender roles are clear-cut and specific. Men go to sea and women stay on land to process and market the catch both in local and distant markets. This means that without the complimentary role of the women, the efforts of the men will come to nothing. Since fish are a highly perishable commodity, they need to be handled immediately after they are landed. This explains the need for another group of people who have not spent hours at sea to handle the fish. In Ghana, this role has been played by women for centuries and continues to be played by them. The role of women in this economic venture is therefore firmly embedded in the traditions of the people. It is impossible to imagine the fishing industry in Ghana without women.

As in other sectors of the economy, the fishing industry has had its share of innovations which have led to repercussions in the traditional relationships of production and distribution. Formerly, men manufactured their own gear and used physical energy to propel their craft. As they started depending on imported inputs they began to rely on savings accumulated over a period of time supplemented by advances from kinsmen to start their fishing ventures. With the introduction of mechanisation leading to the need for outboard motors, bigger canoes and nets, the initial capital investment went beyond the saving capacity of the fishermen. This was aggravated by high maintenance and fuel costs. Apart from initial help given to fishermen by way of credit to encourage them to use the outboard motor, the financial institutions have not kept pace with the fishermen's need for cash to run their business. The fishermen have therefore had to rely on their business partners and associates, the one group which has a vested interest in their venture – the women fish handlers and processors.

Through this, women have crossed the role demarcation line and are now actively involved in fish production as financiers and sometimes as owners of the means of production. Actually women's involvement in production predates mechanisation. In the Anlo area, the seat of beach seine fishing in Ghana, the purchase of the first beach seine net, Yevudor (European net), is credited to a Woe woman named Afedima, a wealthy daughter of a prominent local man Anatsi (Nukunya 1989). The fact that the beach seine was introduced to the Anlo coast between 1850 and 1860 shows the extent and dimension of the participation of the Ghanaian woman in the fishing industry (*ibid.*).

Migration

One of the integral features of the fishing industry in Ghana is migration. In keeping with the seasonal movement of fish, especially the sardinella from July to October, fishermen have developed a tendency to follow the fish to the locality which is experiencing its glut season at any particular time. Such movements last only for a season with the fishermen returning to base at the end of the season. Other types of migration continue over a number of seasons and lead to a semi-permanent or permanent change of residence with the possibility of partial or total integration into the host society. This type of migration is either internal within Ghana or external, taking the fishermen across national boundaries to other West African countries such as Liberia, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon.

The mode of organisation of the fishing industry and its resultant dependence by fishermen on their wives and kinswomen for the success of their business poses a problem for the individual fisherman whenever he decides to move from his own locality. He is faced with two options. Either he goes accompanied by his wife as business partner or associate or he finds someone else to play the role of, at least, the business partner; otherwise the economic motivation for the trip will be defeated. The ultimate decision taken by the fisherman depends on his final destination, the type of fishing he engages in and the proposed length of stay. For example, Ewe fishermen who travel in large companies on account of the labour needed to operate one beach seine net, always travel accompanied by women. They usually acquire a tract of land at the beach in their host community, build temporary structures, and live by themselves with their women processing their catch (*ibid.*).

On short term seasonal migrations, fishermen tend to rely on a local woman who acts as hostess, business associate, guarantor, and mother. She is the one who looks for accommodation for the fishermen when they first arrive, introduces them to the chief fisherman and sees to the payment of their 'beach drink' or fees. She advances them money or guarantees such advances for the purchase of fuel or repairs to fishing equipment. She is referred to as fishmother, *loonye* in Ga. In return the fishermen sell their catch to this local fishmother who renders account to them at the end of the fishing season or periodically as agreed upon. As the season extends to years, the fishermen are joined by their wives. They participate in the fish handling as processor and distributor without ousting the local fishmother. The wives realise that being foreigners, like their husbands, they need local support which is represented by the fishmother.

This role played by the fishmother in seasonal internal and external migration can also be found in extended external migration where migration takes place to an area where local women play an active role in the handling of fish. In some cases the women actually invite the fishermen, advance them money for the purchase or repair of fishing gear and work in partnership with them till the debt is paid. Examples of such a situation can be found in Togo and Benin.

From the above, it is clear that the migrant Ghanaian fisherman is sometimes caught between loyalty to his wife's business interests which are intricately interwoven with his own economic success and role as husband, and his own business security manifested in access to local credit and support represented by the local hostess or fishmother. The lot of the migrant Ghanaian woman, fish dealer or processor, is by no means simple or

straightforward. She is caught in a web of co-operation, competition, conflict and, sometimes, downright hostility from local women. Does she stay at home to avoid all these problems or does she migrate?

Causes of Migration

The major motive for migration among the female migrants interviewed in Cote d'Ivoire and the Republic of Benin is to join husbands. The success of the move leads to chain migration in which daughters, younger sisters, nieces and other relatives join the wife to help in processing, handling of the fish and other commercial activities which are labour intensive. Widowed, divorced and, occasionally, married women accompany or join male relatives.

Purely economic considerations are also found to be the motivation of some of the women. Like their male counterparts, these women migrate to accumulate capital for a particular venture, such as building or completing a house and to acquire a few consumption items like cloth, household utensils, toiletries, perfumes, etc. Some were pushed out by economic hardships at home aggravated by marriage problems, sickness or the death of a child. A group of female migrants who are operating independently outside any male control were found in Vridi III in Abidjan.

The above classification is not meant to suggest that wives are devoid of any economic motives in migration. The weak position of women in traditional inheritance of property and their virtual exclusion from joint ownership of property with their husbands make it imperative for them to try and seek their own economic security even as they help their husbands. They are expected by their extended families and society at home to acquire something for themselves and for the benefit of other members of the family or lineage.

The interplay of dependence and independence with varying emphasis on the women's roles as wives and mothers, business partners and associates, managers, employees and independent traders, provides a fascinating spectacle.

Wives and Mothers

As wives and mothers, the women's first responsibility is to their families. It is primarily as wives of the fishermen that they have left home. For most of them, the change in residential pattern alone is enough to emphasize this role. This however, varies with the ethnic origin of the women. For the Ga and Fante, marriage in their home-towns is duo-local (Hagan 1983). The wife lives with her female children and male children under ten years of age among her own male kin. All her cooking and commercial activities take place there. She sends her husband cooked meals and goes to sleep with him in his house, which he also shares with his male kin.

This residential arrangement gives the wife some freedom to organise her domestic and commercial activities. Among the Fante it is not unusual for a woman with married daughters to cook in bulk, dishing out the meals for her daughter's husbands from a central pot. In this situation, one person can do the cooking whilst the others tend to the processing of the fish or any other commercial activity. The residential pattern provides

a good setting for a family co-operative with varying degrees of formal and informal profit sharing commonly found among the Ga and Fante.

When the women move to join their migrant husbands they lose the labour provided by their kinsmen at home. They make up for this loss by keeping their daughters with them and sending for other female relations to join them. Among the migrant fishing communities, no female member of the community is too young to be part of the labour force. From the age of eight years or earlier, girls engage in fish processing, hawking or taking care of younger siblings. This has adversely affected female education.

The women also have to contend with the presence of their husbands in the home and the possibility of their knowing more than they should about their profits and other matters. They have developed techniques of avoiding the scrutiny of their husbands. It appears that migrant Ewe women do not have this problem of learning to live with their husbands since they are used to the same residential pattern in their home-towns.

Not all members of the fishing company travel with their wives. Wives of canoe owners and bosuns invariably migrate with their husbands. Other members either make their own decisions or are encouraged or invited by the company to migrate with their wives. In cases of polygyny, a man travels with his first wife or the wives take turns to go and stay with him.

In the artisanal fishing industry, the conjugal role of women is so intricately bound to their occupational role that it is quite difficult to distinguish between the two. As wives, the women act the varying roles of employees, business partners and associates and independent operators. Each role is determined by the type of fishing engaged in by their men, and circumstances in the locality of operation and the season.

Business Partners and Associates

In some Fante towns women may be their husbands' business partners. In this instance, the women either sell the fish in its fresh or processed state and then render accounts to the men in return for a share in the proceeds. This mode of operation is not common. A typical example of this was found with the Fante Tenga fishermen at Placondji and Akpakpa Dodome. As soon as a fisherman lands his catch, he hands over the fish to his wife. The wife carries the fish from the canoe and sells it without any interference or even the presence of the husband. The wife renders accounts to the husband when he goes home but she continues to keep her husband's money. She goes with him to the market to pay for inputs needed to repair damage to the nets. In this way the woman acts as sales manager, purchasing officer, accountant, banker, and wife. When questioned about this mode of operation the men at Akpakpa Dodome explained that they spend hours at sea leaving their unlocked palm-frond houses at the mercy of storms and intruders. It is therefore safer for them if the women keep the money, knowing how to protect it in the face of crisis. The younger men are against this mode of operation but are unable to change the tradition. The women also claim that they are protecting the men's interests by keeping their money which could easily be dissipated by them on drinks.

With such financial control in the hands of the women, their honesty is stretched to capacity. This is more so since Tenga, the type of fishing done by their husbands,

involves small quantities of fish. Unfortunately for them, they are not allowed by the local women to sell directly to the consumer and are also frustrated in engaging in other commercial activities. The women are therefore easily accused of misappropriating their husbands money. To avoid total dependence on their husbands' money and to be able to lay claim to some money they can call their own, the women have developed a marketing technique aimed at helping each other at Cotonou harbour (in Benin).

As soon as the wife of a fisherman unloads her husband's catch, the other women rush in to take some for themselves. After bargaining, they sell this fish to Benin fish dealers who in turn sell to the ultimate consumers. No loss is suffered in this kind of transaction. If the Benin woman offers less than the price agreed between the two migrant women, the seller goes back to get the consent of the original owner before sale. This is to ensure that she makes at least a little profit on the sale. By so doing, the women legitimize the personal profit they make on their husband's catch. To avoid possible trouble they try to hide any personal effects they buy from their husbands.

It was observed that the more common role in this category is that of business associates. This is a continuation of the role the women are used to playing at home. This was observed among the Fante women of Vridi III and Grand Bassam in Côte d'Ivoire, and the Ewe women of Port Bouet and Cotonou. In this instance, the women, mainly wives and relatives, buy the fish from the fishermen and sell it fresh or in a processed form. The profit made by the women is their own money. In Ghana, fishermen do not give their wives daily, weekly, or monthly chop money but give them some capital to trade with. They also give them what is known as 'eating fish,' *yeli loo* in Ga, when they return from fishing trips. It is out of the profits accrued from a woman's enterprise that she is supposed to cater for the needs of her husband and children (Hagan 1983). In the migrant situation, wives receive regular chop money from their husbands but this is normally inadequate for the needs of the family. The women therefore supplement the chop money given by their husbands with their profits from their business. When the fishing business is going through hard times, the men depend entirely on their wives for support since whenever possible, they engage in other commercial activities such as food processing and the sale of cooked food, provisions and alcohol.

Where catches are small, co-operation in business is essential for success. The fisherman must make enough to maintain his gear to continue fishing and maintain the family as far as possible; and the wife must also make enough to maintain the family and, occasionally, act as a source of credit for the husband. Above all, both categories must make enough to take home to make the whole migration venture worthwhile. This is to be observed in the distribution of fish and the bargaining. In the distribution of fish to the women, the maxim, as stated by Mr Defeamekpor, the leader of the Ewe migrant fishermen in Port Bouet, is, 'Everybody must eat.' Even after the bargain has been struck, if the women make a loss on the sale at the market they always come back to plead with the fishermen for a reduction in price. In the bargaining for the fish with the fishermen, the women usually look up to the wife of the boat owner as a natural leader. She performs a balancing act between the interests of the women (including herself) and those of her husband. In cases where local women join migrant women in buying fish from the fishermen, the migrant women get rebates privately in their homes after the transaction, when they ask for them and the fishermen think their demand is reasonable.

Credit facilities given to the women enable them to get as much fish as they can cope with from the men when the catch is good and there is no competition from the local women. The women of the Ewe town of Kedzi developed a very lucrative network with the migrant Ewe fishermen in the republics of Benin and Togo. They used to go round purchasing fish from the different companies. They smoked the fish and transported it to Keta, which was then a very important market centre, for sale. They either kept the money for the companies or gave them to relatives as directed. They also acted as purchasing agents for the fishermen, buying materials for repairing their nets on the return journey. The Fante women also used to export fish from Grand Bassam for sale at the Fante market of Mankessim in Ghana.

In the relationship between the migrant fishermen and their women-folk, the key word is adaptation. Women are therefore found to be playing yet another role in the fishing business. They can be described as employees, shareholders and agents.

Employees, Shareholders and Agents

This multiple role was observed among the Ga-Adangbe migrant women. They appeared to be the most displaced in the fishing business. In Lomé and Cotonou, the local women use their financial power over their husbands' business to squeeze them out. The local women act as fish-mothers for the migrant Ga-Adangbe fishermen. Some of the fishermen came as a result of being invited by these local fish-mothers who give them loans to purchase part of their gear. The fishermen repay the loan in kind by handing over a part of their catch to the fish-mothers. As strangers and debtors, the fishermen are at the mercy of these local fish-mothers. Their wives are not entitled to any of the catch. To provide their wives with a small income, the fishermen employ them as porters to carry the fish from the canoes to the point of sale on the beach. Payment is made with fish at the discretion of the fishermen. This gives them a chance to be generous to their wives when possible.

In Abidjan, the Ga-Adangbe migrant women are prevented from dealing in fish not by local fish-mothers, but by the mode of operation and local taste. Here, the sale of fish is by auction held by men and it is purchased mainly by men. There is also a special market for male retailers of fresh fish. Women who sell fresh fish usually buy it from the men after they have bought it at the auction. Only those who have access to the market are able to buy. These are mainly Nzima women who can easily claim to be Ivorians because of the national border which cuts through their territory making some Ghanaians and some Ivorians. Unfortunately for the Ga-Adangbe women, the type of fish caught by their husbands, mainly sea bream and grouper, is preferred fresh by the Ivorians and the large expatriate community, so they cannot even smoke it.

Fortunately for this group, the type of fishing, long distance hand-lining, done by their men has given them other opportunities. The men are away five to ten days at a stretch and when they come home they stay for only two or three days. They need the services of women to cook and wash their clothes for them. Two to four women, usually the wife of the bosun and the wives of two or three hard-working men of the crew are incorporated into the company to provide these services. These, together with the men of the company, are considered shareholders or employees. At the end of the accounting

season, they are given a share of the profits, but they do not receive the same amount as the men. The women are grouped together and given the equivalent of a single man's share or pay.

This, however, is not their only source of income. They also act as chandlers for the fishermen. This is reckoned as their private business so they are given loans for it. They purchase the food for the men's fishing trip and are paid when the fishermen return from the trip. They take turns in doing this with the fishermen giving extra money when paying the bills, as a sign of appreciation, when the food requirements have been met. Some of the women also supply the canoes with engine oil. Besides all these activities, the women use the spare time they have when their husbands are away for their own business, mainly the sale of cooked foods. It is not surprising that these women appear to indulge in conspicuous spending beside having completed or being in the process of building houses in their home towns.

Independent or Free-Lance Operators

This group of independent operators was observed in Vridi III. It consists of Ga-Adangbe women whose presence in Abidjan does not depend on marriage or blood relation with any man in the fishing business. They are mainly between the ages of 20-30, usually unmarried, separated or divorced. They work in companies of three to six consisting of relatives or friends. They have neither ovens, adequate capital nor supply of fish, so they hire ovens from male Moshie fish smokers who have left the business to sell petrol. These women buy fish from Fante fishermen whose wives cannot take the whole catch, left-over herring bait from hand-line fishermen, or, from fish-fryers, fish which has become too fermented for use. They occasionally buy fish from the harbour, but the expenses involved are too much for their meagre capital, rendering the whole venture unprofitable. When they cannot get fish they hire their services to the Fante fish smokers. The service of migrant Ghanaian women to the fishing business or community also takes other forms which can be described as support services.

Support Services

A group of migrant Ghanaian women work in the market at Abidjan as fish dressers. Having observed that Ivoirian ladies do not like dressing fish, they offer their services in dressing their fish purchases for a fee. Migrant Ghanaian women also operate as food vendors, hawkers, dressmakers and hair-dressers for the fishing community, other Ghanaian migrants and Ivorians. Women traders also act as couriers taking back home from the host countries provisions and personal effects belonging to the migrants. They also help them in the transfer of currency by using the fishermen's money to buy goods and paying for them at home in cedis, the Ghanaian currency. By so doing, the traders have a source of credit and the fishermen have their money transferred so that they do not have to worry too much when they are compelled to leave their host country under hostile circumstances. This relationship is beneficial to both traders and the migrant fishing communities. Apart from the material services offered by women to the migrant fishermen, female spirit mediums and syncretic prophetesses follow the migrants with

their services. They sell herbs and other concoctions and perform rituals meant to give solutions to their health and other problems which are invariably linked with the spiritual.

Boat-Owners

Cutting across all the various roles mentioned above is the role of boat-owners, who can come from any group. What is needed is capital and the capital can be moved from one section to the other. Ghanaian women in the coastal communities have a philosophy that a woman should not be limited to one occupation. She should be able to move from one to the other or to take on two if possible. Migrant women who are not originally engaged in fishing sometimes use their profits from other ventures for investment in fishing. Migrant women were observed to own purse-seine (*watsa, sieve*), hand-lines and *ali* canoes and gear. These boat owners normally have a male relative who controls or supervises the actual operations.

Consequences of Migration

Both internal and external migration affect Ghanaian women in the fishing business individually and collectively. The congregation of migrants in locations based on family, ethnic and friendship ties, give the women also a chance to socialise. They form benevolent societies and local savings and credit unions known as 'Susu' groups which help them on occasions of illness, death and birth. This is essential for the women who have to live without the security and support of the extended family. The men appear to be sensitive to the vacuum created by the absence of the family and try to make up for it. One woman in Abidjan remarked: 'They have brought us here and are responsible for us. Our families are not here so they have to be our fathers and mothers.' On the other hand, marriages and liaisons contracted away from home are treated very casually and the women involved end up as losers.

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Fanti and Ewe Fishermen's Migration and Settlement in Côte d'Ivoire

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Dominance and strength of Ghanaian fishermen

The fishermen

In Côte d'Ivoire artisanal marine fisheries are at present largely dominated by fishermen from other countries, while the Ivoirians are only represented by a few Alladian handline crews established near Abidjan. Along the rest of the coast, maritime fishing is no longer carried out, except in certain villages on an occasional basis, or to supplement the diet. However, even if it is frequently considered that Côte d'Ivoire has no maritime tradition, and although the lagoons effectively formed a protected area more favourable for fishing, sea fishing itself would appear to be an ancient occupation in the case of the Alladian who were based south of the Ebrié lagoon. This allowed for early exchanges and underwent important developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. In addition, in the east and the centre of the country, the expansion of the plantation economy and the rapid growth of industrial fishing since 1950 have turned the coastal populations away from 'traditional' fishing on an individual basis. Meanwhile, the migration of youth to the towns, the inaccessibility of the western region well into the 1970s and the growth of the 'Kroumen phenomenon' (men embarking as crew on board European vessels) did nothing to develop fishing other than as a small-scale means of subsistence.

Therefore, amongst the some 10,000 small-scale fishermen working on the Ivoirian coastline in 1989, 8,000 to 9,000 were of Ghanaian origin, especially Fante and Ewe, the others being mainly Liberian or Senegalese.¹ The Fante fishermen, from the central part of the Ghanaian coast, are presently settled all along Côte d'Ivoire. Their expansion, which began at the beginning of the twentieth century on several different sites along the coast, is distinguished by their great ability to adapt to ecological and/or economic conditions, both in terms of the privileged sites chosen and the techniques used.

The Ewe fishermen (Anlo/awlan)² from the east of Ghana (more rarely from Togo) have mainly settled in the Abidjan area since the 1930s. Their settling in Côte d'Ivoire is characterized by a certain stability in their place of settlement and in their fishing strategies (see Table 1).

The Fante and the Ewe are the two main groups of Ghanaian origin. A community of Ga line-fishermen from the Accra area has also settled in Abidjan since the 1970s. As for the Nanakrou, organized in small units of 1 or 2 line fishermen from Liberia, and

The evolution of Ghanaian artisanal fisheries in Côte d'Ivoire

Periods	General characteristics	1st phase: beginning XX cent.- 1970	2nd phase: 1950 - 1970	3rd phase: since 1970
Fante fishermen	First Ghanaian fishing settlements in various points along the Ivorian shore.	Establishment of camps in the coastal ports, main axis being Gd Bassam. Abidjan. Exportation of fish towards Ghana.	Geographical and numerical reduction, abandonment of the Abidjan area. Focus of settlements-west in SW C.I. (Sassandra).	Stagnation of industrial fisheries production. Rapid increase of frozen fish import. New impetus for the artisanal fisheries and that of the Fante in particular.
Ewe fishermen	Establishment of a settlement in Port Bouët which extends eastwards, small settlements in Tabou and Gd Lahou. Various types of beach seines (yewudi): <i>kpalipâdo</i> of <i>fufolo</i> for mackerels, <i>deido</i> for sardinella, <i>abadiô</i> for anchovies. Also sardinella drift net (<i>ali</i>). Non-motorized canoes.	Use of encircling sardinella gillnets (<i>adi</i>) from motorized canoes; use of setnets (<i>tenga</i>), also from non-motorized canoes.	The fishing units try to prevail but with great financial losses while fishermen quit for jobs in the port. The Ewe women from Port-Bouët Bassam take over the trade of sardinellas landed in the port.	C. 1950: BEGINNING OF INDUSTRIAL FISHERIES
			Use of beach seine (Yewudi) (the <i>kpalipâdo</i> tending to disappear) from non-motorized canoes.	C. 1970: BEGINNING OF FROZEN FISH IMPORTS

C. 1970: BEGINNING OF FROZEN FISH IMPORTS

Ca. 1950: BEGINNING OF INDUSTRIAL FISHERIES

C. 1970: BEGINNING OF FROZEN FISH IMPORTS

Tendency of amalgamation of the *yewudi* and the *abadiô* seines, the others having disappeared, still non-motorized canoes. Adoption of the *wassa* purse seine from large, motorized canoes - limited to the Vridi settlement.

the Senegalese line fishermen using big motorised canoes, these groups are settled to the west of Côte d'Ivoire.

Production

Official statistics on small-scale sea fishing generally estimate the production at 15,000 to 20,000 t a year for the 1980s, that is less than a quarter of the total national production.³ However, other estimates take this amount to more than 30,000 t a year for 1984-1985, thus comparing favourably to the tonnage landed by the industrial fleet based in the port of Abidjan (Ecotin et al. 1990). The vitality of the small-scale sector is also shown by the noticeable development (during the last ten to fifteen years) of fishing camps in the Abidjan area (near the port) where fishing Ghanaian units came to compete with the industrial sardine fishery by providing a cheaper and better quality produce (Guingueno 1986) into the market.

Whereas in the early stages (between 1950 and 1960) the rapid development of industrial fishing may have caused a crisis for the artisanal fisheries, the latter have undergone remarkable expansion since the 1970s, while industrial production has tended to stagnate, even to diminish, and the import of frozen fish has greatly increased.⁴

Organisation of Fante and Ewe fishermen: Migratory Structures in Côte d'Ivoire

Fishing Camp: Establishment Structures⁵

The Ghanaian fishermen's campsites, presently located all along the Ivoirian coast, make up the backbone of migration movements: they form a series of permanent reception centres around which seasonal movements and migrations as such⁶ between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, and along the Ivoirian coastline, are organized.

Retracing the history of these camps exposes the fishermen's migrations, not as a straight-forward phenomenon only motivated by the search for fish, but as an expansion movement. Multipolar from the start, it is marked by advances and retreats related to ecological conditions and to the evolution of commercial outlets.

Fante and Ewe fishing camps are of different composition, the two groups having followed different patterns of expansion. It is also rare to find Fante and Ewe fishermen in the same camp, and in the few cases this occurs (e.g. Vridi), they form two different communities, each having their own chief, organisation, etc.

Fante camps are made up of clusters of fishing units whose numbers vary from one site to another depending on the time of the year. The permanent campsite structure is ensured by a nucleus of practically sedentary fishermen, some of whom perform prominent roles, such as headman and head fisherman. Although each camp practices numerous techniques, some specialisation according to type of production does occur in camps within the same area. For instance, Sassandra is an important centre for landing sardinella, while nearby Drewin is reputed for its rock lobster production.

Among the Ewe, to the contrary, technical specialisation according to campsite is very clear. In the Vridi camp near Abidjan the units use purse seines while the other camps specialise in beach seining. In the latter case, because of the contiguity of teams along the coast, every unit tends to form an autonomous entity. However, a certain

coherence is ensured in each sector by the presence of a headman, who is at the same time judge in internal matters and community representative in external matters. Despite the wide sphere of influence his authority does not extend to the economic domain as it does among the Fante.

Fishing units⁷

A survey carried out in August and September 1989 on the Alladian coast (Ewe fishermen using beach seines) and at Sassandra (Fante), coupled with various interviews with camp headmen and craft owners, allows us to understand certain socio-economic characteristics of the units.

Generally, the boats belong to a sole owner and rarely to a group of owners. This is usually a man of Ghanaian origin, more rarely a woman or an Ivoirian.⁸ The team is recruited in Ghana for a specific length of time, at the end of which the sharing of profits takes place back home after making accounts of expenses and earnings. However, the fishermen are sometimes recruited on the spot, in which case the earnings are shared out on a daily (in fish) weekly or monthly (in cash) basis. Married fishermen are accompanied by their wives while bachelors travel alone or with a 'sister' (real or otherwise). Although not truly a part of the unit, these women have an important role to fulfil in the smoking and selling of the fish. Usually the women buy the fish from the fishermen but only pay for it after it has been sold at the market, the profit made on the sale being theirs to pocket (any loss also being their responsibility). Thus each unit is associated with a group of women who sell the produce.

The surveys also highlighted certain existing differences between Fante and Ewe units. Ewe units use the same gear all year round. Beach seine units are large groups of about thirty men, 'the sons of the net' (*edovio*), recruited in Ghana on a 5 year contract. These groups are characterised by the need to preserve the capital invested, combining a collective management of expenses with a share system which favours the owner (sharing into four shares being the most common) on the one hand; and on the other hand by their longevity which sometimes spans successive generations through patrilineal inheritance. The Ewe owners also form a close-knit group with those who have been 'successful' at the centre: those who have managed to put together several nets and are therefore at the head of several fishing units.

The nets used by the Fante units are of several types. In addition, the units using purse seines often have secondary gear at their disposal for seasonal use. The teams are made up of 3 to 15 fishermen according to the gear used. Both the ways in which the teams are put together and the share systems appear to vary. A contract is not necessarily signed upon recruitment and usually extends to no more than 2 or 3 years. In the case of purse seines units in Sassandra for example, the most frequently used system of sharing gives 3 shares to each input (canoe, motor, net) and one share to each fisherman. The running costs (fuel and everyday net maintenance) are charged to the units while repairs, replacements and investments are solely the owner's responsibility (however, the latter may borrow from the communal account). Generally speaking, such units sell their catches not only to the fishermen's wives, but also to other women with whom they do business in order to have access to cash whenever needed. In the case of the smaller

fishing units using set nets, relations of production are more linked to domestic relations (father – son and husband – wife) or to associations.

Besides, if at present most of the units are run on the basis of single ownership, in the early 1960s collective ownership was very frequent (cf. de Surgy). Lastly, the longevity of a fishing unit appeared shorter and the concentration of the means of production by one person appeared less frequent and less important than among Ewe fishermen.

Migration factors

In most cases the fishing units presently found in Sassandra and especially on the Alladian coast were created in Côte d'Ivoire, even though the owners primarily came with units created in Ghana. This however does not imply that ties are broken with the native country or that periodical or definitive movements back do not take place.

Within the teams, operating principles imply periodical splits leading to the return of the fishermen-crew members to their native country. However, the teams are frequently centred on a core of permanent fishermen, often members of the owner's family, particularly among the Ewe. In addition, on-the-spot recruitment as practiced by some headmen and possible debts contracted with the owner are factors contributing to prolonged stays for the 'employees.'

The migrations and settlements of the fishing units tend to follow that of their owners. In this respect the Ewe units using beach seines are characterised by their permanence in Côte d'Ivoire in a limited area, even though certain owners invest in nets back home as they grow old (so as to eventually return to Ghana) or they maintain shares in 'family' nets operating in Ghana.

Although quite large cores of more or less sedentary Fante owners can be found in nearly all camps, mobility remains an important element in the operation of Fante units. It essentially occurs between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, and along the Ivoirian coastline. These temporary or seasonal moves can be motivated by the abundance of fish, but also by the prospect of better prices and the search for cash;⁹ they can also provide the opportunity to buy cheaper equipment. In addition, a number of Fante owners might have chosen a policy of spatial risk spreading by having a boat operating in Côte d'Ivoire and another one in Ghana.

Settling in Côte d'Ivoire may have been preceded by earlier migrations to other countries, especially to Benin for the Ewe and Liberia for the Fante. I have not been able, however, to pinpoint definitive departures from Côte d'Ivoire.

The Role Played by Fante and Ewe Fishermen in Côte d'Ivoire: Nomads or Settlers?

Relationships between the Ghanaian Fishermen and the Ivoirians

Relationships between the fishermen and the Ivoirians, whether authorities or village people, are certainly complex. The nomadic nature of the Ghanaian fishermen makes them an uncontrollable and suspect population, but one cannot ignore the important impact of this same population on the economic life along the coast, directly through its fishing activities and indirectly, by the financial resources it represents and the parallel

activities it sustains. The Ghanaian fishermen amplify this economic role, but each individual knows his situation is precarious (the Ewe still recall the expulsion measures against them in 1958 and more recently Ghanaian fishermen's homes were destroyed on the Aby lagoon).

If mutual exchanges between communities are distant and distrustful, individual relationships can exist with respect to mutual favours rendered (for example, fish supply made easier in return for tolerance of certain deals).

Ivoirian politics are also complex with regard to maritime fisheries, especially to the role given to fishery centres created in the west of the country. One of their main preoccupations is supposed to encourage the native population in taking up fishing so that the country's natural resources do not enrich foreigners.¹⁰ Another aspect of their activities has been the creation of cooperative groups (Groupements à Vocation Coopérative – GVC), through which fishermen have had access to loans from Ivoirian banks and to tax-free petrol. However, the enforcement of these measures has been problematic, having to come to terms with the internal organisation in the camps while adhering to a desire to modernise small-scale fishing but also to encircle and control it.

As for the spreading of fishing techniques, the Ghanaian fishermen have had little or no lasting effect on the Ivoirians; not that attempts have not been made to adopt Ghanaian techniques. The authorities even supported these efforts which they saw as a means of modernisation, but they ended up in failure.

In the case of villages of the Alladian coast which attempted to adopt the beach seines in the 1950s and 1960s,¹¹ it would appear that failure was due to sociological problems rather than a technical incapacity or a lack of know-how. These attempts appear as an achievement of the new social relationships brought about by the development of plantation agriculture. Their failure seems to stem from the fact that net owners (often important planters, chiefs or village headmen) could not pin down the village workforce they hoped to mobilise by using their hierarchical position in the lineage (the young people refused to be 'proletarised' in this manner).

Reasons Behind Migration

Generally the fishermen explain their presence in Côte d'Ivoire by their taste for travel or the need to leave their families behind in order to make some savings; reasons noted by A. de Surgy some 25 years ago. However, these explicit personal motives appear insufficient in accounting for the complexity of the expansion process of Ghanaian fishermen in Côte d'Ivoire.

As already shown, Ewe and Fante migrations are inspired by different dynamics. For Ewe owners along the Alladian coast (beach seining), migration leads to real establishment. This has allowed the setting-up of a network of hierarchical relationships which tie the group up and in which the possession and accumulation of capital is translated in terms of social power through increased prestige. Organised in large units where the relations of production are based on kinship models, they appear to follow a 'Big Man' type of logic where the concern is the preservation of social relations rather than strict economic gains.

With regard to the Fante, migration appears to have been inspired originally by the desire to find funding sources in Ghana, outside the 'traditional' circuits, through the

creation of collectively owned units which later made possible the local emergence of a group of owners. The migratory forms underwent some modification, but the search of and for profitability and gain than appears stronger among the Ewe group. This is expressed by the greater mobility of Fante units and more diversified fishing activities. Organised in small fishing units conceived basically as working teams, the Fante appear to follow the logic of the small businessman concerned primarily with minimising risks. Thus, in as much as it is not linear, the expansion of the Ghanaian fishermen in the Côte d'Ivoire is neither uniform nor univocal.

However, if their presence in Côte d'Ivoire appears to be the result of the above phenomena, the fishermen nevertheless maintain firm ties with Ghana. They have houses built and invest in nets and plantations. They also portray a true migrant spirit in declaring themselves prepared to travel to other countries should the presently strained situation in Côte d'Ivoire deteriorate.

Notes

* Translated from French.

1. According to figures produced by the CRO in Abidjan (J. Konan) based on lists established by CRO agents in the east and centre of the country and those of Centre de Pêche in the west. Unfortunately the total figures do not specify the distribution of fishermen according to ethnicity and origins.

2. The term 'Awlan' used in Côte d'Ivoire for these fishermen is a very derogatory one (Awlan is particularly associated with human sacrifice). This probably explains why the fishermen of this group established in the Côte d'Ivoire prefer to call themselves Ewe. By assimilation they are also called Beninois or Popo, having been accepted by people of that origin (as in Tabou) or having previously migrated to Benin themselves.

3. Although estimations concerning the volume unloaded per type of production vary, one may retain those established by J.Y. Weigel for 1984 in order to give an idea of the relative importance of different fishing types within national production:

Industrial fishing	31,960 tons	Lagoon fishing	12,500 tons
Small-scale fisheries	18,000 tons	River and lake fishing	16,000 tons

4. These imports rose to the record figure of 140,000 tons in 1989, representing FCFA 20 billion (Direction des Pêches, Abidjan).

5. The Ghanaian settlements are generally located on the outskirts of towns and native villages. Although the houses are mostly flimsy structures, they are permanent. The fishermen have their own authoritative structure (with a chief and notables), but each is dependant on the town or village that has allowed him to settle there and which more often than not deducts taxes or fees for this privilege. These characteristics lead us to consider these settlements as camps rather than villages or quarters.

6. Distinction made by Jorion (1988).

7. The fishing unit as portrayed here is made up of technical assets belonging to one or more owners and of a team (which may or may not include the owners). Each element may evolve or change. Both a working unit and a management unit, it is also the scene and expression of certain social relationships and

as such may last a long time, beyond going to sea and beyond the accounting exercise taking place between two rounds of recruitment and sharing.

8. Without neglecting the role played by these factors in financing fishing activities, especially that of the Ghanaian women. The participation of external fish traders in the financing of equipment is limited, mainly to specialised fishing units pursuing high value species (for instance lobster fishing in Drewin), and is found mainly in urban centres.

9. Although a group of women usually comes along with the teams moving in to settle, Fante crews migrating on a temporary basis usually go by themselves; they then have to give their production to women they have no regular relations with and who are not in association with the team. The fish is then bought cash, with no discount.

10. This idea is clearly displayed in certain articles published in the daily national 'Fraternité Matin,' one of which is significantly entitled 'Fishing in the south-west: a lucrative activity slipping away from the native population.' It had an insert saying: 'Encourage the young to fish' (19.09.1989).

11. Generally these villages first tried to adopt the sardinella surrounding net, but the growth of industrial sardine fishing forced the Alladian to abandon this type of net.

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Book Reviews

APOSTLE, Richard & Gene BARRETT (Eds.) *Emptying their Nets: Small Capital and Rural Industrialization in the Nova Scotia Fishing Industry*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. xix + 396 pages, notes, bibliography, diagrams, maps. ISBN 0-8020-5894-9 (cloth), ISBN 0-8020-6831-6 (paper). \$65 cloth; \$ 24.95 paper.

This book is a report of a six year project which started as a collaborative investigation of the endurance of small fishing and fish processing enterprises in Nova Scotia. The group used various methods including surveys of captains, processing plant workers, and managers; financial analysis; historical inquiry; and participant observation and historical case studies. From its comprehensive theoretical overview and introduction to its detailed tables and case studies and final conclusions, the book achieves its goal admirably with unanticipated coherence and continuity given the number of contributors and the diversity of their topics and approaches.

The central puzzle of the work is to understand why small capital has not disappeared and to account for its resilience in the face of large capital and government policy. The authors identify three views on this phenomenon associated with three time periods: industrial dualism in the 1960s; dependency theory in the 1970s; and differentiation theory in the 1980s. Recommending an empirical approach, they suggest that 'sacred doctrines' 'be assessed in an open-minded fashion' (p. 12) and see no antipathy between dependency and differentiation approaches.

Neoclassical and Marxist dualists alike argued that large capital was dynamic and progressive, the center of change and growth while the traditional backward sector would inevitably wither away. In the face of the historical tenacity, unanticipated survival, and resurgence of small enterprises in recent times, dependency theorists argued that large capital used increasingly sophisticated transportation, information, and communication technologies to lower wage costs and increase labor flexibility by decentralizing and dis-integrating. This argument holds that while there are necessary affiliations between small and large capital, the relationships are unequal and exploitative though the earlier view of small enterprises as archaic or pre-capitalist persisted. Theorists of differentiation have held that capitalist production is composed of interconnected heterogeneous forms designed to insure regularized predictable flows of raw materials and markets. Small firms are flexible and adaptable to changing conditions by making quick decisions to use inexpensive and flexible technology with a willing labor force. Apostle and G. Barrett conclude this section with a discussion of the distinctive characteristics of fisheries enterprises.

In the next two chapters G. Barrett discusses the pre and post World War II history of the Nova Scotia fisheries. In the fourth chapter Apostle, G. Barrett, Davis, and Kasdan use surveys of managers to describe small, middle and large fish plants. While small plants confirm to the dependency picture of close association with large capital for inputs and outputs, competitive or middle sized plants illustrate differentiation with a diverse structure of supply and flexible production structure for multi-dimensional and seasonal harvesting. In the fifth chapter K.J. Barrett uses accounting methods to describe the financial characteristics of the three kinds of firms to conclude that all are similar in their high levels of risk, poor structures of capital, excess capacity, and variable operating returns. Small plants are variable from year to year with great excess capacity; middle sized plants have better capital levels with long term debts but manage production costs least well and have lowest profits; large plants have the worst capital positions and poorest cash flow and highest administrative expenses, disadvantages offset by their greater production efficiency which offsets higher costs to make them the second most profitable.

Apostle, G. Barrett, and Mazany discuss relations between processors and dealers in the northeastern part of the United States in chapter 6. In chapter 7 Apostle and G. Barrett discuss the variable relationships among different kinds of fishermen and processors. In chapter 8 Davis and Kasdan provide a local history and in chapter 9 Willett presents a community level description. Apostle and G. Barrett move chapter 10 to a more general level with a discussion of labor in the whole area. In chapter 11, Giasson gives us another local history and description. Chapter 12 moves again to a more general level when Apostle and G. Barrett discuss social and economic connections among plants, fishermen, and workers. Barber moves to the local arena again for a discussion of household budgeting in historical perspective. In chapter 14 Apostle and G. Barrett show how economic processes divide groups and fragment their political efforts and how differentiation among capital and producers provides a basis for a right-wing populist ideology of free enterprise and suspicion of government, corporations, and unions. An unattributed conclusion reviews positions and wisely abstains from offering 'a blueprint for resolving the confusion and conflicts that characterize the industry' (p. 321).

There are two areas of traditional concern in anthropology that are little noted in economics or sociology: the economic importance of 'informal' social and cultural relations such as kinship, gender, and friendship; and the dynamics of household economies. Since anthropologists have dealt with such issues, there is a body of useful and relevant theory and empirical findings, though no one person or even group can cover all extant theoretical and empirical possibilities with any degree of coherence and clarity.

The authors are attentive to the construction of gender and its importance. Throughout the book the various authors point out issues of gender and patriarchy and paternalism. These attitudes and predispositions at the same time facilitate smoother labor relations but also make for gender conflict in other settings.

The authors attend to other social relations as well. The book concludes that 'the ties between small capital and the communities in which it is situated frequently provide social and economic advantages that are overlooked in any narrow assessment of economic viability of small enterprises. Kinship ties, paternalism, and community networks are not easily or neatly incorporated into standard research designs, but studies that ignore these concerns will result in poor social science and even worse social policy' (p. 321). Recalling diverse research designs and reports of empirical work and theoretical reflection in the field of economic anthropology that elucidate this point, anthropologists will not find it problematic. Indeed, such factors are routinely incorporated into anthropological research design, as the case studies in this book show well, though such practice may be alien to economists and policy makers. The point deserves emphasis both because of its importance to anthropology and because of its practical importance to understanding fisheries. It is about time that researchers begin to take such factors into account as central rather than peripheral dimensions of the phenomena under study and incorporate them in standard research designs, whether this can be done neatly or not. This project is to be applauded for its progress in this direction and for recognizing and highlighting the conceptual and methodological issues.

Another conclusion is that 'many small businesses are family undertakings, and connections between kin structures and economic activities should be a central concern for future research. Family involvement gives small capital a flexibility that is not sufficiently understood and alters basic assumptions about rationality in economic behavior.' Again, most anthropologists will find in this conclusion an echo of Chayanov's conclusions about peasant economies and will recall debates and theoretical as well as empirical work that bears on the topic and may even provide a sufficient understanding of many of its aspects (see Durrenberger 1984). Here, the conceptual problem is to break out of traditional assumptions received from economists, an endeavor to which anthropologists are accustomed. But the authors are certainly right to emphasize this point because this is one job that remains to be done especially with regard to fisheries and the theoretical task of integrating the understanding of household economics with

ideologies, practice, and political/economic systems is a central issue in anthropology (Durrenberger and Tannenbaum 1992).

Though the book is ambitious in its scope it lives up to the initial aspirations by skilfully integrating critical theoretical thinking with detailed qualitative and quantitative data over a wide area, time, and range of occupations to characterize a fishery, explain its form, and describe how it got that way. This project has gone a long way to move the study of fishing beyond the boats and to take account of the larger economic, regional, and historical structures that anthropologists all too often ignore. These are the lessons anthropologists can profitably take from this book. In short, this group has made excellent use of abstract critical thought to elucidate the details of local empirical observations and has shown once again that Canadian social scientists are leading the way in the description and analysis of complex modern fisheries.

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KALLAND, Arne & Brian MOERAN *Japanese Whaling. End of an Era*. Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, Monograph Series No. 61. London: Curzon Press, 1992. 228 pp., notes, appendices, references, index.

This book is a polemic in defence of a characteristically Japanese activity, whaling, which, although it never provided for the livelihood of any more than a small minority, still provided a significant part of the diet of almost the whole population of Japan. I write deliberately in the past tense. When I was last in Japan, in the late autumn of 1991, I visited Taiji, the whaling port where Kalland and Moeran finished writing their book, and its time was past. Everywhere in Japan, whenever I asked for whale meat in local markets I was treated as almost hopelessly naive. Only in Kii-Katsuura, just along the coast from Taiji, did I succeed in my quest, but only in a souvenir shop for tourists, which displayed small, and expensive, cellophane wrapped packets, labelled simply 'kujira,' or whale. And yet Japanese of my generation grew up eating whale meat, which less than fifty years ago supplied 47 per cent of their requirements for animal protein (p. 90). The drastic decline of Japan's whaling economy can hardly be explained by a change in the consumption demands of the Japanese public. True the booming consumer economy of recent times has led to a change in tastes: the fact that beef, and other red meat, are now consumed on an unprecedented scale may certainly mean that whale is hardly missed, but it is equally true that many Japanese would gladly eat whale meat – a part of their diet for more than a thousand years – if it were available. It is not, and that is why Kalland and Moeran's book is essentially a work of historical anthropology: as such it presents not only the traditional whaling communities, but also a remarkable insight into Japanese culture and social organization at local level. The whales '...as gifts from deities, ... have to be fully utilized, for to do otherwise would be an insult to both deities and whales' (p. 152). The decline and fall of the whaling communities is inevitably tied up with urbanization. 'Farmers may believe in the inherent value of rice,

and young city people in salvation through McDonald's hamburgers, but whalers have whale meat. That is what sets them apart' (p. 156).

Why, then, has the Japanese government not defended the interests of whalers with the same dedication as it has those of the country's rice farmers? In terms of pure *realpolitik* it is a question of numbers. Where millions grow rice, only thousands ever hunted whales, at least in modern times. But the real answer is to be found in international pressure by *soi-disant* environmentalists, who have succeeded in having the public adopt the whale as a sort of totem for their cause (p. 6). The success of this campaign can be judged by looking at Plate 18, which displays the front page of London's *Daily Star* for Saturday, May 11, 1991. The first two sentences of the article should win a prize for tendentiousness: 'RAW whale meat was on the menu at a sickening dinner for Japanese VIPs. Hundreds of MPs and other guests tucked into the disgusting delicacy to protest at the worldwide ban on whaling.' The Daily Star describes itself as 'THE PAPER FOR WINNERS,' and the battle against the Japanese whalers had certainly been won by 1991. Since the 1985-86 season all commercial whaling has been banned by the International Whaling Commission. The fact that the real sufferers are not well-fed Japanese VIPs, but working men deprived of a traditional livelihood, is obviously too subtle to be grasped by the readers of the Daily Star. Equally to the point is the fact that the whales have not won either. Not one of the species taken by the Japanese in recent times is in danger (p. 5). Kalland and Moeran have shown themselves not only to be first class anthropologists, but have also written a book of great integrity: the world needs to be reminded that Japanese can also be the victims of injustice. Unfortunately the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies has not got the clout of the Daily Star. All the more reason, then, why anyone concerned for the truth should read this book.

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RAM, Kalpana *Mukkuvar Women, Gender, Hegemony and Capitalist Transformation in a South Indian Fishing Community*. North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991. Asian Studies Association of Australia, Women in Asia Publication Series, 145 pp., ISBN 1 86373 137 7 and 1 86373 014 (paper).

The point is often made that women in fishing communities perform important social and economic tasks, and that their undeniable financial power and relative autonomy from men in daily life gives them considerable presence in land-based activities. During the long absences of men at sea, it is the women who shoulder much of the responsibility for the day-to-day continuity of family life and who maintain crucial social and economic relations. At the same time however, women the world over are excluded from the actual fishing activities, particularly at sea, and this makes for their being dispossessed from the main productive resources in the community. Dispossession is, however, not a simple negative exercise of power, but is compensated by other forms of empowerment in the domestic sphere, which is also the central focus of women's identity. This seemingly paradoxical situation, in which women negotiate their relative autonomy with their necessary subservience to the interests of the fishing men and their dependency on their income, represents a major departure from mainstream feminist theory, which has viewed women's status as being mainly associated to their productive roles. In her fascinating account of the lives of the women of the Mukkuvar fishing community of Tamil Nadu (South India), Kalpana Ram addresses the complex ways in which women try to resolve the conflicting cultural values that result from the unusual sexual division of labour that is typical of the fisheries. She hereby achieves a rare synthesis between the different strands of anthropological theory, and in particular between economy and

symbolic anthropology, and shows how symbolic meanings are subtly and constantly being contested and redefined in day-to-day practice.

The dominant perspectives of fisheries studies have concentrated on the sea-based male act of fishing and have hereby systematically excluded women. Though the past few years have witnessed a modest, but growing interest for women of the fishing communities, the relation between maritime anthropology and gender studies remains an uneasy one. A recent World Bank study on research needs in artisanal fisheries, for instance, merely lists the need for research on women's roles along with highly specialized male-centered topics, without disclosing why this type of research is not only long overdue, but essential to understand the wider setting in which the transformation of fishing economies is taking place.

The modest literature on women's roles has mainly been concerned with modern fisheries in temperate waters, while very little has as yet been written on women in the artisanal fishing communities of the South, which are now undergoing major transformations. Kalpana Ram's book therefore represents a major contribution towards understanding the processes at hand and in particular how they affect the lives of those concerned. Her study is particularly important in that it seeks to trace the transformation of artisanal fisheries within the world economic order and how the ideology of gender is deconstructed and reconstructed in the process.

Ram's analysis is a clear pointer that the workings of fishing economies and the way their culture is constructed, cannot be understood unless the complementary, land-based roles of women are also taken into account. Addressing a fundamental issue such as the escalating level of dowries, she links it to the heightened investments required by motorized fishing and the displacement of labour brought about by the commercialization of fishing. With the emphasis shifting away from the jewellery component of dowry towards cash, which is used to finance male ventures in gear, shares in motorized boats and overseas trips in search of employment, the meaning of dowry is radically being altered. The implications are ambiguous, not only for women, but for the welfare of the entire family. The cash remittances that men, as part-owners or labourers in motorized fishing or as overseas workers, hand over to the women, do not compensate for their loss of financial control, which was largely based on their ability to raise credit by pledging jewellery. In this way women witness the erosion of the subsistence economy which provided them and their children with a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the men, and bear the brunt of the costs associated with the formation of a male labour force for motorized fishing. The wage work many women now undertake does not compensate, in Ram's view, for the loss of domestic autonomy. On the contrary, it is often undertaken in competition with men, and therefore lacks the aura of legitimacy which allowed women to significantly expand their radius of action beyond the immediate confines of the house. Contrary to what western modernization theories have been assuming, women in wage work, though often significantly expanding the geographical radius of their activities, have indeed also witnessed a concomitant shrinking of the culturally legitimate female domain. An important reason is that the type of work that women generally undertake is experienced as extremely demeaning, particularly because it forces them to interact and compete with unrelated men. In an effort to counter the loss of status implied by this forced interaction, women seek to replicate in the way they organize their work the safety provided by the domestic sphere, and this, in the end, ties them more firmly than ever to the four walls of the home. However, in her effort to generalize, Ram fails to visualize that one of the effects of the transformation of women's roles is also undeniably a more marked social and economic differentiation. In the light of the rising dowries, one may start questioning whether the dispossession of women from the means of production is indeed a valid proposition for all women, and in particular for those belonging to the wealthier fishing households. Conversely, the fact that motorisation dispossesses also men, and reduces them to a de facto wage labour force, may also shed another light on the significance of wage work for the autonomy of the poorer women.

Mukkuvar women is exciting reading, though its readability is somewhat lessened by the apparently random sequence of the chapters and the lack of a more general chapter that would have been of great help to the reader unfamiliar with the ethnography of South India. Essential information on Dravidian caste and kinship systems is now scattered over the various chapters, and this makes the book less readily accessible to the wider readership. This notwithstanding, Kalpana Ram's is a sophisticated and thorough study, which is as yet unique in its kind. It contains a wealth of data, ideas and insights that are highly inspiring to anyone working on allied themes. Particularly to maritime anthropologists the book is recommended reading.

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TANAKA, Masakazu *Patrons, Devotees and Goddesses. Ritual and Power among the Tamil Fishermen of Sri Lanka*. Kyoto: Kyoto University (Institute for Research in Humanities), 1991. xvii + 228 pp.

Until now most of the case-studies published on Sri Lankan fishing communities have focused on the economic and social aspects of these societies (e.g. Alexander 1982, Bavinck 1984, Stirrat, 1988). The present book under review, which takes religion as its central theme, is a welcome extension to the existing literature. In 1982-'83 the Japanese anthropologist Tanaka carried out fieldwork in Cattiyur, a Sri Lankan fishing village with a predominantly Hindu population. During his stay he analysed two important Hindu festivals, the Bhadrakali festival and the Draupadi goddess festival, focussing on the political dimension of these festivals. As he himself formulates it: 'This book is designed to present the relationship between religion and power by focussing on two dimensions of meaning, personal and cosmological, in Hindu rituals, and their political function to legitimate the power structure in the village' (p. 19).

Cattiyur is situated about seventy-five miles north of Colombo. 97,1% of the Hindu inhabitants belong to the Karaiyar caste. The population is heavily dependant on fishing with beach-seine fishing being the dominant fishing technique.

The main festivals are sponsored by two kinds of patrons; the Karaiyar caste as a whole, represented by the Cattiyur Hindu Temple Administrative Committee, and individual, rich net-owners.

The Bhadrakali festival, held for ten days, is a non-Brahmanical festival. Bhadrakali is an ambivalent goddess. On the one hand she is the Mother Goddess, the guardian of the village, at the other she is conceived of as fierce and dangerous. She is able to possess villagers as she is closely associated with epidemics. During the festivals Bhadrakali is symbolically transformed from a fierce and dangerous goddess in a benevolent one. The climax of the festival is the slaughter of a goat on the tenth day. The goat can be understood as representing the evil in Bhadrakali herself. The killing of the animal then means the victory of Bhadrakali over her own evil aspects. Thereafter she is no longer dangerous but benevolent and protective. The festival ends with worship, the patrons getting the first sacred offerings from the priest.

The Draupadi goddess festival, which lasts twenty days, is a typical Brahmanical festival. It is based on the life of Draupadi – who changes from a suffering woman into a victorious queen – as told in the Mahabharata epic. Draupadi is less fierce than other village goddesses and she is considered to be pure. From the first day onwards various rituals are performed of which the abhiseka is of a special importance. Abhiseka is a consecration ritual designed to generate divine power. It is sponsored by a patron who is

infused with divine power during the ritual and transformed into a sacred figure. The climax of the festival is the fire walking on the eighteenth day. Participants walk across the fire in trance for purification and union with the goddess.

The political function of both festivals, in Tanaka's analysis, is to legitimate the political structure of the village, the politico-economic domination of the wealthy sector, and to affirm the social order. While the political function is less apparent in the Bhadrakālī festival – the patrons are singled out as a group just at the end of the festival – it is much more explicit in the Draupādī goddess festival. The abhiseka ritual gives the opportunity to wealthy men, who are able to meet the expenses of the whole ritual, to legitimate their position by turning their economic power into sacred power.

In his book Tanaka gives a detailed description of the two festivals and a very interesting interpretation of the symbolical meaning of the various rites and processions which take place. By paying attention to the cosmological meaning – 'the narrative basis (mythes, episodes, symbolism) on which the festivals are structured' (p.18) – and the personal meaning, as well as to the political function of the festivals he presents a complex analysis indicating that rituals work in various respects.

Some criticism, however, can be levelled, especially against his analysis of the political dimension of the festivals. He criticizes structural-functionalism for picturing a society as being harmonious and in equilibrium, ignoring social differentiation and conflict. As a result – and here he cites Bloch – structural-functionalism '...account(s) little for the dynamism of reality, replete with social and ideological conflict, and...[has] great difficulty in explaining social change' (p. 14). But he does not really seem to be able to transcend this paradigm himself. He does indeed account for social differentiation in the community but sees it as legitimated by religion. In this way one gets the impression of a, no doubt, unequal society, but still harmonious with every member accepting this inequality. And so the criticism he expresses on structural-functionalism can as well be applied to his own analysis; i.e. difficulties in explaining social change (festivals affirm the existing order) and difficulties in taking the existence of social conflict in a community into consideration (the function of the festivals is to legitimize the power structure of the village, to make members accept the inequality; in this way he actually negates the existence of social conflict or at least bypasses it in his analysis).

Another problem of his analysis is the gap which exists between the political function of the festivals and what actually was happening in the political arena of the village. According to Tanaka the political function of the festivals is to affirm the given social order and power structure. On page 51, however, we learn that, apparently, there have been changes in the power structure. Before 1980 the rich net-owners dominated the Hindu Temple Administrative Committee, the most important political institution for inter village affairs. Thereafter it was – like the Cattiyur UNP branch – taken over by educated, not yet rich but politically very active young villagers. In 1984, after Tanaka had left the village, the net-owners resumed their domination. Unfortunately Tanaka pays no attention to the relationship between these changes and the political function of the festivals. As a consequence the reader is left with questions like: what is the importance of the political function of the festivals, to what extent are they able to influence the actual developments in the political arena; e.g. is the political dimension of these festivals of minor importance to the outcome of the political structure compared with other forces; or should one interpret this dimension as being so influential that it helped to suppress the aspirations of the political youngsters who lacked this kind of legitimization? Answers to such questions – which would require including the political system in the analysis, thus demonstrating the actual political impact of rituals on society – would imply a fuller understanding of the political function of rituals.

In spite of these criticisms the book offers a very interesting interpretation of the symbolical dimension of the two festivals. Altogether, it represents a useful contribution to the literature on rituals and Hinduism in maritime communities.

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Video Review

Trap Fishing. 1991. 1/2" VHS videotape (US\$10.00). 30 minutes. Produced by Terra TV, with funding from the New York State Sea Grant Extension Program; video by Rameshwar Das. Available from Robert J. Kent, New York Sea Grant Extension Program, Cornell University Laboratory, 39 Sound Avenue, Riverhead NY 11901-1017 (Fax: 1-516-369-5944).

Work is Our Joy: The Story of the Columbia River Gillnetters. 1989. 1/2" VHS videotape (US\$25.00 + \$3 Shipping & Handling). 32 minutes. Oregon State University Extension Sea Grant (OSU Seafoods Laboratory, 250 36th St., Astoria, Oregon 97103) and the Columbia River Maritime Museum, Astoria, Oregon.

The Water Talks to Me. 1989. 1/2" (US\$110) or 3/4" (US\$175) VHS videotape; rentals available. 29 minutes. Produced and edited by Nancy Cohen; Diverse Productions, P.O. Box 519, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA 02238.

The three videos I review are all situated in the United States, about one-half hour long, and suitable for classroom use. And one way or the other they all celebrate commercial fishing as a way of making a living. From that point they diverge. *Trap Fishing* is about baymen of New York who fish with stationary traps; *Work is Our Joy* features river fishermen of Oregon and Washington state who fish with gill-nets; and *The Water Talks to Me* shows offshore fishermen of Massachusetts who fish with otter trawls. The first two were produced in conjunction with state Sea Grant Extension programs (roughly comparable to agricultural extension); they are somewhat less 'professional' and much less costly than the third. And the second two are ethnographic while the first is technical. I review each in turn.

Trap Fishing is a no-nonsense account of how to make and use one fishing technique, the ocean trap or pound-net. It features two Long Island, New York, baymen, Tom Lester and Brad Lowen, uncle and nephew, who briefly celebrate their families' long tradition in fishing, back to the 1600s, before getting to the business at hand. Lowen does all of the narration in the video; Lester quietly does his share of the work.

The traps featured are very large (up to 700 feet from one end to the other) stationary structures made of poles driven into the bottom of the bay, from which are hung nets. They form a complex made up of a long leader coming out from the shore, which migrating fish strike as they move along shore; and heart shaped funnels or 'wings' that direct the fishes' efforts to escape the net seaward into the final destination, a large net 'box' where the fish are trapped and remain until removed by the fishermen. The general idea is found worldwide where fish migrate; here it developed into gigantic traps with the invention of net-making machinery in the mid-19th century. The traps or pound-nets were widely used along the eastern coast of the United States until the 1940s or 1950s but are now found only in small pockets such as eastern Long Island, eastern New Jersey, and parts of Maryland and Virginia.

At different seasons of the year, Brad Lowen – and of course Rameshwar Das, the video maker – shows the work involved in cutting, painting, and installing stakes for the traps. The video mostly features Brad talking and showing what is happening around him, with some switches to footage showing the traps in actual use. We learn the technical details, e.g. why the stakes are cut in the winter months, why the paint includes copper oxide, how the stake holes are drilled in the bottom of the bay, what 'dirty' nets

are and how to take care of them, the dangers of storms, voracious bluefish, and nets overloaded with crabs, the types of fish caught at different seasons, and so forth. We are also reminded that this is a commercial operation, 'what we do for a living.' Happily, the video was made when the bay fish were more abundant than in the previous five years, and so Brad Lowen is upbeat. He also expresses the familiar job satisfaction theme: why fish? Yes, it's a lot of work, time, but 'it's fun!...It's almost like a Christmas present every day...; you see things that you don't normally see, you do thing that few people do....and it's just something that I really enjoy.'

The video is clearly and properly educational about the technology of trap fishing. It does not pretend to do anything more, and as such preserves some of the cultural dignity of working fishermen. The device of a sustained interview with a fisherman works very well to provide a sense of authority and authenticity. Who else knows so much about technology? The device also gives the sense of an extended field trip with a class. In teaching, the video could be usefully combined with Peter Matthiessen's book *Men's Lives: The Surfers and Baymen of the South Fork* (1986, New York, Random House), about the fishermen of eastern Long Island.

The Columbia is one of the great rivers of the American Pacific Northwest region; it comes out to the sea between the states of Oregon and Washington, and every year it attracts salmon that move upriver to spawn (or try to, against the challenge of dams and diversions). Indians depended on and mastered the technique of fishing for Columbia River salmon. In the 1850s white men from New England brought their gill-netting technique to the task. *Work is Our Joy* focuses on what followed, the rise of the commercial salmon fishery on the river. This is an engrossing record of immigrant experience, of Finns, Swedes, Norwegians, Yugoslavs and others who brought knowledge and commitment to the sea. It is a study of technology and culture: the boats and gear of gill-netting on the Columbia River and the meaning of the work to the men and women involved in it.

The video, which is superbly written by Irene Martin, is based on oral history interviews with 16 men and women who were involved in this fishery in the past. The title comes from one of these men, who recalled a family saying: 'Beginning is always difficult; work is our joy; and industry always overcomes bad luck.' At the end the theme of joy appears again, in a discussion of gill-netting as being 'in the blood' and dependent more on the experience and love for the work that comes from being 'born into it' than on teaching: 'I think it's probably a matter of receiving joy in what you're doing. There are some people who just fish, and others who *love* to fish.'

The theme is communicated by the voices and messages of those interviewed and through old and recent photography of these people, the river, boats, people mending and making nets, great catches of salmon, the headlines of old newspapers, and more. The joy and love of fishing are underscored by a musical sound track that is exceptionally well-designed for an educational documentary; it includes original guitar, electronic, violin and banjo-mandolin music. The electronic music manages to evoke the squeaking sounds of boats moored at the dock. A banjo-mandolin sequence of 'Santa Lucia' backs up one of the old-timer's memories of a night during the August fishing season, at the mouth of the Columbia River, when someone on 'the Mediterranean side' (the boats gathered and worked along ethnic lines) began playing this tune on a violin, and suddenly everyone else on the river was quiet.

Particularly intriguing is discussion of the development of 'snag unions,' or groups of fishermen who pooled resources to hire divers to remove snags such as logs (or other debris, including one 16-ton steam engine) from the drifts, or grounds used by gill-netters using 'diver' rather than 'floater' nets (the difference and technology are clearly explained). Through the work and investment in clearing drifts of snags, union members claimed heritable and saleable fishing rights, 'drift rights.' These became legitimate rights, and the basis for controlling access and reducing costly conflict. Another local-level communal effort at regulating the fishery shown in this video is the development of a system of drawing lots for

rights to fish the drift, rather than having to quickly run back up to the end of the line to wait one's turn, and spend hours just waiting. Yet another, one of the informal but very effective ways the rules were enforced, is also shown: the practice of 'corking,' or laying out nets to cut off fish from the nets of offenders (or other enemies).

The critical role of women in the fishery is presented unobtrusively but well, including an interview with Georgia Maki, who makes her living knotting and mending nets for other fishermen, shots of women working with men, and discussion of the movement of the entire family to the mouth of the river for the August salmon run and the importance of support of women and children to the fishermen. The video also dwells on the critical late-19th century phase of organizing fishermen, on the one hand, and canneries or packers on the other, including the formation of a fishermen's union to both help clear snags from estuaries and negotiate for prices, a violent strike, an attempt to form a cooperative cannery, and the formation of a combine of packers.

The video is one of the best I have seen on the history and ethnology of a fishery. I would have liked more information, such as on the fate of the cooperative and the aftermath of the formation of the Columbia River Packers' Association, which is only suggested in interviews with people who fished for this combine. There is also only a hint of the contemporary situation on the Columbia River: near the end, a radio station is heard announcing brief seasonal openings and other restrictions, but hardly enough for the viewer to understand that hardly any commercial gill-net fishing now takes place on the Columbia River because of bitterly fought contests between Indians, sports anglers, different kinds of commercial fishermen, and behind this all, the public utilities that run dams and divert irrigation water. Using this video for teaching would require filling in this kind of information, but I am sure that the video-makers – Irene Martin, the writer, Lawrence Johnson, the producer and photographer, and advisors such as the anthropologists Courtland Smith, Kent Martin (also, and first and foremost, a gill-netter), and Bent Thygesen – would be happy to suggest appropriate readings.

Finally, when I first showed this video-tape neither members of my graduate class nor myself noticed until near the end the fact that the filming is entirely based on still-shots: old and new photographs. The video is so skillfully produced that when a snapshot of an old man or woman appears with that person's voice, one imagines and almost sees that person move; at the end of the tape, one remembers what a drift-netting operation looked like even though all that was seen were still shots from different points in time. *Work is Our Joy* is not only an educational accomplishment but also an artistic one.

Nancy Cohen's documentary *The Water Talks to Me*, which was first broadcast on public television in the Boston area in 1989, is set in the fishing town of Gloucester, Massachusetts. It focuses on the lives of a father and son, Normie and David Borge, and David's wife Melissa and their children, at a critical period in the latter 1980s that is intended to reflect larger trends and problems. Normie, who was born and bred a Gloucester fisherman and worked most of his life on the boats, was convinced by his son David to buy an offshore trawler with him in 1984. Unfortunately, their venture coincided with a downturn in the New England groundfish (e.g. cod, haddock, flounder) fishery, and they are interviewed and followed to the fishing grounds just before they decide to sell their boat and then during its sale. At the end of the film, in 1988, the boat is sold, and we follow the men as they leave the boat for the last time. In the interim, we learn more about the fishery, its technology, and challenges to both families and resource managers through skillful footage and interviews with other fishermen and women and fishery professionals.

Both Normie and David are eloquent and revealing about their feelings and the challenges of fishing. Normie develops the familiar occupational theme of fishing as 'in my blood' but with the ambivalence that gives this film its dramatic tension: 'It's in my blood; I just can't get away from fishing. I love the ocean. The water's hitting [the dock, audibly on the film] now; it makes a noise to me, ... the water's

talking to me. You guys probably don't understand what I'm saying. I never want to move from Gloucester, I love Gloucester. But I'm just tired of fishing. The business has gone down so bad, it's just, it's hard.' Salvatore Favaloro, a retired fisherman who now sells nets and gear and provided a home movie of his boat and the work on board, restates the strong ambivalence about fishing for a living when he remembers never seeing his children, out to sea six months at a time, but then – with no evident transition – reflects that he hates working on shore 'with no windows, the ceiling falling down.' Salvatore offers a simple but unconvincing resolution: 'Every job has its drawback.'

The video vividly shows the situation affecting the Borges, and, by implication, others in Gloucester, through shots of a few buckets of mixed species in the bottom of the large hold of a dragger; a scene in which a young man comes in to bring his mother a sad looking codfish, saying fishing was poor, but there's enough to cook anyway; and several interviews comparing the catches of the past (abundant) to those of the present (meager).

According to the narrator and several people interviewed, the reason for the tragic situation of the Borges and others in Gloucester is very simple: overfishing. The fishermen reflect on the impact of modern depth-sounding, fish-finding, and navigational gear on fishing success and hence the fact that 'the poor fish hasn't got a chance.' Footage from a trip to the fishing grounds with the Borges shows the cod end of an otter trawl almost completely full – of dogfish, which in New England has been considered nearly worthless 'trash.' Not only is there less caught overall, but the composition of the catches has changed dramatically.

The film's thesis of overfishing is given authority by interviews with a government biologist (Richard Langton) and a government fishery manager (Guy Marchessault). Marchessault (then deputy director of the New England regional fishery management council) repeats the reigning dogma that has, nonetheless, not convinced the fishermen of New England: 'there has to be less caught for there to be significant stock rebuilding.' No one would deny the reality of over-fishing but there have also been environmental changes; moreover, the solution – catch less so there is more in the future – is not as sure a thing as many fishery managers would have it, given the poorly understood ecological events and processes of the sea. Given the predominance of dogfish (a small shark) and skates in New England waters, do codfish have a chance to rebound?

If the writing and narration of this compelling film can be faulted, it is for taking what Langton and Marchessault say too earnestly and also for not giving enough weight to what else is going on that makes life difficult for Gloucester's fisher families. Fortunately, the interviews and images give clues to other aspects of this situation so that the film is, overall, balanced. Most compelling and more revealing is the testimony of David's wife Melissa. She notes that when they started fishing in 1984, she went along with it on the understanding that fishing 3 days a week would be enough to meet the bills and support the family; however, with increased scarcity of the higher priced fish, they are now out for four or five days continuously. That is simply too much. Unlike the other woman featured in the film, Lena Novello (a founding member of the Gloucester Fishermen's Wives Association), Melissa did not come from a fishing family nor did she expect the man she married to fish; that came later. She finds it particularly hard to deal with the loneliness, uncertainty, and responsibility that seem to go with waiting for her husband to return from sea, and here and there, although subtly – until the very end, when it is said straight out – it appears that this is a major reason for selling the boat.

When depicting changes in the politics of international fisheries, including the 200 mile limit, the film notes the 1984 World Court ruling on the dispute between the U.S. and Canada over the fishing ground known as Georges Bank. It records the complaint of one of the New England fishermen that this is a disaster because the Canadians, who received less of the bank but more of the more productive area, are allegedly doing less than the Americans to protect the resource. Ironically, the Canadian government has

a far more restrictive management regime than the U.S. has on Georges Bank or anywhere else, so one could argue that they are doing more (if to not much greater effect, but this would return us to the issue of the reigning dogma). This is not mentioned, and an unfortunate effect is to make the film seem very political to anyone with experience outside of New England.

The Water Talks to Me also notes that the low price of fish and competition from Canadian fish in the market are problems perhaps as serious as that of fish scarcity. However, this information is heard very briefly. And neither the narrator nor those interviewed discuss the related issue of fish quality. However, the video brings up this issue visually, through footage of the Gloucester fishermen handling their fish. These scenes are extensive and eloquent in suggesting that a poor competitive position vis-a-vis Canada may not be due entirely to unfair trade practices. For example, watch the dockworkers sling cod around with sharp prongs (that bruise and invite infection to the flesh of the fish); it has been almost 20 years since prongs were allowed on the docks of eastern Canada. Also note the generally cavalier way that fish of all kinds are handled and the unkempt and unhygienic look of the vessels and docks, again in contrast with what can be seen today in Canada or Scandinavia, major competitors.

The video offers scenes that can be the springboard for further discussion in a sociology or anthropology class. Near the beginning of the film is a set of scenes from the annual Blessing of the Fleet in Gloucester, showing dignitaries from church and state as well as school children celebrating the fishery in a decades-old tradition worthy of analysis in itself (in the 'making of tradition' vein: why so much parading now, when the fishery is in so much trouble?). The narrator opines that the people in the film feel 'tied to the water...with a hope and faith that can only be explained by tradition,' a theme that is reinforced by several statements from Normie Borge about fishing 'in the blood' but that might call for further debate. There are two stories about danger and the miracle of survival at sea, one from Normie Borge and the other from Lena Novello. Normie Borge interprets his miraculous escapes from drowning as meaning 'the ocean don't want me,' a sign that he should continue fishing (as he makes plans to leave). Lena recalls the escape from near-drowning of her father and a large number of other close relatives back in the days when a boat coming in at half mast was a fearfully awaited and common sight; she recounts their story of seeing a vision of St. Rosalia, followed by a rescue boat. In addition, there are a few precious moments of Lena Novello at a public hearing on oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank, where she lets loose the wonderful rhetoric that has made a big difference in the politics of coastal conservation: '...When God created the world He gave us Georges Bank...' Finally, the interviews with Melissa Borge and Lena Novello are grist for the ethnological mill on families, culture, and occupational choice.

The Water Talks to Me is an excellent way to show a class what otter trawl fishing technology is like and to introduce students to questions concerning the sociology and anthropology of occupation, gender, and resource management. It is a very professional and beautiful production.

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Japanese Whaling: End of an Era?

Arne Kalland & Brian Moeran

1992, 228 pp, ISBN 0 7007 0244 X

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Byron, R.

1980 Skippers and Strategies: Leadership and Innovation in Shetland Fishing Crews.
Human Organization 39(3):227-32.

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1979 Marine Ecotypes in Preindustrial Sweden: A Comparative Discussion of Swedish Peasant Fisherman. In: R. Andersen (Ed.), *North Atlantic Maritime Cultures. Anthropological Essays on Changing Adaptations*. The Hague: Mouton. Pp. 83-109.

Taylor, Lawrence J.

1983 *Dutchmen on the Bay. The Ethnohistory of a Contractual Community*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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